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INTRODUCTION
When Congress enacted the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) in 1990, disability rights supporters hailed the law as a
radical shift in our nation's policy toward people with disabilities.
Ten years later, however, the statute's impact-at least in the
employment area-seems anything but radical. ADA plaintiffs are
among the least successful classes of litigants in the federal
courts-with a rate of (non)success that is second in futility only to
that of prisoner plaintiffs.' Although disability rights advocates
have won some important victories in the Supreme Court,2 both that
Court and the lower federal courts have issued a series of decisions
that significantly restrict statutory coverage.' And perhaps most
important, the ADA appears to have had no significant positive
effect on the rate of employment of people with disabilities.4
Why this gap between radical expectations and disappointing
results? Many disability rights advocates and academic defenders
of the ADA have a ready explanation: Employers, courts, and the
general public are engaged in a "backlash" against the ADA. Unlike
1. See Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 100 (1999) [hereinafter Colker, Windfall for Defendants] (finding
that defendants in ADA employment cases prevail at the trial level 93% of the time, and that,
when such cases reach the appellate courts, defendants prevail 84% of the time); Ruth Colker,
Winning and Losing under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 239, 248-57
(2001) (reviewing ADA employment discrimination decisions from the federal courts of
appeals and finding: (1) in 94% of these cases, the district court's judgment favored the
defendant; (2) in appeals brought by plaintiffs, the courts of appeals reversed only 12% of the
time; and (3) in appeals brought by defendants, the courts of appeals reversed in whole or in
part 60% of the time); Study Finds Employers Win Most ADA Title I Judicial and
Administrative Complaints, 22 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 403, 404 (1998)
(observing that ADA employment plaintiffs prevail 8% of the time).
2. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 690 (2001) (holding that PGA Tour
must waive its "walking rule" to permit a golfer with a disability to ride a cart in its
competitions); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999) (holding that the
ADA in certain circumstances requires states to provide services to individuals with
disabilities in community settings rather than in institutions); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S.
624, 641, 648 (1998) (holding that the ADA protects an individual with asymptomatic HIV
against a dentist's discriminatory refusal to provide her treatment, unless the dentist can
establish the existence of a "direct threat" to health or safety).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See infra notes 391-95 and accompanying text.
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964,' which was enacted ten years after the
Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,' and
after a series of highly salient events operated to change public
consciousness about the civil rights of African Americans,7 the ADA
was enacted before the disability rights movement had a full
opportunity to educate the public about the important principles
that underlay the new law.' As a result, employers and other
entities regulated by the ADA have resisted full compliance. And
courts, untutored in the basic principles of the disability rights
movement, have imposed their own retrograde views of the proper
response to disability on a statute that decisively rejects those
views.
In his important journalistic history of the disability rights
movement, published shortly after the ADA's passage, Joseph
Shapiro foreshadowed the "backlash" argument.9 A recent article by
Bonnie Tucker (coeditor of a major casebook 0 and coauthor of a
treatise 1 on disability discrimination law) gave the argument clear
expression:
The ADA was enacted ahead of its time, in that much of the
country is not yet ready to embrace the precepts on which the
ADA is premised. And the ADA has not yet succeeded in
requiring many people and entities to do what they do not wish
to do-for one primary reason: many, perhaps most, courts are
not enforcing the law, but instead are finding incredibly
inventive means of interpreting the ADA to achieve the opposite
result that the Act was intended to achieve. Judges are only
5. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. Examples include lunch counter sit-ins, the Freedom Rides, James Meredith's
admission to the University of Mississippi, the protests in Birmingham, Alabama, and the
March on Washington, to name a few.
8. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Socio.Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
476,488-89 (2000) (making this distinction).
9. See JOSEPH P. SHAPERO, No PITY: PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES FORGING A NEW CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 328 (1993).
10. RUTm COLKER & BONNIE PorrRAs TUCKER, THE LAW OF DISABIUTY DISCRIMINATION
(3d ed. 2000).
11. BONNIE P. TUCKER & BRUCE A. GOLDSTEIN, LEGAL RIGHTS OF PERSONS WITH
DISABILITs: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL LAW (Supp. 2001).
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people, generally people without disabilities, who are not yet
willing to change the rules of society to require themselves or
others to act as good Samaritans. Unless a law clearly and
emphatically states that people must act as good Samaritans,
most judges will not interpret that law to require such action.
The ADA appears to waffle on this point, and thus gives the
courts sufficient leeway to reject the real principles upon which
the Act was founded and to interpret the Act in a manner that
is in accord with the courts' own values or beliefs.12
Tucker is far from alone. In some sense, hers is the most common
view of disability rights advocates and academic supporters of the
ADA. 13
12. Bonnie P. Tucker, The ADA's Revolving Door: Inherent Flaws in the Civil Rights
Paradigm, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 335, 337-39 (2001).
13. See, e.g., Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000) [hereinafter Diller, Judicial Backlash] ("[Tihe
pattern of narrow and begrudging interpretations of the ADA derives from the fact that the
courts do not fully grasp, let alone accept, the statute's reliance on a civil rights model for
addressing problems that people with disabilities face in the workplace.*); Krieger, supra note
S, at 516 (noting that "the ADA's definition of disability has come under such powerful
narrowing pressure because people do not understand that the ADA is an anti-discrimination
statute rather than an entitlement program"); Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans
with Psychiatric Disabilities, Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 272-73 (2000) (stating that "[tihere is both a public and judicial
backlash against the Americans with Disabilities Act" and arguing that "[clourts appear to
share some of the stereotypes about mental illness that motivated the passage of the
Americans with Disabilities Act"); cf SUSAN STEFAN, HOLLOW PROMISES: EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST PEOPLE WITH MENTAL DISABILITIES 195 (2002) ("[The ADA's] specific
protections were established by Congress in the first instance, rather than being codified by
Congress from pre-existing court rulings as was the case with race and gender discrimination
law, and judges are therefore unfamiliar with concepts such as 'reasonable accommodation.");
Marta Russell, Backlash, the Political Economy, and Structural Exclusion, 21 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 335, 352 (2000) ("Whatever the reasons for this judicial backlash, courts are
clearly thwarting the congressional intent of the ADA by turning away disabled people who
seek judicial remedies."). In a recent book, Ruth O'Brien advocates an interesting variation
on this standard argument. In her view, recent decisions under the ADA reflect the continuing
influence of the "whole man theory" of rehabilitation developed by Howard Rusk, Henry
Kessler, and Mary Switzer in the late 1940s and the 1950s. See RUTH O'BRIEN, CRIPPLED
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE 137 (2001).
Although O'Brien adds an interesting layer of historical context to the standard "backlash"
story, I find her basic arguments to be dramatically undersupported. See Michael A. Stein,
Disability, Employment Policy, and the Supreme Court, 55 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2002) (critiquing
O'Brien's argument). For my purposes here, however, it should suffice to note that O'Brien,
like the other "backlash" advocates, fails to account for the role of the welfare reform
argument, pressed by the disability rights movement itself, in accounting for many of courts'
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In this Article, I challenge that view. I agree that in many cases
courts have read the ADA in a restrictive manner-unduly so, from
my perspective. But I do not agree with the assertion that the
courts, in reaching these restrictive decisions, "have not been
receptive to the principles upon which the ADA is premised." 4 Or
at least I believe the issue is much more complicated than is
typically acknowledged.
When critics of decisions interpreting the ADA speak of "the
principles upon which the [statute] is premised,"'5 they appear to
assume that those principles can be relatively uncontroversially
determined. In particular, they appear to assume that the statute
is premised on a particular conception of disability and the
appropriate societal response to it, a conception that draws on a
major strand of the thinking of disability rights advocates.
Roughly put, under that conception disability consists of the
quantum of disadvantage an individual experiences because of the
incompatibility between that individual's actual or perceived
physical or mental condition and the societal, institutions that
control access to an opportunity she desires. The appropriate
societal response to disability, in this view, is to rearrange the
institutions that control access to opportunities and make them
accessible to all individuals who are currently excluded by them.
Many of the restrictive decisions of the Supreme Court and lower
courts are in fact inconsistent with these principles. 16
But the claim that those principles constitute the "basic premises"
of the ADA is itself exceptionally problematic. While many of the
disability rights advocates who assisted in drafting and lobbying for
the statute shared the basic commitment to a social model of
disability and society's responsibility to alter its institutions to
make all opportunities accessible to all, those who urged passage of
the statute relied to a significant extent on a distinct argument that
rests in some tension with these premises. 7 In official reports, in
congressional hearings, on the floor of Congress, and in the popular
press, supporters of the proposed ADA argued that the statute was
most restrictive decisions under the ADA.
14. Tucker, supra note 12, at 383.
15. Id.
16. See infra Part I.
17. See infra Part II.
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necessary to reduce the high societal cost of dependency-that
people with disabilities were drawing public assistance instead of
working, and that a regime of "reasonable accommodations" could
move people with disabilities off of the public assistance rolls
and into the workforce in a way that would ultimately save the
nation money." This argument was asserted by individuals with
disabilities who urged passage of the ADA, by the bill's major
sponsors, and by President George H.W. Bush himself.19 In short,
the ADA was sold to a significant extent as a means of welfare
reform.2 °
If the "basic premise" of the ADA is seen as the imperative to
reduce the cost of dependency of people with disabilities, then many
of the restrictive decisions attacked by ADA supporters begin to
make sense. Roughly put, those decisions limit the statute's
protections to individuals who would be largely unable to work
without them, and they limit required accommodations to those
that are necessary to move those individuals into the workforce in
a reasonably cost-effective manner. In short, on at least one
plausible account of the statute's "basic premises," the restrictive
interpretations offered by many courts reflect a vindication rather
than a betrayal of those premises.
My point is not to endorse those restrictive decisions. I share
disability rights advocates' discomfort with most of them. Rather,
I seek to unearth the welfare reform basis for the ADA and
demonstrate its fundamental inadequacy as a guide to disability
employment policy. To the extent that the ADA has failed to achieve
the goals of bringing more people with disabilities into the work-
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra notes 200-56 and accompanying text.
20. In a recent book, published while this Article was undergoing the editorial process,
Thomas Burke makes the same point, using strikingly similar language: "Indeed, the ADA
was sold as a way to reduce governmental expenditures by getting people with disabilities off
welfare. For the Bush and Reagan officials, the ADA was a kind of welfare reform." THOMAS
F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS AND LEGAL RIGHTS: THE BATTLE OVER LITIGATION IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY 95 (2002). Burke, a political scientist, recognizes the importance of the welfare
reform argument to the passage of the ADA-a point largely overlooked in the legal literature.
But because his focus is on understanding why the ADA was enacted, he does not address the
connection between the welfare reform argument and the judicial "backlash" against the ADA,
nor does he discuss the limitations the welfare reform argument is likely to place on the
future ability of disability rights activists to achieve their goals. In this Article, I give great
attention to the latter two points.
20031 927
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force, that failure has as much to do with inherent flaws of the ADA
as with judges' refusal to accept the statute's basic premises.2' While
civil rights protections for people with disabilities are essential to
serve many purposes,22 they are not and cannot be the exclusive (or
even primary) means of assuring meaningful employment for the
maximum number of people with disabilities.
The issue remains an important one because, as I will demon-
strate below, disability rights advocates' reliance on welfare reform
arguments in lobbying for the ADA was not merely a tactical
decision that had some unfortunate effects. Those arguments drew
directly on a set of ideas, indigenous to the disability rights
movement, that proceed under the label of "independent living." The
individualistic, almost libertarian aspects of independent living
thinking served a crucial purpose both in obtaining wider public
support for the disability rights movement and in creating a
disability rights movement in the first place. As the restrictive
development of ADA case law makes clear, however, framing
disability rights arguments in terms of independent living comes at
a cost, for it may provide insufficient justification for the significant
government interventions necessary to increase the employment
rate of people with disabilities.
My argument proceeds as follows. In Part I, I set forth the
disability rights critique of the case law that has developed under
the ADA. I focus on three sets of cases: those involving the definition
of "disability;" those involving whether individuals who have
received public or private disability benefits may be deemed
"qualified" individuals; and those holding that employers need not
make "reasonable accommodations" to avoid stigmatizing employees
21. Both while I was a full-time practitioner and since I entered academia, I have been
counsel for plaintiffs or their amici in a number of significant disability rights cases. In
challenging the standard "backlash" story articulated by many disability rights activists, I
recognize that some may see me as giving aid and comfort to the enemy. But I believe, to the
contrary, that it is essential for those of us who sympathize with the disability rights
movement to be attentive to the contradictions and pitfalls inherent in the manner in which
disability rights claims have been framed, and to be open to new ways of framing those claims.
On the importance of subjecting to critique the practices and ideologies even of political
movements one supports,, see Wendy Brown & Janet Halley, Introduction to LEFT
LEGALISM/LEFr CRITIQUE 1, 27-28 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 2002).
22. I have previously defended the ADA as a response to group-based societal
subordination of people with disabilities. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma,
and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 452-66 (2000).
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with disabilities. After briefly describing the state of the case law in
each of these areas, I show how disability rights supporters and
academic defenders of the ADA have challenged the courts' decisions
as rejecting the basic premises of the ADA.
In Part II, I turn to the welfare reform argument for the ADA.
Examining the official reports that preceded the introduction of the
original ADA bill, the internal legislative history of the statute as
enacted, and contemporaneous news accounts, I show in Part II.A
that the imperative of avoiding costly dependency formed an
important (though hardly the exclusive) part of the public
justification for the statute. In Part II.B, I re-examine the case law
considered in Part I in light of that welfare reform justification for
the ADA and conclude that it fits the cases quite well.
In Part III, I attempt to trace the connections between the welfare
reform argument for the ADA and the goals of the independent
living movement. In so doing, I rely to a significant extent on work
by social scientists theorizing the issue-framing processes in which
social movements engage.23 As I explain in Part III.A, the notion
of "independence" promoted by leaders of the independent living
movement incorporated a strong degree of ambivalence toward
disability benefits programs and other forms of direct assistance to
people with disabilities. Although independent living centers and
other institutional manifestations of the independent living move-
ment have long provided individuals with disabilities assistance
in advocating for the benefits to which they are entitled, many of
the most prominent independent living activists have nonetheless
been quite hostile toward such programs. Indeed, the welfare
reform argument for disability discrimination law was first
articulated in the early 1980s by independent living activists who
23. After this Article was substantially completed, I had the opportunity to read Edward
Rubin's recent call for legal scholars to pay attention to the social movements literature. See
Edward L. Rubin, Passing Through the Door: Social Movement Literature and Legal
Scholarship, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001); see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling:
Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 419, 419 (2001) (*Law
professors have a lot to learn from sociologists and political scientists who have studied social
movements."). Although this Article may not have been precisely what Rubin had in mind, it
responds to a similar desire to integrate the social movements literature into legal analysis.
This Article is part of a broader project examining the politics of disability discrimination law.
For an earlier installment, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Americans with Disabilities Act as
Risk Regulation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1479 (2001).
2003] 929
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
saw antidiscrimination protections as an alternative to dependency-
inducing welfare programs.
Building on this foundation, I show in Part III.B that disability
rights activists' increasing reliance on the independent-living-
derived welfare reform argument was not simply a political accom-
modation to a climate of fiscal conservatism and civil rights
skepticism (though it was in part that). The increased reliance also
served an important internal purpose for the disability rights
movement in helping to create a cohesive collective identity of
people with disabilities. Finally, in Part III.C, I suggest that the
welfare reform approach that framed so much of the work of
disability rights activists in their efforts to secure adoption of the
ADA has imposed significant limitations on the ability of those
activists to achieve their goals.
I. THE CRITIQUE: BETRAYING THE PROMISES OF THE ADA?
In this Part, I set forth the basic elements of the common
critique of current ADA doctrine. The critique has focused on three
areas of the law: (1) the threshold definition of "disability" that
defines the class entitled to protection under the statute; (2) the
practice, seemingly rejected by the Supreme Court but resilient in
the lower courts, of deeming individuals who receive disability
benefits unqualified and hence unprotected by the ADA; and (3)
the interpretation of the statute's central mandate of "reasonable
accommodation." In each of these areas, ADA defenders have
charged the courts with disregarding the basic purposes of the
statute.
A. The Definition of "Disability"
Following the model of the Rehabilitation Act24 before it, the ADA
protects only those individuals who have a "disability." The statute
defines the term to include three conditions: (1) actual disability---"a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more
24. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000)).
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major life activities;"" (2) past disability--"a record of such an
impairment;" 28 and (3) perceived disability-"being regarded as
having such an impairment."27 Only if an individual has one of these
forms of "disability" is that individual protected against discrim-
ination or guaranteed reasonable accommodation by the ADA.
Many disability rights advocates believe that the threshold
"disability" inquiry should be treated as an essentially perfunctory
hurdle that courts should quickly jump over to reach the
"real" issues in an ADA case: Was the plaintiff "qualified?"2 Is the
plaintiffs requested accommodation "reasonable?"29 Such an
approach, they argue, is necessary if the ADA is to operate as a civil
rights statute. Under other civil rights laws, a plaintiffs case stands
or falls on her ability to do the job and the degree to which she can
establish that she was deprived of an opportunity to perform
because of the employer's discriminatory conduct. She need not
establish how black or female she is.30 So too here, these advocates
argue, ADA plaintiffs should not be forced to prove how disabled
they are before the court will turn to the key issues of qualification
and discrimination.31
25. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000).
26. Id. § 12102(2XB).
27. Id. § 12102(2)(C).
28. See id. § 12112(a) (protecting only "qualified individual[s] with a disability" against
discrimination).
29. See id. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination to include "not making reasonable
accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified
individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity").
30. Issues regarding the definition of"race' and of particular races arise at the margins
of various civil rights regimes--particularly affirmative action programs. For further
discussion, see MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAw 45-46 (1990); Luther Wright, Jr., Note, Who's Black, Who's White, and Who
Cares: Reconceptualizing the United States's Definition of Race and Racial Classifications, 48
VAND. L. REV. 513 (1995). But such issues-unlike the question of what is a "disability"-are
hardly central to the administration of antidiscrimination laws.
31. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., "Substantially Limited" Protection from Disability
Discrimination: The Special Treatment Model and Misconstructions of the Definition of
Disability, 42 VILL. L. REv. 409,568-72 (1997); Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the
"Regarded As" Prong: Giving Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 589, 609-12
(1997).
2003] 931
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The Supreme Court has decisively rejected that position, however.
In a series of cases-Sutton v. United Air Lines,32 Murphy v. United
Parcel Service,"3 Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,s4 and now Toyota
Motor Manufacturing v. Williams'--the Court has made clear that
it regards the threshold "disability" determination as an important
device for cabining the reach of the ADA. 6 The Court made the
point explicit in its unanimous decision in Toyota, which held
that a plaintiff can establish a substantial limitation in the major
life activity of "performing manual tasks" only by showing that
her impairment "prevents or severely restricts [her] from doing
activities that are of central importance to most people's daily
lives.""7 Reversing a lower court decision that held that the inability
to perform manual tasks associated with a single job was sufficient,
the Court emphasized that the terms "substantially limits" and
"major life activities ... need to be interpreted strictly to create a
demanding standard for qualifying as disabled.""8
The significant effects of the Court's narrow reading of the
disability definition are particularly evident in the three definition-
of-disability cases the Court decided in 1999. In Sutton, the Court
addressed the so-called "mitigating measures" issue. In determining
whether a plaintiff satisfies the ADA's "actual disability" prong, the
Court ruled, courts must determine whether the plaintiffs condition
substantially limits major life activities even after the application of
mitigating measures.39 Accordingly, to the extent that the plaintiff
was taking a medication or using a device that removed any sub-
stantial limitation imposed by her impairment (without imposing a
substantial limitation of its own), she would not be covered under
the ADA's actual disability prong.'
The Court applied this principle in Sutton to hold that twin
sisters with vision of 20/200 in one eye and 20/400 in the other were
32. 527 U.S. 471 (1999).
33. 527 U.S. 516 (1999).
34. 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
35. 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
36. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 495 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (discerning congressional
"intent to restrict the ADA's coverage to a confined, and historically disadvantaged, class").
37. Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198.
38. Id. at 691.
39. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-89.
40. See id. at 481-89.
932 [Vol. 44:921
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not substantially limited in the major life activity of seeing
because their vision improved to 20/20 in both eyes when they used
corrective lenses.4' In Murphy, the Court applied this principle to
uphold a lower court's ruling that an individual with severe
hypertension was not substantially limited in any major life activity
because his condition was currently controlled by medication.4 2 And
in Albertson's, the Court stated that the Ninth Circuit was "too
quick"41 to find that the plaintiff's monocular vision substantially
limited the major life activity of seeing because the lower court did
not take account of the way in which the plaintiffs brain adapted to
the condition."
In all of these cases, the employers denied opportunities to the
plaintiffs based on their physical impairments notwithstanding
the fact that the plaintiffs were able to control the effects of their
impairments through corrective measures.45 Yet in all of these
cases, the Court said that the plaintiffs' use of such corrective
measures could remove them from the protection of the ADA and
thus deprive them of the right to show that they were in fact
qualified for the positions at issue and that their employers acted on
the basis of prejudice or stereotypes. 8
Many academics and advocates have sharply criticized the Sutton
Court's holding that the "actual disability" inquiry must take
account of mitigating measures. They have argued that the Court's
ruling, which rejected specific statements in the legislative history
and in the interpretive guidance issued by. the EEOC,47 leaves
unprotected a large number of people with conditions that Congress
clearly intended to cover: epilepsy, diabetes, amputated limbs, and
severe hearing impairments, for example.'
41. Id. at 488-89.
42. Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521.
43. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 564.
44. Id. at 564-66.
45. See id. at 558-60; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 518-20; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 475-76.
46. See Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 564-66; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488-
89.
47. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480 (quoting EEOC and Department of Justice interpretive
guidance); id. at 499-501 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the House and Senate committee
reports to the bill).
48. See, e.g., Arlene Mayerson & Matthew Diller, The Supreme Court's Nearsighted View
of the ADA, in AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR
INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUYTIONS 124 (Leslie Pickering Francis & Anita Silvers eds., 2000);
20031 933
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But the critics have responded even more sharply to a different
aspect of Sutton and Murphy-the Court's restrictive interpretation
of the perceived disability prong of the statute's "disability"
definition. In both cases, even though the employers plainly believed
that the plaintiffs' physical conditions disqualified them from
performing the jobs at issue, the Court held that the perceived
disability prong was not satisfied because the employers did not
perceive those conditions as substantially limiting the plaintiffs'
ability to work generally.49 Thus, in Sutton the Court stated, "When
the major life activity under consideration is that of working, the
statutory phrase 'substantially limits' requires, at a minimum, that
plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class of jobs." °
"If jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but perhaps not his or
her unique talents) are available," the Court continued, "one is
not precluded from a substantial class of jobs."5 Applying that
standard, the Court held that the plaintiffs (airline pilots excluded
from flying global jets for United) were not (and were not "regarded
as") substantially limited in the major life activity of working
because "there [weire a number of other positions utilizing [their]
skills" available in the workforce generally. 2 And in Murphy, the
Court held that the employer's perception that the plaintiffs
hypertension disqualified him under federal law from driving a
commercial motor vehicle-a disqualification that would have ex-
cluded the plaintiff from literally millions ofjobs 3-was insufficient
to show a perceived substantial limitation in working because the
plaintiff (a mechanic) was still eligible to work in mechanic's jobs
that did not require commercial motor vehicle certification.5"
Critics have seen this aspect of Sutton and Murphy as confirming
and endorsing the trend in the lower courts to limit ADA protection
Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1279, 1299-1307 (2000); Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court's Definition of
Disability Under the ADA- A Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 325-26, 372-73
(2000). I have previously sought to defend the Court's mitigating-measures ruling-though
not necessarily the results in all three cases in the Sutton trilogy-against these challenges.
See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 495-503.
49. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 524-25; Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491-92.
50. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 491.
51. Id. at 492.
52. Id. at 493.
53. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 512.
54. See Murphy, 527 U.S. at 524-25.
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to a relatively small group of severely disadvantaged people, a group
the courts occasionally refer to as the "truly disabled."5 Although I
have not found any post-Sutton cases to use precisely that language,
the narrow interpretation of the disability definition reflected in
that term continues to prevail in the lower courts.56 Building on the
influential pre-Sutton critiques of the "truly disabled" idea by
Robert Burgdorf and Arlene Mayerson,5 7 commentators have urged
that the Court's narrow reading of the "disability" definition
"seriously undermine[s] the purposes and goals of the ADA."" To
put it more colorfully, "the Supreme Court has taken many people
with disabilities back to the dark ages, by permitting employers
and program administrators to discriminate against such indi-
viduals at will based on irrational stereotypes and prejudice." 9
These commentators decry the Court's implication that an employer
could defend an irrational refusal to hire an individual with a
disability "by indicating that the individual would be capable of
working at other jobs at other companies or in other fields.' °
If that implication is correct, they contend, the Court is simply
treating the ADA as a disability benefits program like Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) that provides redistributive
largesse to a disadvantaged class; it is not implementing the ADA's
55. See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931,934 (4th Cir. 1986). For an argument that the
decisions in the Sutton trilogy reflect an endorsement of the "truly disabled" cases, see Paula
E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in
Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POLY REV. 1, 3 (1999).
56. For a review of post-Sutton law in the lower courts, see O'BRIEN, supra note 13, at 210-
17. In its principal brief in Toyota, the employer argued extensively that the ADA's disability
definition should be read as covering only "the truly disabled," and that this limitation is
inherent in the Court's decisions in the Sutton trilogy. See Brief for Petitioner at 3, 10-11, 18,
29-30, Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (No. 00-1089). Although the
Court did not use that precise language, its statement that the ADA must "be interpreted
strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled," Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197,
will not dispel the influence of the"truly disabled" idea. For an early criticism of Toyota, along
the same lines as the academic criticisms of the Sutton trilogy, see Ruth O'Brien, The
Supreme Court's Catch-22, RAGGED EDGE, Nos. 2 & 3, at 13 (2002).
57. See Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 536-46; Mayerson, supra note 31, at 609 & n.99.
58. Tucker, supra note 48, at 370.
59. Id. at 373. For an equally harsh criticism of the Sutton trilogy, see Soifer, supra note
48, at 1299-1312.
60. Tucker, supra note 48, at 372; see also Mayerson & Diller, supra note 48, at 125
("Imagine this logic in any other area of civil rights and it does not pass even the laugh test.
'No we don't hire women, Jews (fill in the blank) but you can get a job somewhere else, so
what's the beef?'").
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civil rights focus on providing equal opportunity to all .6 ' As Matthew
Diller puts it, the implicit message "that rather than demanding
accommodations, the plaintiff should simply find a job where no
alteration of the workplace would be necessary" in the end "defeats
the goal of establishing equal access to the job market":
The focus on other jobs transmutes the ADA from an equal
access measure into a means of providing some threshold level
of access to the job market. It suggests that accommodation is
only required when it is necessary to enable the plaintiff to
remain in the work force-an objective that is very different
from that of equal opportunity.62
Encapsulating the views of these advocates, Linda Krieger argues
that the fundamental disconnect between the disability-benefits
orientation of decisions like Sutton and Murphy and the purported
civil rights focus of the ADA arises from the fact that judges and
members of the public "completely fail to understand the ADA's
anti-disparate treatment agenda. They do not understand that
the ADA, even with its redistributive reasonable accommodation
provisions, is an anti-discrimination statute, not a social welfare
benefits program like social security disability, which seeks to
provide a safety net for the non-working disabled."'
B. Judicial Estoppel Cases
1. The Basic Problem
Although the definition-of-disability cases have been the major
target of criticism, they have not been the only target. Academics
and disability rights advocates have also challenged a set of cases
61. See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 568.
62. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 29.
63. Krieger, supra note 8, at 516; see also Anita Silvers, The Unprotected: Constructing
Disability in the Context of Antidiscrimination Law, in AMmRcANs wITH DISABILITIES:
EXPLORING IMPLICATIONS OF THE LAW FOR INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS, supra note 48, at
126, 128 (arguing that the prevalence among people with disabilities of the view that "the
ADA was meant to sweep away social practice that arbitrarily relegates people to inferior
treatment or outcomes based on their being physically or mentally impaired" has created a
"feeling of disorientation" surrounding the Sutton trilogy).
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in which courts have held that an-individual's receipt of benefits
under the SSDI program (or other public and private disability
benefits programs) bars that individual from pursuing a remedy
under the ADA.64
These cases, which began arising almost as soon as the ADA
became effective, generally follow some variation on a standard
pattern: An individual with a job acquires a disability often, though
hardly always, because of a workplace injury. Soon thereafter, the
individual loses her job, allegedly because the employer has
discriminated on the basis of the individual's disability or failed to
provide accommodation for that disability. After being fired, the
individual files an application for benefits under SSDI.' To obtain
benefits under that program, an individual must establish that she
has a "disability.'
Unlike the ADA, the Social Security Act defines "disability"
generally in terms of the inability to work. Specifically, "disability"
under the SSDI program is the "inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months. 7 And the statute appears to
define "inability" quite restrictively:
An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only
if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but
cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired
if he applied for work."
64. See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 489-506, 575-80; Matthew Diller, Dissonant
Disability Policies: The Tensions Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Federal
Disability Benefits Programs, 76 TEx. L. REV. 1003, 1032-48, 1055-59 (1998) [hereinafter
Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies]; Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 30-31, 47-48.
65. See generally McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996) (reporting
facts similar to the general case described in the text).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 423(aXl) (2000).
67. Id. § 423(dX1XA).
68. Id. § 423(dX2XA).
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In the typical case, the individual's benefits application proceeds at
the same time as the individual sues under the ADA to obtain his
or her old job back, perhaps with an accommodation. To obtain relief
under the ADA, an individual must establish that he or she is
"qualified."9 The statute defines "qualified" as the condition of being
able to "perform the essential functions of the employment position
such individual holds or desires," even if only with a "reasonable
accommodation."
70
In cases like this, in which an individual simultaneously pursues
benefits under SSDI (or other public or private disability benefits
programs) and relief under the ADA, a significant inconsistency
may appear to exist between the two claims. How can an individual
possibly assert to a court that she is a "qualified individual with a
disability"7 '-that is, a person capable of performing the "essential
functions" 2 of her job-when she has already asserted, in sworn
declarations to the Social Security Administration, that her
disability has left her both "unable to do [her] previous work"7 3 and
unable to "engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy?"74 Based on this apparent
inconsistency, a number of lower courts have held that the assertion
on a disability benefits application of inability to work bars an
individual from proceeding on an ADA claim.75 Some of these courts
have reached this result through application of the doctrine of
judicial estoppel, under which a party who asserts a position in
a judicial proceeding and prevails is estopped from taking a
contrary position in a subsequent proceeding.76 Other courts have
reached this result by applying a strong, but formally rebuttable,
69. Id. § 12112(a).
70. Id. § 12111(8).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. § 423(dX2)(A).
74. Id.
75. Both Robert Burgdorf and Matthew Diller have canvassed extensively the lower-court
cases addressing this issue before the Supreme Court's decision in Cleveland v. Policy
Management Systems Corp., 526 U.S. 795 (1999). Rather than repeat that canvass, I will
simply describe the outlines of this problem and refer readers to their exhaustive footnotes.
See Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 489-506, 551-53; Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra
note 64, at 1032-48.
76. See, e.g., McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc., 91 F.3d 610, 616-20 (3d Cir. 1996).
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presumption that representations of disability on a benefits appli-
cation bar a showing that an individual is "qualified.""
The formal doctrinal basis that the courts have used to reach
these results is less important for present purposes than the results
themselves and the courts' obvious impatience and even indignation
with the actions of the plaintiffs.7" In the leading case of McNemar
v. Disney Store, Inc.,79 the Third Circuit held that an individual who
had applied for disability benefits was judicially estopped from
asserting in an ADA suit against his former employer that he was
a qualified individual with a disability.' McNemar, the plaintiff,
had HIV. 1 He asserted that his employer had fired him after
discovering his condition. 2 After he was fired on November 18,
1993, McNemar applied for and received federal and state disability
benefits. In his applications for those benefits, he stated that he had
been "unable to work because of [his] disabling condition" beginning
in October 1993, the date he was diagnosed with HIV.13 McNemar
also signed forms containing boilerplate statements that he was
"unable to work" and "unable to perform the duties of [his] regular
occupation" because of his disability."
These quite general statements are obviously reconcilable with
McNemar's assertion in his ADA suit that he was a "qualified"
individual: His HIV left him "unable to work," he might say,
precisely because of others' prejudiced reactions to that condition.
Denial of opportunities on the basis of such prejudiced reactions, of
course, is a major evil that disability discrimination law aims to
address."s But the Third Circuit would have none of it. McNemar,
the court suggested, "misrepresent[ed] important information";
77. See, e.g., Dush v. Appleton Elec. Co., 124 F.3d 957, 963 (8th Cir. 1997).
78. Examining these cases in detail, Matthew Diller has found little practical difference
between the two formulations. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at
1046-47.
79. 91 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996).
80. Id. at 616-19.
81. Id. at 613.
82. Id. McNemar was fired ten days after his manager asked him to confirm "rumors that
he had tested positive for HIV," id., and two days after he had been observed taking two
dollars from a company cash register to make a personal purchase. Id. at 613-14.
83. Id. at 615 n.2. McNemar applied for student loan deferment "on the basis that he was
'unable to work and earn money.' Id. at 616.
84. Id. at 615 n.4, 616 n.5.
85. See Sch. Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282-84 (1987).
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"ma[del false representations;" "flout[ed] the exalted status that the
law accords statements made under oath;" "undermine[d the
integrity of the judicial system;" and "play[ed] fast and loose with
the courts." 6 Other courts have used similarly indignant language.
Plaintiffs who have pursued both disability benefits and ADA
claims have also been described as attempting to perpetrate
"fraud"7 or as seeking "the very height of ... unfair advantage
through manipulation of the judicial process."'
When it became evident that these "judicial estoppel" oases
marked a significant trend in the lower courts, critics began to
observe (correctly) that the courts' indignation against plaintiffs
who simultaneously pursue disability benefits and ADA claims
was misconceived.89 For a number of reasons, an SSDI applicant's
assertion that she has a "disability," as defined in the Social
Security Act is not inherently inconsistent with a claim that the
same individual is "qualified" for ADA purposes. Most notably,
as suggested above, an individual's disability may render her
"incapable" of working not because of any inherent inability but
simply because of inaccessible environments, the failure to make
accommodations, or exclusionary attitudes.' That, of course, is
a crucial insight of the disability rights movement, and the
ADA's provisions seek to end exclusion on such bases. The SSDI
"disability" definition, however, does not assume that employers will
comply with the ADA in these respects; in particular, the SSDI
"disability" determination does not take account of the possibility of
accommodation.91 Thus, an individual can be deemed to have a
"disability" for SSDI purposes even though she would be fully able
to work if provided with a reasonable accommodation. 92
86. McNemar, 91 F.3d at 620 (quoting Ryan Operations & P.V. Santiam-Midwest Lumber
Co., 81 F.3d 355, 358 (3d Cir. 1996)).
87. Harris v. Marathon Oil Co., 948 F. Supp. 27,29 (W.D. Tex. 1996), affd, 108 F.3d 332
(5th Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
88. Hindman v. Greenville Hosp. Sys., 947 F. Supp. 215,223 (D.S.C. 1996), affd, 133 F.3d
915 (4th Cir. 1997).
89. See, e.g., Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 489-506, 575-80; Diller, Dissonant Disability
Policies, supra note 64, at 1032-48.
90. See supra notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
91. See Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 503-04; Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra
note 64, at 1040.41.
92. See Burgdorf, supra note 31, at 504 & n.498.
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Even aside from the possibility of accommodation, an individual's
assertion that she has a "disability" for purposes of SSDI does not
necessarily imply that the individual is entirely unable to work.
Under valid Social Security Administration regulations, many
impairments (such as HIV and quadriplegia) are deemed to
constitute an SSDI "disability" per se-even though many indi-
viduals with these impairments hold down jobs. And under various
work incentive programs, SSDI recipients are permitted and even
encouraged to work.' As either a formal or an empirical matter,
then, "disability" for purposes of Social Security cannot be equated
with a complete inability to work, notwithstanding what appears on
the face of the statutory definition.
2. The Cleveland Decision
Moved by the foregoing arguments, a number of lower courts
rejected the holdings of their sister circuits and refused to accord
disability benefits applications preclusive effect in subsequent ADA
proceedings.95 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998 to
resolve the conflict, and when it issued its unanimous opinion in
Cleveland v. Policy Management Systems,' the Court seemed to side
with the disability rights advocates. The Court held that "pursuit,
and receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the
recipient from pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a
strong presumption against the recipient's success under the
ADA."97 Despite "the appearance of conflict that arises from the
language of the two statutes,"8 the Court found no inherent
inconsistency between a claim for SSDI benefits and a suit for
reinstatement under the ADA. 99 The Court found "too many
situations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA claim can
93. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1038-39.
94. See id. at 1017-19, 1044-45.
95. See, e.g., Rascon v. U.S. W. Communications, 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (10th Cir. 1998);
Griffith v. Wal-Mart Stores, 135 F.3d 376, 381-83 (6th Cir. 1998); Swanks v. Wash. Metro.
Area Transit Auth., 116 F.3d 582, 586-87 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
96. 526 U.S. 795 (1999).
97. Id. at 797-98.
98. Id. at 802.
99. Id.
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comfortably exist side by side."' As disability rights advocates had
urged, the Court observed that the SSDI application process does
not take account of the possibility of reasonable accommodation;' 0 '
that people with per se disabilities under the SSDI regulations need
not show an actual inability to work;'0 2 that under work incentive
programs "the SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals
who not only can work, but are working;"' 3 and that "the nature of
an individual's disability may change over time,"' 4 making an
individual who could not work when he applied for SSDI benefits
capable of working at the time of her ADA suit.0"
Although it rejected any strong presumption of inconsistency
between disability benefits applications and ADA claims, the
Cleveland Court did believe that "a plaintiffs sworn assertion in an
application for disability benefits that she is, for example, 'unable
to work' will appear to negate an essential element of her ADA
case-at least if she does not offer a sufficient explanation." 1°6
Accordingly, it held that a plaintiff who has made such a statement
must provide an "explanation of any apparent inconsistency with
the necessary elements of an ADA claim"° 7'-an explanation
"sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that, assuming
the truth of, or the plaintiffs good-faith belief in, the earlier
statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless 'perform the essential
functions' ofherjob, with or without'reasonable accommodation." 0
But the Court suggested that such explanations could be readily
found. It noted that the plaintiffs Supreme Court brief "explain[ed]
the discrepancy between her SSDI statements that she was 'totally
disabled' and her ADA claim that she could 'perform the essential
functions' of her job." °9 The "totally disabled" statement, according
to the plaintiff, was "made in a forum which does not consider the
effect that reasonable workplace accommodations would have on the
100. Id. at 803.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 804.
103. Id. at 805.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 806.
107. Id. at 807.
108. Id.
109. Id.
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ability to work"-and was in any event accurate "in the time period
in which [it was] made." 1 ' Without suggesting that these assertions
failed to offer sufficient explanation for the apparent inconsistency,
the Court remanded the case to afford the parties "opportunity in
the trial court to present, or to contest, these explanations, in sworn
form where appropriate."'
3. The Cleveland Aftermath
Echoing a common sentiment, Matthew Diller predicted in 2000
that the Cleveland decision "should put an end to the widespread
practice of barring disability benefit recipients from bringing cases
under Title I of the ADA.""' Unfortunately, that prediction has not
come true. Two years after the Cleveland decision, the lower courts
appear to be responding to ADA plaintiffs who simultaneously seek
disability benefits in much the same way they responded before the
Supreme Court spoke. Many post-Cleveland courts, like some pre-
Cleveland courts, have been particularly willing to entertain
plaintiffs' explanations of the apparent inconsistencies between
their applications for disability benefits and their ADA claims."'
But many others (probably the majority)"' appear nearly as
unwilling to credit those explanations as they were before
Cleveland. In Motley v. New Jersey State Police,"' for example, the
Third Circuit reaffirmed its earlier McNemar"judicial estoppel" rule
five months after the Supreme Court issued the Cleveland opinion
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 30.
113. See, e.g., Giles v. Gen. Elec. Co., 245 F.3d 474,484-85 (5th Cir. 2001), amended by 245
F.3d 474 (5th Cir. 2001); EEOC v. Stowe-Pharr Mills, Inc., 216 F.3d 373, 379 (4th Cir. 2000);
Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191 F.3d 1043, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 1999).
114. I will describe some of the leading cases in the text and footnotes that follow. See infra
notes 115-50 and accompanying text. To get a very rough sense of the overall picture in the
lower courts, I conducted a Westlaw search in November 2002 that revealed seventy post-
Cleveland cases in which federal courts ruled (either as a sole basis for decision or as an
alternative holding) on the effect of a public or private disability benefits application on a
subsequent ADA claim. In forty-one of those cases (58.5% of the total number of cases), the
court concluded that statements on the benefits application foreclosed the plaintiffs ADA
claim. Because this rough-cut analysis is limited to cases available on Westlaw, it likely
overstates plaintiffs' rate of success. See Colker, Windfall for Defendants, supra note 1, at 105.
115. 196 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1087 (2000).
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that supposedly put an end to such applications of judicial
estoppel."6 In the closest that the court came to acknowledging any
tension at all between McNemar and Cleveland, it suggested that
McNemar had simply been misconstrued as imposing a per se rule
of judicial estoppel regardless of the facts of the case.11 7 "To the
extent that McNemar [was] unclear on this issue," the court sought
merely to "clarify" that "consistent with Cleveland and the rule that
every case should be decided on its individual facts, there may be
circumstances in which a party may pursue a successful ADA claim
even after he has applied for disability benefits.""'
Although it acknowledged that there "may be [such] circum-
stances,"1 9 the Third Circuit did not find them in Motley itself.
Motley, the plaintiff, was a New Jersey state police detective who
had been severely injured in a work-related incident in 1990.120
He continued to work for three years after the incident "and
received exemplary performance evaluations and several com-
mendations." 2' But because of his injuries the police department
did not permit him to take the physical examination that was
required of any candidate for promotion. 22 Accordingly, the
department deemed Motley ineligible for promotion in each of three
successive years: 1991, 1992, and 1993.123 After being passed over
the third time, he applied for and received a disability pension from
the state in 1993. Motley's benefits application stated that "he was
'permanently and totally disabled' as a result of the events of
January 1990."124 On the basis of Motley's "detailed description of
his injuries and their impact on his ability to work," 125 the medical
board that reviewed his application deemed Motley "'totally and
permanently incapacitated for state police officer duties.""28
Although Motley's statements, like Cleveland's, "'were made in a
116. Id. at 165, 167.
117. Id. at 163.
118. Id. at 164 n.4 (emphasis added).
119. Id.
120. Id: at 162.
121. Id. at 170 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 162; id. at 171 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
123. Id. at 162.63.
124. Id. at 166.
125. Id.
126. Id.
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forum which does not consider the effect that reasonable workplace
accommodations would have on the ability to work,"127 the Third
Circuit held that "simply averring that the statutory schemes differ
is not enough to survive summary judgment in light of Cleveland." "
The dissent offered an additional explanation-that Motley applied
for a disability pension only after the police department, because of
his disability, refused on three occasions even to consider him for
promotion notwithstanding his continued outstanding perform-
ance.'29 Although the dissent did not phrase it this way, the
department's conduct amounted to something like a constructive
discharge-conduct that Motley sought to challenge in his ADA
claim.
Motley is hardly unusual. Like the Motley court, a number of
other lower courts appear to believe that the only kind of disability
benefits claims that are compatible with ADA suits are those
that consist of "a mere blanket statement of complete disability
checked on a box in order to obtain ... benefits."30 When the
plaintiff's benefits application is "supported by ... additional
statements concerning the type and extent of his injuries," 31 those
courts are inclined to find a conflict with the subsequent ADA
claim--even if the descriptions of the injuries make no reference to
possible accommodations. 32
Indeed, post-Cleveland cases have precluded ADA claims even
where the plaintiff made only quite general assertions of inability
to work on her benefits application,1 33 and even in cases in which the
127. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 807. The majority opinion in Motley said that the state pension
finding "presumably took the fundamental job requirements for state police officers, along
with reasonable accommodations such as light duty, into consideration." Motley, 196 F.3d at
166. But the dissenting judge persuasively explained that such a "presumption [was)
unfounded, and the majority provide[d] no authority for its conclusion." Idt at 171 n.8
(Rendell, J., dissenting). On the face of it, the New Jersey statutory provision under which
Motley received his disability pension indicates that the possibility of reasonable
accommodation is not taken into account. See id.
128. Motley, 196 F.3d at 166.
129. See id. at 171 (Rendell, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Rendell, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 167.
132. See, e.g., Feldman v. Am. Meml Life Ins. Co., 196 F.3d 783, 791 (7th Cir. 1999).
133. See, e.g., Hrobowski v. Runyon, No. 97C 5608,2001 WL 290193, at *4 (N.D. Ill. March
16, 2001) ("Plaintiffs sworn assertion in her application for disability benefits that she is
unable to work negates her contention in this case that she can (or could) nevertheless
perform the essential functions of her job.").
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plaintiffidentified specific reasonable accommodations for which the
disability benefits process failed to account.'34 The Eighth Circuit's
decision in Lane v. BFI Waste Systems 3 provides a good example.
While employed by BFI, Lane was injured in an automobile accident
in August 1996.136 Lane took a medical leave to recover, and his
doctor cleared him to return to work in November 1996.' When
Lane sought to return, BFI initially offered him a job as a route
auditor-a position he had previously held.' But the employer's
physician determined in December 1996 that Lane would be unable,
because of his injuries, to climb in and out of large garbage trucks
while performing the duties of that position.3 9 "Mr. Lane requested
the use of the [company's] pick-up truck so he would not have to
climb in and out of the large garbage trucks."" ° Lane previously had
used a pick-up truck when he held the route auditor position, "but
BFI informed him that the pick-up truck was no longer available."' 4 '
Subsequently, but still in December 1996, Lane requested that he
be reassigned to an open dispatcher position in another district, but
the company refused on the basis of a policy of filling dispatcher
positions with employees who had previously served in the
same district. 14 2 On unpaid leave, Lane applied for SSDI benefits
in March 1997 and ultimately received them. 143 BFI formally
terminated him in December 1997.14
Lane subsequently filed an ADA suit against BFI. The district
court granted summary judgment to the defendant on numerous
134. See, e.g., Martini v. Boeing Co., 238 F.3d 429 (9th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table
decision), at 2000 WL 1367919, at *1 (holding that although the plaintiff in 1991 "qualified
his SSDI application with statements that he believed he could be employed with various
accommodations," his statement in 1996 that he "had been totally disabled and unable to
work for the entire six years after he resigned from Boeing" was "unqualified and obviously
conflicts with the claim of employment discrimination"); Fields v. St. Bernard Parish Sch. Bd.,
No. Civ. A. 99-3396, 2000 WL 1560012, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 16, 2000) (reaching similar
conclusions).
135. 257 F.3d 766 (8th Cir. 2001).
136. Id. at 768.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 768, 770.
143. Id. at 768.
144. Id.
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grounds, but the Eighth Circuit found the inconsistencies between
Lane's SSDI application and his ADA claim dispositive. 141 Without
quoting any specific statement in the SSDI application, the
appellate court held that Lane "failed to address the discrepancy
between his assertion that he was able to perform the essential
functions of the dispatcher position and his claim of disability in his
social-security application."" ' But the explanation was obvious: For
all that appears from the court's opinion, Lane had consistently
maintained since December 1996 that he could perform the auditor
job with accommodation, and that he could perform the dispatcher
job if the company would accommodate him by letting him transfer
into it. The company simply refused to provide the requested
accommodations. It was that denial of accommodation that left Lane
unable to perform his previous job-and the SSDI application
process assumes that other employers would not accommodate him
either. 147 At the time Lane applied for SSDI benefits in March 1997,
BFI had been refusing for three months to permit him to return to
work; that he applied for those benefits nine months before BFI
formally terminated him-a fact on which the court relied"-is
entirely beside the point.
My point is not that these lower courts have misread Cleveland.
In fact, a fair argument can be made that they are being entirely
faithful to that decision, though such an argument is difficult to
sustain on the facts of a case like Lane. Cleveland, after all, required
that plaintiffs explain the apparent inconsistency between their
disability benefits applications and their subsequent assertion that
they remain "qualified."" 9 These cases simply hold that the plaintiff
has failed to supply a sufficient explanation.
My point is that Cleveland seems to have changed very little.
Many plaintiffs continue to be precluded from asserting ADA claims
because of statements they earlier made on disability benefits
applications-statements that are not, in principle, inconsistent
with their ADA claims. 50
145. id. at 768-69, 771.
146. Id. at 769.
147. See Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 803, 807.
148. See Lane, 257 U.S. at 770.
149. Cleveland, 526 U.S. at 806-07.
150. This result is particularly troubling because of the difficulty disabled former
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4. The Critique
As with the definition-of-disability cases, the cases barring
disability benefits recipients from asserting claims under the ADA
have evoked significant criticism from academics who charge that
those decisions reflect a "failure ... to fully embrace the concept of
equality reflected in the ADA."5s In an important pre-Cleveland
article, Matthew Diller argued that these cases demonstrate that
courts persist in viewing disability "as a medically determined
category that is inconsistent with work.""5 2 By treating an assertion
of "disability" as the equivalent to an admission of disqualification
from work, the argument goes, these courts reveal their image of
disability as inherently disqualifying. That view of disability, Diller
argued, "misunderstand [s] the premises of the ADA," a statute with
a "clear focus ... on reshaping societal institutions in order to change
the social significance of disabilities" and make society appreciate
that disability and work can readily go together.'53 Rather than
viewing the ADA as a civil rights law, Diller has argued more
recently, these cases show that many courts see the statute as a
special benefit for people with disabilities-one that is unnecessary
for those who "are already being 'taken care of' by the social welfare
system." 54
employees may have in obtaining quality counsel-particularly in a timely enough fashion to
provide advice regarding an application for disability benefits. Unadvised or poorly advised
clients may, in filling out benefits applications, simply create a trap for themselves in their
subsequent ADA litigation by failing to provide sufficient qualification to their assertions of
disability. While high-quality counsel might be able to sidestep that trap in the subsequent
litigation by providing sufficient explanation for apparent inconsistencies in the plaintiffs
position, ADA plaintiffs are too often unable to retain such high-quality counsel. For an
argument that ADA plaintiffs' remarkably low rate of success is largely attributable to poor
lawyering, see Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Dan R. Gallipeau, Judges and Juries: Why Are So Many
ADA Plaintiffs Losing Summary Judgment Motions, and Would They Fare Better Before a
Jury? A Response to Professor Colker, 19 REv. LITIG. 505, 510-57 (2000).
151. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 47-48; see also Burgdorf, supra note 31,
at 551 ("Many inequities arise from decisions in which plaintiffs, who have represented that
they are disabled while applying for disability benefits, are judicially estopped or otherwise
precluded from contending that they are 'qualified'in the context of the ADA or Rehabilitation
Act.").
152. Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1059.
153. Id.
154. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 48.
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C. Reasonable Accommodation Cases
Because so many courts have rejected ADA claims on threshold
issues such as the definition of disability or the judicial estoppel
doctrine without reaching the core question whether the defendant
provided "reasonable accommodation" to the plaintiff, critics have
not focused as much energy on challenging courts' interpretations
of the "reasonable accommodation" requirement. But that does not
mean that the courts that have reached the "reasonable accom-
modation" question have ruled in ways that are congenial to those
who support the statute. To the contrary, disability rights advocates
have found fodder for criticism in the courts' "reasonable accom-
modation" decisions as well.
Perhaps the best example is the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Vande Zande v. Wisconsin Department of Administration.'55
Whether because it was one of the earliest cases to flesh out the
ADA's accommodation requirement, because of the stature of the
author of the court's opinion (Judge Richard Posner), or because of
the cogency of its analysis, Vande Zande has been extraordinarily
influential.
156
Lori Vande Zande worked as a program assistant for Wisconsin's
Department of Administration. She had paraplegia as a result of a
spinal cord tumor, and the agency that employed her made several
accommodations for her."7 But the agency refused to make some
155. 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
156. See, e.g., Reed v. LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 259 (1st Cir. 2001) (endorsing
Vande Zande's interpretation of "reasonable accommodation"); Monette v. Elec. Data Sys.
Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). A Westlaw KeyCite search conducted on
November 18, 2002, revealed 321 court opinions that have cited Vande Zande. Although the
Supreme Court's opinion in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S. Ct. 1516 (2002), did not cite
Vande Zande, it expressly relied on both the First Circuit's decision in Reed, a case that itself
purported to follow the Vande Zande analysis, and the Second Circuit's decision in Borkowski
u. Valley Center School District, 63 F.3d 131 (2d Cir. 1995) (discussed infra note 167), a case
that applied a similar analysis to that of the Vande Zande court. See US Airways, 122 S. Ct.
at 1523.
157. See Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 544. The court emphasized the employer's efforts to
accommodate Vande Zande, even going so far as to itemize them within the court's opinion:
As examples, in her words, "they paid the landlord to have bathrooms modified
and to have a step ramped; they bought special adjustable furniture for the
plaintiff; they ordered and paid for one-half of the cost of a cot that the plaintiff
needed for daily personal care at work; they sometimes adjusted the plaintiffs
2003]
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other accommodations that Vande Zande believed necessary to
provide her with an equal workplace experience to that of her
coworkers. Of particular relevance to my discussion, the agency
refused to make a minor modification to the design of Vande Zande's
workplace so that she could have access to the sink in the employee
kitchenette in an office building that was constructed during her
tenure."5 8 While that building was still in the midst of construction,
Vande Zande complained that the sink was to be placed thirty-six
inches above the floor, out of the reach of a wheelchair user. If the
sink were placed two inches lower, people who use wheelchairs
would be able to reach it. 9
Because Vande Zande raised this issue with her supervisors
before the kitchenettes were built, the sink could have been placed
at an accessible height without inordinate expense. Plumbing had
already been installed, so the state would have had to spend about
$150 to modify the plumbing if it placed a thirty-four-inch sink in
the kitchenette on her floor; if it installed thirty-four-inch sinks in
all of the kitchenettes in the new building, the state would have had
to spend about $2,000.'" But the state refused to install any thirty-
four-inch sinks in the kitchenettes. Instead, the agency informed
Vande Zande that she could use the bathroom sink on her floor
(which was thirty-four inches high) to perform any of the tasks for
which other employees used the kitchenette sinks.' 6'
Upholding the district court's grant of summary judgment to the
state employer, the Seventh Circuit held that the state was not
required to install the kitchenette sink at thirty-four inches.6 2
The court first considered the general standards for determining
whether a proposed accommodation is "reasonable." Analogizing to
schedule to perform backup telephone duties to accommodate the plaintiffs
medical appointments; they made changes to the plans for a locker room in the
new state office building; and they agreed to provide some of the specific
accommodations the plaintiff requested in her October 5, 1992 Reasonable
Accommodation Request."
Id.
158. Although the events I discuss occurred after the ADA took effect, construction on the
building began before the statute's effective date, so the stringent accessibility requirements
the ADA imposes on newly constructed buildings did not apply. Id. at 545.
159. Id. at 545-46.
160. See id. at 546.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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Judge Learned Hand's test laid out in United States v. Carroll
Towing1 3 for "reasonable care,"164 the court concluded that the
term "reasonable accommodation" requires some kind of balance
between the costs of a proposed accommodation and its benefits. 6
Although the court emphasized that it did not intend to require
plaintiffs to provide precise quantification of the costs and
benefits of their proposals--or at least that it did not intend to
require such a showing in every case's-it concluded that some
rough proportionality between cost and benefit was essential for an
accommodation to be deemed "reasonable."6 7 Any other approach,
the court argued, would be inconsistent with the ADA's purpose
of reducing the social costs of disabled persons' dependency:
"The preamble actually 'markets' the Act as a cost saver, pointing
to 'billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from
dependency and nonproductivity.' The savings will be illusory if
employers are required to expend many more billions in
accommodation than will be saved by enabling disabled people to
work."68
Vande Zande argued that "forcing her to use the bathroom sink
for activities (such as washing out her coffee cup) for which the
other employees could use the kitchenette sink stigmatized her as
different and inferior." 69 Although eliminating that stigma at a one-
time cost of $150 would appear to satisfy a requirement of rough
proportionality between cost and benefit, the Seventh Circuit
disagreed. Characterizing the concept of stigma as "merely an
epithet," the court held that an employer has no "duty to expend
even modest amounts of money to bring about an absolute
163. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).
164. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 542 (citing Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 173).
165. Id. at 542-43.
166. Id. at 542 ("It would not follow that the costs and benefits of altering a workplace to
enable a disabled person to work would always have to be quantified, or even that an
accommodation would have to be deemed unreasonable if the cost exceeded the benefit
however slightly.") (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 542 ([Alt the very least, the cost could not be disproportionate to the benefit.").
For a roughly similar approach to "reasonable accommodation," though different in some
details, see Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 136-40 (2d Cir. 1995). The
Second Circuit held that "an accommodation is reasonable only if its costs are not clearly
disproportionate to the benefits that it will produce." Id at 138.
168. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 543 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(9) (2000)).
169. Id. at 546.
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identity in working conditions between disabled and nondisabled
workers." 7 ° Instead, "[tihe duty of reasonable accommodation is
satisfied when the employer does what is necessary to enable the
disabled worker to work in reasonable comfort.",
17
Critics have attacked the Vande Zande decision for disregarding
and indeed disparaging the statute's basic purpose of eliminating
stigmatic assertions of difference between people with and without
disabilities. Lennard Davis has argued that Judge Posner's opinion
treats stigma as a mere emotional injury and fails to appreciate its
sociological role in creating the disadvantage experienced by people
with disabilities. 72 Linda Hamilton Krieger has used Judge Posner's
reference to stigma as "merely an epithet" as evidence supporting
the more general assertion that judges simply do not understand
the principles on which the ADA was premised:
Whatever one may think about the ultimate merits of the Vande
Zande case, stigma is not just an epithet. That a federal circuit
court judge could characterize the concept in this way gives
substance to Professor Hahn's claim that the ADA's crabbed
interpretation derives in substantial part from judges' failure to
understand the connection between stigma, structural exclusion,
and discrimination in the disability rights context.173
Here, as in the definition-of-disability and judicial estoppel contexts,
commentators charge the courts with failing to understand the
"true" purposes of the statute.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over Backwards: Disability, Narcissism, and the Law,
21 BERKELEYJ. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 206 (2000). I have previously emphasized the importance
of stigma as a target of the ADA. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 436-45. For an endorsement
of a cost-benefit approach to the ADA's "reasonable accommodation" requirement like that set
forth in Vande Zande, see J. HOULT VERKERIKE, AN ECONOMIC DEFENSE OF DISABILITY
DISCRIMINATION LAw 24 (1999) (University of Virginia School of Law Legal Studies Working
Paper No. 99-14, 1999). For a challenge to Verkerke's argument on the ground that he does
not account for the broader dignitary goals of the ADA, see Stewart J. Schwab & Steven L.
Willborn, Reasonable Accommodation of Workplace Disabilities, 44 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1197
(2003).
173. Krieger, supra note 8, at 518.
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II. THE ADA AND THE WELFARE REFORM ARGUMENT
Do the sets of cases discussed above in fact represent a betrayal?
Do they demonstrate that courts have failed to appreciate the
principles upon which the statute is premised, and that judges have
imposed their own views of disability on the statute? In an earlier
article, I argued that the ADA is best interpreted as aiming to
provide a stigmatized group whose members are likely to experience
systematic social disadvantage with tools to challenge practices that
deny them equal opportunities to participate in the full range of
economic, civic, and political affairs of the community. 174 Following
the familiar purposivist interpretive strategy,17 I argued that courts
should impute such a purpose to the ADA for several reasons: Such
a purpose fits the general structure of the statute, it connects to the
goals of the disability rights movement that formed an important
impetus for the passage of the statute, and it coheres with the most
attractive understanding of the normative basis for civil rights law
generally.176 When the ADA's provisions are interpreted in the
light of the general purpose I would attribute to it, many (though
not all) of the cases discussed above appear to have been decided
incorrectly.'77
But critics do not contend merely that the cases are wrongly
decided because they disregard the most normatively attractive
basis for interpreting the statute's provisions. By arguing that
courts have failed to appreciate the principles on which the ADA
was premised, and that judges have improperly imposed their
own views of disability on the statute, the critics suggest that
the ADA was animated by a single set of principles that can be
uncontroversially identified as a matter of simple historical fact. For
two reasons, one theoretical and one historical, I cannot agree. First,
174. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 445-66.
175. The most prominent discussions of that method of interpretation appear in RONALD
DWORKIN, LAw's EMPmE 337-47 (1986) and HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE
LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1374-80 (William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
176. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 452-66.
177. In my earlier article on the Sutton trilogy, I argued that the Court's mitigating-
measures ruling was correct, as was the bottom-line result in Sutton. I disagreed, however,
with much of the Court's reasoning on the substantial-limitation-in-work issue in Sutton and
argued that Murphy was wrongly decided. Id. at 495-519.
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the notion that a statute-particularly one as complex and wide-
ranging as the ADA-can have a single actual intent that can be
identified as a historical matter is largely incoherent. Members of
Congress may have widely varying (and perhaps even conflicting)
reasons for voting in favor of any particular piece of legislation, and
social choice theory demonstrates that there is no coherent basis for
choosing which of these "is" the actual reason for the legislation.
178
Second-and my crucial point here-ADA defenders have tended
to ignore the fact that, at the time the statute was proposed and
debated in Congress, many of the statute's strongest supporters
justified the statute in terms that are quite compatible with
the cases that ADA defenders now criticize. In particular, those
supporters sold the statute as a means of avoiding the social
costs of dependency by moving people off of benefits rolls and into
the workforce. I call this the "welfare reform argument." When
considered in the light of that purpose, the cases discussed above
begin to make a great deal of sense.
In this Part, I first trace the welfare reform argument in the
debates that led to passage of the ADA. By examining the official
reports that led to the introduction of the ADA, the legislative
history of the bill as introduced, and news coverage from the time
the statute was considered, I show in Part III.A that the welfare
reform argument formed a significant part of the public justification
for the statute as ultimately enacted. In Part III.B, I reconsider the
cases discussed above and demonstrate that those cases-as well as
178. See, e.g., Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 875 (1930) ("If by
the purpose of a statute we mean the actual purpose entertained by those who framed it ...
this purpose is practically undiscoverable and would be irrelevant if discovered."); Kenneth
A. Shepsle, Congress is a "They," Not an "It". Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT'L REV. L.
& EcoN. 239 (1992) ("Legislative intent is an internally inconsistent and self-contradictory
expression."). Some have taken this point as an argument against any effort to construe a
statute by attributing a purpose to it (and against the related practice of consulting legislative
history as an aid to interpretation). See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and
Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoLY 61, 68 (1994); John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,684-86 (1997). But
one can accept the idea that it is incoherent to purport to identify any single purpose that
"actually" motivated passage of a statute without abandoning the conventional view that
judges should interpret a statute by attributing to it a "purpose" based on concerns of
doctrinal coherence and normative attractiveness. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 175, at 313-
75 (criticizing efforts to identify legislators' true intent or purpose but arguing that courts
should attribute a purpose to the statute that puts "the political history including and
surrounding that statute in better light").
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restrictive decisions that courts have issued on other ADA questions
-are largely consistent with a welfare reform understanding of the
ADA.
I offer two cautionary notes. First, I do not mean to suggest that
the welfare reform argument was the only, or even the predominant,
justification offered by the ADA's supporters. At every stage of the
legislative process-from the government commission reports that
first suggested a comprehensive disability civil rights bill to the
legislative hearings and debates in Congress-supporters also (and
probably primarily) urged passage of the ADA on dignitary grounds
of equal opportunity and full citizenship.' But what is often
obscured is that those dignitary arguments were not the only
arguments for the ADA. As the unfortunate length of the discussion
that follows should indicate, the more green-eyeshaded welfare
reform argument formed a major part of the public justification for
the statute. 8°
Second, I should emphasize that my goal here is not to offer any
final defense of the restrictive interpretations that have been
made by courts. Rather, my goal is to suggest a coherent principle,
consistent with a plausible account of the purposes of the ADA, that
could justify those interpretations. Most scholars who criticize
current interpretations of the ADA charge judges with disregarding
179. In his speech supporting passage of the conference report on the ADA, Senator Harkin
(the major Senate sponsor of the ADA bill-and perhaps the most insistent welfare reform
advocate, see infra notes 202-05,208, and accompanying text) began by proclaiming, "[H]istory
is going to show that in 1990, 26 years after the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 43 million Americans
with disabilities, gained freedom, dignity, opportunity-their civil rights." 136 CONG. REC. 17,
366 (1990) (statement of Sen. Harkin). He went on to argue that the ADA constituted the
logical next step-after the abolition of slavery, the grant of suffrage to women, the passage
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the enactment of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act three years later-in our Nation's unfinished effort to "live[] up to the words of the
Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights." Id. There are countless examples of
similar statements throughout the legislative history of the ADA. I make no attempt to
catalog them all here, however, because the dignitary basis of the ADA is well understood; my
aim is to show that the welfare reform argument was also important to obtaining passage of
the statute.
180. 1 do not mean the term "public justification" in any formal way, as does Bernard W.
Bell, Legislative History Without Legislative Intent: The Public Justification Approach to
Statutory Interpretation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 6 (1999) (arguing that statutes should be
construed in accordance with their text and their "public justification" as reflected in
"committee reports and floor manager statements"). I mean instead to refer more generically
to the arguments offered by the ADA's proponents in public fora in which they sought to
obtain support for the proposed legislation.
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the statute's "true" purposes and substituting the judges' own
preferred responses to disability. These scholars argue that the
restrictive interpretations of the ADA can be explained by the
difficulty of implementing radically norm-changing legislation
-particularly where the legislation precedes the laying of a
groundwork in social attitudes for the new norms. 8' In short, these
scholars explain courts' restrictive interpretations of the ADA as a
simple matter of ignorance or, worse, backlash. Although some of
these scholars refer to instances in which members of Congress used
the welfare reform argument to justify the ADA, they do so only in
passing and treat the argument as if it was not a meaningful part
of the statute's public justification.182
I do not doubt that both ignorance of and backlash against the
ADA exist. But the welfare reform argument may provide a more
fruitful lens through which to view the restrictive decisions
challenged by scholars. At the time the ADA was being considered,
the welfare reform argument for the statute was widely dissem-
inated and promoted by disability rights activists themselves. To the
extent that today's restrictive decisions represent the full flowering
of that argument, the problem may lie less in a simple backlash
response than in the inherent limitations of the welfare reform
argument-and ultimately of the ADA itself.
181. Linda Krieger's work provides an excellent example. See Krieger, supra note 8, at 497-
520.
182. See, e.g., Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1031-32 (arguing that
.even at the inception of the ADA, hints of the tensions between the new law and the
disability benefit programs could be discerned," and citing several invocations of the welfare
reform argument during consideration of the statute, but not treating that argument as one
of the major arguments asserted on the statute's behalf); Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note
13, at 36 (stating, in a single sentence, that "tb]ecause it was anticipated that civil rights
protection would enable people to leave the disability benefits rolls, the ADA was even
promoted as a means of decreasing the extent of redistribution in our society").
Writing before any of the cases discussed in Part I were decided, Jonathan Drimmer
criticized a century of disability law-including the ADA-for an excessive focus on economic
efficiency rather than civic inclusion. Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil
Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with
Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1341, 1397-1400 (1993). Although Drimmer's piece is certainly
consistent with a critique of the welfare reform case for the ADA, he does not treat the point
in any detail, nor does he acknowledge the substantial role of disability rights advocates
themselves in pressing that case.
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A. The Welfare Reform Argument and the ADA
As Judge Posner pointed out in Vande Zande, the ADA "markets"
itself as a cost-saving measure. 183 The congressional findings that
introduce the statute refer to a number of statutory purposes. Most
generally, they state that "the Nation's proper goals regarding
individuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity,
full participation, independent living, and economic self-sufficiency
for such individuals." 8' The findings make clear, however, that at
least one motivation for the statute was a concern with the high
fiscal cost of keeping people with disabilities on disability benefits
rolls. The findings state that "the continuing existence of unfair and
unnecessary discrimination and prejudice" against people with dis-
abilities "costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary
expenses resulting from dependency and nonproductivity."'8 s
That was not a passing or peripheral remark. Rather, during the
period in which the ADA was proposed, considered, and enacted,
supporters of the bill frequently invoked the costs of dependency as
a major justification for antidiscrimination legislation for people
with disabilities. As I have noted, the welfare reform argument was
hardly the only justification offered for the statute.' But that
argument was repeatedly articulated throughout the process by the
entire spectrum of ADA supporters: members of Congress (both
Republicans and Democrats, major sponsors and more peripheral
supporters), disability organizations, disability rights and civil
rights advocates, and individuals with disabilities. And these
supporters articulated the argument in a wide range of fora: official
reports, testimony at congressional hearings, statements on the
floor of Congress, and in the broader media. A fair reading of the
relevant history demonstrates that the welfare reform argument
formed a major part of the public justification for the ADA.
183. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1995).
184. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(aX8) (2000). As I will discuss in detail in Part III, the statutory goal
of "independent living" itself suggests a skepticism toward dependency-inducing reliance on
benefits programs.
185. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
186. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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1. Early Signs: The Commission on Civil Rights and National
Council on the Handicapped Reports
Enactment of the ADA represented the culmination of nearly two
decades of official activity, beginning with enactment of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.187 Although that statute was largely
devoted to an expansion of then-existing vocational rehabilitation
programs, it included two novel features: a requirement that
federal agencies and federal contractors take affirmative action to
hire people with disabilities and advance them in employment;
and a prohibition on disability-based discrimination by recipients
of federal financial assistance. 8" The 1973 enactment of the
Rehabilitation Act, and the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare's promulgation in 1977 of regulations to implement the
antidiscrimination requirements of Section 504 of that Act,
constituted the first significant federal initiative to guarantee civil
rights to people with disabilities." 9
In the 1980s, two federal commissions (the Commission on Civil
Rights and the National Council on the Handicapped) began to lay
the groundwork for expansion of federal disability discrimination
law to all of the domains covered by race discrimination law. In
particular, these commissions sought to extend disability dis-
crimination law to the hiring practices of private employers and
the treatment of clients and customers by places of public
accommodation-areas left largely unregulated by then-existing
law. In making their case for expansion of civil rights law, both
commissions relied significantly on the argument that the then-
current system promoted costly dependency. Broader antidiscrim-
ination laws, the commissions argued, would render many disability
benefits expenditures unnecessary by guaranteeing employment
opportunities for people who were previously forced to depend
on public assistance. The Civil Rights Commission's 1983 report,
187. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (1973) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000)).
188. See 29 U.S.C. § 791 (2000) (applying to federal agencies); id. § 793 (applying to federal
contractors); id. § 794 (applying to recipients of federal financial assistance).
189. The authoritative account of the drafting and enactment of Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, and of the drafting and promulgation of the statute's implementing
regulations, is RICHARD K SCOTCH, FROM GOOD WILL TO CIVIL RIGHTS (2d ed. 2001).
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Accommodating the Spectrum of Individual Abilities, offered an
elaborate defense of disability discrimination law and sought to
show how that body of law reflected an application of the same
basic principles as race discrimination law. 9 ° While establishing
that point, the Commission apparently deemed it necessary to
provide an extensive discussion of what it labeled "The Costs and
Benefits of Full Participation."9' The report noted that President
Kennedy had justified a more integrationist approach to mental
disabilities in part by "emphasiz[ing] the economic waste resulting
from previous governmental policies toward mental health and
mental retardation."'92 It also pointed to "numerous authorities
[who] have argued that economic advantages to society support the
objective of handicapped people's full participation."'93 After
reviewing the costs of various efforts to integrate people with
disabilities into the activities of the community-including the costs
of architectural barrier removal and other accommodations-the
Commission con-cluded that such efforts would more than pay for
themselves through "large savings in reduced expenditures of public
benefits programs, such as social security disability insurance,
supplemental security income (SSI), and State welfare, home relief,
and aid to families with dependent children." 94 Summarizing its
conclusion, the report stated that "although the costs of integrating
handicapped people into the mainstream of society may be
substantial in some contexts, they are more than offset by the
benefits that accrue to society."
95
The National Council on the Handicapped picked up the same
theme in its 1986 report, Toward Independence.' The centerpiece
of Toward Independence was its proposal that Congress enact a
comprehensive law, "perhaps under such a title as 'The Americans
190. See U.S. COMMN ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ACCOMMODATING THE SPECTRUM OF INDIVIDUAL
ABILITIES (1983).
191. Id. at 69.
192. Id. at 72.
193. Id. at 73.
194. Id. at 81 n.88.
195. Id. at 81.
196. See NATL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TOWARD INDEPENDENCE (1986). Two years
later, the renamed National Council on Disability issued a new report that included the text
of the proposed Americans with Disabilities Act, which was introduced as the first ADA bill
in Congress in 1988. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE
(1988).
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with Disabilities Act of 1986,'" that would "requir[e] equal
opportunity for individuals with disabilities, with broad coverage
and ... clear, consistent, and enforceable standards prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of handicap."'97 On the first page of the
executive summary and again on the first page of the body of the
report, the council highlighted the massive costs of disability
benefits programs:
Our nation's current annual Federal expenditure on disability
benefits and programs exceeds $60 billion. This report proposes
some fiscally responsible approaches for spending disability-
related dollars more prudently and productively. The Council is
strongly convinced that present and future costs of disability to
the Nation are directly related to the degree of success we attain
in reducing existing barriers, both structural and attitudinal,
and in providing appropriate services to individuals with
disabilities so that they may realize their full potential and
become more independent and self-sufficient.'
The Council thus argued that measures to reduce the dependency
of people with disabilities, such as the proposed comprehensive civil
rights law, would reduce those costs to the public.'
2. The Welfare Reform Argument in the Congressional
Hearings: Members of Congress Build the Case
When they first introduced the National Council on Disability's
proposed legislation in Congress in 1988,200 the bill's principal
House and Senate sponsors echoed the Council's cost-of-dependency
197. NATL COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, TowARD INDEPENDENCE 18 (1986).
198. Id. at vi; see also id. at 1.
199. As the Council's official history of the effort to enact the ADA makes clear, the
emphasis on this argument was wholly intentional. See NATL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY,
EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY: THE MAKING OF THE AMERICANS wrrH DISABILITIES ACT 52-55
(1997) (describing efforts to make the case that civil rights protections for people with
disabilities would save the government money).
200. In 1988, after Congress had failed to act on the central recommendation of its 1986
Toward Independence report, the National Council on Disability issued a new report. See
NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE (1988). That report
included the complete text of a proposed Americans with Disabilities Act. Id. at 26-38. The
text of the Council's 1988 proposal formed the basis for the ADA bills introduced in the House
and Senate that year.
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theme. Tony Coelho, principal sponsor in the House, spoke of the
problem in somewhat general terms: "Our entire society bears the
economic burdens of this prejudice: dependency is expensive. It
increases benefit entitlements and decreases productive capacity
sorely needed by the American economy. "2°1 Tom Harkin, the
principal Democratic sponsor in the Senate, was one of the most
insistent proponents of the welfare reform argument throughout the
bill's two-year process of consideration. In his statement on the
introduction of the bill in 1988, Harkin described the "grim effects"
of disability prejudice as including "unnecessary dependency costing
taxpayers and private employers billions of dollars on an annual
basis."202
In the hearings on the bill over the next two years, supporters
repeatedly referred to the high price of disability benefits pro-
rams.2 °3 These supporters frequently pointed to the National
Council on the Handicapped's estimate that such programs cost the
federal government approximately $60 billion per year.'" Some
201. 134 CONG. REc. 9605 (1988) (statement of Rep. Coelho). Major Owens and George
Miller, liberal Democratic representatives who strongly supported the bill, made similar
statements on the House floor near the time the ADA was introduced. See 134 CONG. REC.
9785 (1988) (statement of Rep. Owens) ("Discrimination is a significant reason why many
people with disabilities are trapped in situations of dependency-dependency which costs our
Nation dearly, both in lost potential productivity and in dollars spent for support programs.");
134 CONG. REc. 9664 (1988) (statement of Rep. Miller) (arguing that opponents of the ADA
should "consider the billions of dollars that result from increased dependency, demoralization,
and lost opportunities").
202. 134 CONG. REc. 9382 (1988) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
203. In addition to the excerpts discussed below, see Americans with Disabilities Act of
1989: Hearing on S.933 Before the Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Human Res., 101st Cong. 193 (1989) [hereinafter Senate Labor Hearings]
(statement of Sen. Harkin) ("The ADA will save the Government and society billions of dollars
by getting people off the dependency of social welfare, and into jobs, into restaurants, into
shopping centers, and into community activities."); 134 CONG. REc. 9605 (1988) (statement
of Rep. Coelho) ("Our entire society bears the economic burdens of this prejudice: dependency
is expensive. It increases benefit entitlements and decreases productive capacity sorely
needed by the American economy.").
204. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the
Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 101st Cong. 31 (1989)
(statement of Rep. Owens) ("I do not think the American people know how much they are
paying right now in terms of subsidies for people with disabilities; how we probably will
decrease rather than increase the costs" and referring to estimate that "taxpayers are now
paying about $57 billion on taking care of people with disabilities."). Former Senator Weicker
similarly stated:
Not only is this bill the appropriate humanitarian step for the 101st Congress,
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supporters pointed to still larger estimates of the total cost of
programs that "maintain[] the dependency of the disabled."" 5
At the hearings, the bill's sponsors argued that the significant
funds spent on disability benefits programs "would be available for
other national priorities if the disabled, who are barred from
working because of the barriers of discrimination, were able to
lead productive lives."20 6 Several supporters-including then-
Representative Coelho, a Democratic representative from California
who has epilepsy-set up antidiscrimination protections (including
the Americans with Disabilities Act makes good economic sense as well. Right
now, we have a system that is based on dependence, with over $57 billion a year
in Federal funds going for social insurance benefits for disabled persons. The
economic return to society when people get off the welfare rolls and become
employed cannot be overstated. With two-thirds of disabled Americans
unemployed, and 82 percent of those persons willing to give up benefits if they
could work full-time, it can only mean a reduction in welfare dependency if those
persons have real opportunities to participate in the workforce.
Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 203, at 216 (statement of Sen. Weicker); see also id. at 230
(statement of Sen. Harkin) ("Thus, ending discrimination will have the direct and immediate
effect of reducing the federal government's expenditures of over $60 billion dollars per year
on disability benefits and programs premised on dependency. It will also have the immediate
effect of making people with disabilities into consumers and taxpayers.").
Sandra Swift Parrino, then the Chair of the National Council, testified at the hearings on
the ADA and reaffirmed the points her commission had made in its report. See Joint Hearing
on H.R. 2273, the Americans with Disabilites Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the
Subcomm. Select Educ. and Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and
Labor, 101st Cong. 70 (1989) [hereinafter House Select Educ. & Employment Hearings]
(statement of Sandra Parrino). Ms. Parrino stated:
ADA is critically important because its provisions are shaped to break the chains
that bind many of the millions of persons with disabilities into a bondage of
unjust, unwanted dependency on families, charity and social welfare. This
dependency is a major and totally unnecessary contributor to public deficits and
private expenditures.
Id. (statement of Sandra Parrino); see also Americans with Disabilities Act of 1988: Joint
Hearing on S. 2345 Before Subcomm. on the Handicapped of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Human Resources and the Subcomm. on Select Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor,
100th Cong. 27-28 (1988) (statement of Sandra Parrino).
205. Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Bus.,
101st Cong. 5 (1990) [hereinafter House Small Bus. Hearings]; see also House Select Educ. &
Employment Hearings, supra note 204, at 23 (statement of Rep. Hoyer) (stating that "our
Nation is spending almost $170 billion on maintaining the dependency of the disabled"); see
Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 204, at 30 (statement of Sen. Harkin) (stating that "we are
spending about $75.2 billion a year Federal cost for dependency programs for the disabled,
$75.2 billion a year" but that "there are 8.2 million people with disabilities who would like to
work" and thus "give up their Government benefits").
206. House Select Educ. & Employment Hearings, supra note 204, at 23 (statement of Rep.
Hoyer).
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the requirement of reasonable accommodation) as an opposed
alternative to benefits programs. Coelho's testimony on this point
deserves to be quoted at length:
And all we are asking for is that opportunity to be productive,
to be able to get on a bus, Senator Hatch, and to be able to go to
work. We are not looking for welfare. We are not looking for
something that other people do not have. We just want an
opportunity to be able to live and be able to have an opportunity
to work and to be able to go to that job and come back home and
to be able to have families and to live like everybody else in this
great country. Do not deny us the opportunity to be productive
Americans, to be productive citizens. That is all we ask.
We know that there is going to have to be accommodations to
give us our basic civil rights. We know that. We understand
that. There is a cost involved. But isn't there also a cost involved
with us not being able to exercise our rights? There is a
tremendous cost to the Government right now in maintaining a
lot of us with disabilities, because we do not have our basic
rights to go out and be productive. We would rather be
productive citizens, but we need your help to do it.2"
Senator Harkin in particular emphasized the cost-of-dependency
issue during the hearings in several ways. He used the facts of the
lives of individual people with disabilities in an attempt to
personalize the costs of keeping them on disability benefits
programs.2°8 He also invited disability policy analyst Edward
Berkowitz to provide an extensive delineation of dependency costs.
207. Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 203, at 7 (statement of Rep. Coelho); see also House
Select Educ. & Employment Hearings, supra note 204, at 131-32 (statement of Rep. Rahall)
(tallying the costs "America's taxpayers have been paying to keep the disabled out of our
workforce," including "billions of dollars for food, clothing, shelter, medical and other basic
services so that disabled persons would be kept on welfare and out of everybody's way").
208. At one point in the hearings, for example, Senator Harkin stated:
If we use Danny as a case study, I'll show you the cost of dependency. If Danny's
parents had taken the advice of their doctor, and put Danny in an institution,
Danny's mother thinks that he would still be in an institution today. Today, it
costs $200 per day to be in an institution. If Danny lived in an institution for his
entire life, let's say for 65 years, the cost would be $4,745,000. Danny wants to
work and live in his own apartment. Let's give him and other persons with
disabilities that chance by passing the ADA.
Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 203, at 232-33 (statement of Sen. Harkin).
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In his testimony, Berkowitz estimated the costs of public and
private disability benefits programs at approximately $170 billion
per year. °9 In written questions submitted after the hearings,
Senator Harkin asked a number of the witnesses for "an estimate of
the net dollars we can save by opening up employment opportunities
on a fair basis to persons with disabilities and thereby reducing
dependency." 2 The witnesses' responses, which estimated that
current disability benefits programs imposed significant costs and
that increasing opportunities for people with disabilities would
result in substantial net benefits, were included in the hearing
records."
3. The Welfare Reform Argument in the Congressional
Hearings: Disability Rights Activists Emphasize the Point
Members of Congress were not the only ones who pointed to the
cost savings that would arise from reducing dependency. Activists
with disabilities and disability rights lawyers frequently empha-
sized this point as well.
Such appeals followed a distinguished tradition in disability
rights advocacy. In 1980, Frank Bowe212 published a book that
extensively made the case that the elimination of structural,
environmental, and attitudinal barriers to the integration of people
with disabilities would more than pay for itself by obviating many
current expenditures on disability benefits programs.213 When the
Reagan Administration took office the next year, it embarked on a
program of regulatory reform spearheaded by then-Vice President
Bush. One of the first targets of this program was the set of
regulations adopted to implement Section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973. The still-emergent disability rights community re-
sponded fiercely to this threat to what was, at that time, the most
209. Id. at 370-74 (statement of Edward Berkowitz).
210. Id. at 410, 436-37.
211. See id. at 410 (statement of Harold Russell); id. at 436.37 (statement of Arlene
Mayerson).
212. Bowe was the executive director of the American Coalition of Citizens with
Disabilities, the major disability rights lobbying group at that time.
213. See FRANx BowE, REHABILITATING AMERICA: TOwARD INDEPENDENCE FOR DISABLED
AND ELDERLY PEOPLE (1980).
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important law prohibiting disability-based discrimination.2 4 Evan
Kemp was a major "point person" for the disability community in its
efforts to defend the Section 504 regulations. Kemp, a Republican
who was then serving as the director of the Nader-affiliated
Disability Rights Center, made a national name for himself in 1981
by attacking Jerry Lewis' Labor Day telethon for its role in
propagating patronizing stereotypes of pity and fear of people with
disabilities." Making his case to Bush and his counsel, C. Boyden
Gray, against the rollback of Section 504's regulations, "Kemp used
a conservative argument. Disabled people wanted independence,
Kemp told Bush. They wanted to get out of the welfare system and
into jobs." ' Bush found this argument (backed by significant
political mobilization in the disability community) persuasive, and
his Task Force on Regulatory Relief ultimately decided to make no
changes to the Section 504 regulations.217
By the time of the hearings on the ADA, the welfare reform
argument was a standard part of disability activists' repertoire. In
their testimony, those activists drew on that argument extensively.
Justin Dart, a disability activist and a wealthy Republican, testified
before the House Education and Labor Committee that "cost and
214. For a description of these events, see STEPHEN L. PERCY, DISABILITY, CIVIL RIGHTS,
AND PUBLIC POLICY: THE POLITICS OF IMPLEMENTATION 88-96 (1989).
215. See Evan J. Kemp, Jr., Aiding the Disabled: No Pity, Please, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1981,
at A19. For a discussion of the attack on the Jerry Lewis telethon, see SHAPIRO, supra note
9, at 20-24. For further discussion, see the three pieces on the telethon issue in the Ragged
Edge collection: Anne Finger, ... And the Greatest of These is Charity, in THE RAGGED EDGE:
THE DISABILITY EXPERIENCE FROM THE PAGES OF THE FIRST FIFTEEN YEARS OF THE DISABILITY
RAG 115 (Barrett Shaw ed., 1994) thereinafter RAGGED EDGE COLLECTION]; Mary Johnson,
A Test of Wills: Jerry Lewis, Jerry's Orphans, and the Telethon, in RAGGED EDGE COLLECTION,
supra, at 120; Julie Shaw Cole & Mary Johnson, Time to Grow Up, in RAGGED EDGE
COLLECTION, supra, at 131.
216. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 121. Edward Berkowitz described the events this way:
The handicapped rights movement leader Evan Kemp argued that their goals
and those of the Reagan administration were not dissimilar: Both accused big
government of stifling initiative; both believed in welfare only for the truly
needy; both denounced paternalistic government; and both were
.antibureaucratic." In short, both believed in independence.
EDWARD D. BERKOWITZ, DISABLED POLICY: AMERICA'S PROGRAMS FOR THE HANDICAPPED 222
(1987).
217. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 216, at 222-23; PERCY, supra note 214, at 95-96; SHAPIRO,
supra note 9, at 120-21. For Evan Kemp, the successful fight against the rollback of the
Section 504 regulations led to personal success as well. When Bush became president, he
appointed Kemp Chair of the EEOC.
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physical responsibility provide the strongest possible arguments for
the Americans With Disabilities Act."21' He continued:
ADA is an authentic issue for conservatives. It is the status quo
discrimination and segregation that are unaffordable, that are
preventing persons with disabilities from becoming self-reliant
and that are driving us inevitably toward the economic and
moral disasters of giant, paternalistic welfare bureaucracies.
Businesses, families, taxpayers, are already paying unaffordable
and rapidly escalating billions in public and private funds to
maintain ever increasing millions of potentially productive
Americans in unjust, unwanted dependency.219
In testimony before the Senate Labor Committee, Dart estimated
the net benefit of the ADA to the federal budget as "hundreds
of billions" of dollars.220 Testifying before the House Judiciary
Committee, James Brady-the former Reagan press secretary
paralyzed by John Hinckley's bullet-endorsed the views of
President Eisenhower, who had initially opposed a broad Social
Security Disability Insurance program:22' "Eisenhower warned us
that such programs increase the dependency of disabled people. He
urged instead that it would be far better if people with disabilities
became taxpayers and consumers and thus reduce the terrible costs
to society."222 "That conservative point of view," Brady testified, "is
218. House Select Educ. & Employment Hearings, supra note 204, at 57 (statement of
Justin Dart). Justin Dart, who recently passed away, provided profoundly important
leadership to the disability rights cause throughout his life. It is fair to say that his efforts
were crucial in the campaign to enact the ADA. Whatever my disagreements with the welfare
reform argument, I do not mean in any way to cast doubt or aspersions on the importance of
Dart's leadership and achievements.
219. Id. at 57-58 (statement of Justin Dart); see also Senate Labor Hearings, supra note
203, at 19-20 (statement of Justin Dart).
220. See Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 203, at 256 (statement of Justin Dart) ("The
appropriate question in regard to the economic impact of ADA is not 'how much will it cost?,'
or even 'how much will it save?,' but rather, 'how much will it profit the nation in the long
run?' the probable answer is, 'hundreds of billions.)).
221. See BERKOW1Tz, supra note 216, at 73 (discussing Eisenhower's opposition).
222. Americans with Disabilities Act: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
& Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 40 (1989)
[hereinafter House Judiciary Hearings] (statement of James Brady).
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embodied in the purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act
today."22
3
It might not be surprising that self-described conservative
Republicans would justify the ADA in these terms, but Dart and
Brady were hardly alone. Other individuals with disabilities also
testified about the demeaning nature of dependence on disability
benefits programs and the high dependency costs that society could
avoid by giving people with disabilities the opportunity to work
without discrimination.224
223. Id. (statement of James Brady).
224. Greg Fehribach testified:
At the age of 31, I will pay more tax per capita than 60 percent of Americans.
Because I have had an opportunity, I will not cost the taxpayers on the average
between $2,000 and $5,000 per month for my care and maintenance.
A.D.A. will give other disabled Americans an opportunity that I have already
had. A.D.A. will allow disabled Americans the privilege of paying income tax. It
will prevent them from using the welfare system for their care and maintenance.
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1989: Hearing on H.R. 2273 Before the Subcomm. on Select
Educ. of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 101st Cong. 8 (1989) (hereinafter House Select
Educ. Comm. Hearings] (statement of Greg Fehribach). Janna Shishler similarly testified:
My current position with the Federal Government has allowed me to become a
self-supporting, tax paying member of society.
I no longer receive a regular Social Security check or assistance for vocational
rehabilitation. My salary is sufficient to permit me to hire and pay the personal
attendant who assists me each morning.
I believe that I am not an exception to the rule. The majority of persons with
disabilities do not relish the thought of sitting day after day in a bedroom or
nursing home.
The expense of maintaining nursing care for the disabled may be drastically
reduced by implementing job training and opening access to employment for the
Americans With Disabilities Act.
Id. at 38 (statement of Janna Shishler). Laura Cooper noted in her testimony:
Aside from the human dignity and productivity benefits that will obtain from the
ADA, there will also be a direct financial benefit to the Federal Government and
to employers. In my case, when I was finally able to obtain permanent
employment, I no longer had to collect my monthly Social Security disability
payment, Medicare benefits or vocational rehabilitation funding.
Instead, I became a productive, taxpaying citizen and consumer, able to
support the domestic and medical and other bills I incurred, through salary and
benefits obtained on my job. Even though the Federal benefits I was receiving
before I became employed, were pretty minuscule compared to those received by
most persons with severe disabilities, only 4 years after going to work, I now
estimate that the net, direct and positive financial impact on the Federal
Government due to my employment alone is approximately $40,000 to $50,000
per year.
House Judiciary Hearings, supra note 222, at 153-54 (statement of Laura Cooper). And Amy
Dimsdale testified:
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Disability rights lawyers made the same points. Arguing on
behalf of the proposed statute's provisions that required accessible
public transportation-and tying the debate over the ADA to the
nation's then seemingly perpetual budget crisis-Timothy Cook
stated, "If we get people off of public assistance and paying taxes, it
unquestionably is going to bring down the deficit."22 Arlene
Mayerson tied the proposed statute's accommodation requirement
directly to the reduction of welfare dependency: "[Flor many
disabled people the willingness to accommodate can make the
difference between fruitful employment and welfare."226
Lex Frieden, a longtime disability rights activist who was then
serving as executive director of the renamed National Council on
Disability, summed up the welfare reform argument for the ADA.
After noting the $60 billion estimated annual cost of disability
benefits programs and observing that less than $3 billion of that
total was spent on programs to promote independence, Frieden
declared, "The purpose of this legislation is to change all that."227
Later in his testimony, Frieden reemphasized the point, "it is
exactly to cease the costly dependency of people with disabilities
that the Americans with Disabilities Act was conceived by the
National Council on Disability."22 Even advocates of civil rights
more generally, like the Reverend Jesse Jackson and Washington
civil rights institution Joseph Rauh, argued that the ADA would
save the nation money by moving people with disabilities from
welfare into the workforce.2 9
I feel useless, powerless, and demeaned. And I know I am not alone. Most of my
friends with handicaps experience the same exhausting process. It is enough to
make someone give up and accept lifelong dependency on benefits instead of
productive work. I know many educated, capable, and intelligent disabled people
who have given up in this way.
Discrimination hurts not only those with disabilities whose potentially
productive lives go wasted, but the rest of society as well, because everyone pays
the price for economic dependency.
I do want to work, like millions of my fellow disabled Americans want to work.
I am not asking for charity. I am asking for opportunity.
Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 203, at 29-30 (statement of Amy Dimsdale).
225. Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 203, at 171 (statement of Timothy Cook).
226. Id. at 337 (statement of Arlene Mayerson); see also House Small Bus. Hearings, supra
note 205, at 157.
227. Senate Labor Hearings, supra note 203, at 22 (statement of Lex Frieden).
228. Id. at 107 (statement of Lex Frieden).
229. See House Select Educ. & Employment Hearing, supra note 204, at 28 (statement of
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4. The Welfare Reform Argument on the House and Senate
Floors
After all the attention that the welfare reform argument received
in the hearings, the various committee reports that accompanied the
ADA to the House and Senate Floors predictably placed significant
reliance on it. The reports of both the Senate Labor and Human
Resources Committee and the House Education and Labor
Committee cited the National Council on Disability's $60-billion per
year figure and argued that "discrimination results in dependency
on social welfare programs that cost the taxpayers unnecessary
billions of dollars each year."20
When the ADA bill reached the floor, the debates contained
numerous invocations of the now-familiar argument that the
ADA would save the government money by moving people with
disabilities off the disability benefits rolls and into the workforce. As
he had in his statement on introducing the bill and throughout the
hearings, Senator Harkin again emphasized the $60 billion annual
cost of existing disability benefits programs."3' "The ADA," he said,
"will save the Government and society billions of dollars by getting
people off the dependency/social welfare rolls and into jobs, into
restaurants, into shopping centers and into community activities."2 2
Steny Hoyer, who had taken over as the bill's principal House
sponsor when Tony Coelho left Congress, emphasized the same
points, 3' as did other Democratic supporters of the bill in both the
Jesse Jackson) ("Ve spend $170 billion a year on disabled adults-too much of it is spent
maintaining dependency and activity.... When we open work places, we empower men and
women; we also save money.*); id. at 49 (statement of Joseph Rauh) ("In sum, the employment
provisions of the ADA reflect sound public policy, to allow persons with disabilities to
contribute their skills, to become taxpayers and not to force qualified people who want to work
and who can work onto the welfare rolls.*).
230. H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 2, at 43 (1990); see also S. REP. No. 101-116, at 16 (1989).
231. See 135 CONG. REc. 19,800, 19,803 (1989) (statements of Sen. Harkin).
232. Id. at 19,804 (statement of Sen. Harkin); see also id. at 8508 (statement of Sen.
Harkin) (repeating the $60 billion figure and stating that "the ADA will substantially reduce
the costs of dependency of individuals with disabilities").
233. Representative Hoyer stated:
But the costs of discrimination are tallied from both sides. By discrimination
against the disabled, we lose the productive talents and imaginations of millions
of able.disabled Americans. Our Nation spends almost $170 billion a year on
20031 969
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House234 and the Senate."5 Republican supporters of the bill also
urged attention to the ADA's promise as a means of saving money
by reducing dependency on disability benefits. This was true of both
moderates 6 and conservatives.237
maintaining the dependency of the disabled; more than $75 billion of that comes
directly from the Federal Government. Yet these people want to work.
136 CoNG. REc. 10,856 (1990) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
234. See id. at 11,438 (statement of Rep. Collins) ("By denying access to transportation, we
keep millions of disabled citizens out of the workforce and locked in a state of unwanted
dependency. That dependency costs our Nation $300 billion annually, and we can't afford it
any longer."); id. at 11,455 (statement of Rep. Wolpe) ("The forced dependency of our
increasing population of people with disabilities has resulted in escalating economic burdens
on Government, business, families, and taxpayers. It has been estimated that excluding 10
million citizens with disabilities from the workplace costs our society about $300 billion
annually."); id. at 10,874 (statement of Rep. Kleczka) ("Removing barriers to full participation
by disabled individuals in everyday life will create direct and tangible benefits for the
American economy. More disabled persons working increases earnings, lessens dependence
on the Social Security system, increases spending on consumer goods, and increases
revenues."); id. (statement of Rep. Hawkins) ("Today, there are millions of our fellow citizens
who have a disability. As a group, they suffer the highest rates of unemployment and the
highest rate of dependence on government services.").
235. See, e.g, 136 CONG. REC. 19,898 (1989) (statement of Sen. Simon) (arguing that the
"overwhelming costs of not enacting the ADA included [in]ore than $100 billion a year [that]
is being spent by Government to sustain people with disabilities in welfare situations"); id.
at 19,897 (statement of Sen. Kerry) ("Conversely, dependence resulting from limiting access
and opportunity, not only strips a measure of dignity from capable individuals, but in terms
of social services, lost wages, and wasted human potential, represents an enormous social and
economic cost."); id. at 10,795 (statement of Sen. Lieberman) ("Dependency and
nonproductivity is expensive. We are all better off if everyone who wants to work is able to
work."); id. at 19,893 (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Every year, we spend billions of dollars on
disability benefits for people who can and want to work, but can find no employment.... If we
remove barriers to work for the disabled, we can turn welfare payments into tax receipts.");
id. at 19,891 (statement of Sen. Riegle) (arguing that "the costs of not eradicating
discrimination will exceed those of complying with this act" because the "$60 billion per year
that the Federal Government now spends on dependency in the form of disability benefits and
programs will only escalate"); id. at 19,808 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (noting that the
Nation spent "$169.4 billion in dependent care expenditures for working age people with
disabilities," and arguing that under the ADA "people with disabilities will be independent,
rather than dependent members of our society); see also id. at 8517 (statement of Sen.
Simon); id. at 8518-19 (statement of Sen. Kerry).
236. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REC. 17,369 (1990) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) ("And we
cannot afford to pay welfare benefits to people who can work and who want to work but are
unable to because they are regarded as not being fit enough to work. The ADA will give people
with disabilities the level playing field they need to become a full member of society."); id. at
13,011 ("Frankly, the present and future costs of disability to the country without this
legislation would be much greater than any cost of this bill. Increased independence means
increased productivity and greater self-sufficiency.").
237. See, e.g., 135 CONG. REC. 19,890 (1989) (statement of Sen. Dole) ("The eradication of
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5. The Welfare Reform Argument in the Media
The foregoing discussion should make clear that the statutory
finding referred to by Judge Posner in Vande Zande was not simply
a throwaway. Even before the statute was introduced in Congress,
disability rights advocates and federal commissions were laying the
groundwork for the argument that comprehensive federal civil
rights legislation would save the federal government money by
moving people with disabilities off benefits rolls and into the
workforce. In the hearings and debates in Congress, the ADA's
supporters repeatedly emphasized the welfare reform argument.
One did not have to be a close follower of the congressional hearings
and debates, however, to detect the argument that the ADA would
save money by moving people off disability benefits rolls. In both the
national and the local media, news stories, editorials, and letters to
the editor all repeatedly invoked this welfare reform argument.
The coverage of the statute in the New York Times is typical. In
an editorial applauding the new statute on the day after President
Bush signed the ADA into law, the Times noted the following
"crucial" point about the costs and benefits of implementing the
statute: "The Federal Government now spends $57 billion every
year on benefits for the disabled. That figure will surely shrink if
the disabled have greater access to jobs."23' A year earlier, while the
ADA bill was pending on the Senate floor, the Times ran an op-ed
by James Brady entitled Save Money: Help the Disabled.239 In that
piece Brady argued, as he had in the congressional hearings, that
the ADA "could save taxpayers billions of dollars by outlawing
discrimination, putting disabled people on the job rolls and thereby
reducing Government disability payments."24 After the Senate
passed the legislation, the Times ran a letter to the editor written
by Tom Harkin headed How to Help the Disabled Pay Their Own
Way.24 Harkin concluded his letter with the following comment:
discrimination in employment against persons with disabilities will result in a stronger work
force and lessen dependency on the welfare system.").
238. A Law for Every American, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 1990, at A26.
239. James S. Brady, Save Money: Help the Disabled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1989, at A19.
240. Id.
241. Tom Harkin, Letter to the Editor, How to Help the Disabled Pay Their Own Way, N.Y.
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"For too long, taxpayers have been writing a blank check (last year's
was for $57 billion) to keep the disabled dependent, when clearly
they want to be contributing members of society. With the Senate's
strong approval of the bill, we all begin to get our money's worth."242
Nor was the Times' treatment of this point limited to the editorial
page. In two long news pieces in 1989-a front-page article in
August, shortly after the Senate Labor Committee had approved its
version of the bill,24' and a "week in review" article in December,
after ultimate passage of the law became "virtually certain"241_
Times reporters referred prominently to the ADA supporters'
argument that the statute would save money by reducing welfare
dependency.2"'
Other national newspapers and national wire services gave
similar prominence to the welfare reform argument. In October
1989, for example, during the Senate debate, the Wall Street
Journal ran a pro-ADA letter to the editor by then-Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh.' 6 The second paragraph of the letter, which
provided Thornburgh's major substantive reason for enacting the
statute, rested entirely on the welfare reform argument:
For too long federal policy has provided massive financial
resources for income-support programs to maintain individuals
with disabilities in a state of dependency. The new disability
legislation, on the other hand, will promote the independence of
people with disabilities to enable them to enter into the
mainstream of American life. By removing barriers to full
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1989, at A22.
242. Id.
243. See Susan F. Rasky, Bill Barring Bias Against Disabled Holds Wide Impact, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 14, 1989, at Al.
244. Jason DeParle,Realizing the Rights of the Disabled, N.Y.TIMIS, Dec. 17, 1989, § 4, at
1.
245. See id. ("In fact, [the ADA's] backers predict that it will make money. They say the
Government now spends $60 billion a year to help support disabled people, including some
eight million who want work but can't find it. The law will help transfer them from welfare
ledgers to tax rolls."); Rasky, supra note 243 (quoting Sen. Harkin as stating that "[the
economic benefits to society in terms of reductions to the deficit from getting people off
welfare, out of institutions and onto the tax rolls cannot be ignored"). In the DeParle article,
the dependency-cost argument appears in the third paragraph, as the major substantive
argument for passage of the bill. See DeParle, supra note 244.
246. Dick Thornburgh, Letter to the Editor, Toward Independence for the Disabled, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 6, 1989, at A13.
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participation by disabled individuals, the bill will have direct
and tangible benefits for the economy. The result will be more
disabled people working, increased earnings, less dependence on
the Social Security system, increased spending on consumer
goods and increased tax revenues."'
At roughly the same time, the Scripps-Howard News Service
distributed an op-ed by Senator Harkin, which ran in newspapers
across the country.2 That op-ed reiterated the welfare reform
arguments Harkin had made in the hearings, on the Senate floor,
and in his letter to the editor of the New York Times.249 Some
months later, after the measure passed the Senate, both the
Washington Post and USA Today ran op-ed pieces written by
individuals with disabilities that featured the welfare reform
argument.250 And throughout the two-year process during which
Congress considered the ADA, national wire services ran numerous
stories that highlighted arguments that the proposed statute would
reduce dependency on disability benefits programs and save the
government money.2 1
247. Id.
248. See, e.g., Tom Harkin, Editorial, It Won't Cost Us Much to Accommodate the Disabled,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 8, 1989, at A39, available at 1989 WL 6120388.
249. Id.
250. See Dale Brown, Editorial, Putting the Handicapped to Work, WASH. POST, Jan. 21,
1990, at B8 (" Discriminating against people with disabilities adds to the deficit. The United
States spends more than $60 billion a year, paying people to stay home."); Edward A.
Eckenhoff, Editorial, Law Can Provide Relief to the Disabled, USA TODAY, May 7, 1990, at
A10, available at 1990 WL 7562646 ('Most importantly, when people with disabilities are
employed, they pay into the system rather than having the system pay for them....
Economically, it will mean more people spending more money, which means more jobs and
income for everyone.").
251. See David Bauman, GANNETr NEWS SERV., Sept. 27, 1988 (reporting "[dlisabled
Americans[I descri[ptions of] their unwanted dependency on families, charity and social
welfare"); Enactment of Disabilities Act Nears, TULSA WORLD, Dec. 10, 1989, at B8, available
at 1989 WL 7345089 (referring to "the economic benefits of putting the disabled into the
economic mainstream," to the "8.2 million disabled Americans who wanted to work and were
unemployed in 1986," and to the "nearly $60 billion a year' price tag for disability benefits
payments); Robert Greene, Conservatives Question Impact Effect of Disability Legislation, AP,
Feb. 7, 1990, available at 1990 WL 5990441 ("{Evan] Kemp said more than 8 million disabled
Americans could be brought into the work force through the employment-protection provisions
of the law, saving the government $300 billion in welfare and other payments."); President
Signs Disabilities Act 2000 Cheer Long-Awaited Independence, L.A. DAILY NEWS, July 27,
1990, at N1, available at 1990 WL 5475017 (reporting on the ceremony in which President
Bush signed the ADA into law) ("Bush said taxpayers now spend almost $200 billion annually
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Local newspapers got into the act as well. Many ran editorials
and op-eds or letters to the editor (often written by people with
disabilities themselves) that urged passage of the ADA and relied
significantly on welfare reform arguments.252 A number of papers
to support Americans with disabilities-in effect, to keep them dependent. When given the
opportunity to be independent, they will move proudly into the economic (mainstream] of
American life.').
252. See, e.g., Yael Hana Bethiem, Editorial, A Little Help Sets Disabled Free, ARK.
GAZEIrE, Dec. 7, 1989, at 11B, available at 1989 WL 6917955.
[Elven now, there are roadblocks and disincentives to my working. Since it is
very cost-effective to assist me to work rather than to have me stay on disability
payments, the disincentives don't make sense....
... Rather than forcing disabled people to enter nursing homes or lead
restricted lives due to inaccessibility and lack of assistance, it makes sense to
support changes that allow people with disabilities to work.
Id.
The most compelling arguments relate to the toll exacted when 37 million people
with severe disabilities are denied access to the world around them. While the
human suffering can only be imagined, economists supply the financial bottom
line: In 1986, the country spent $169 billion for the working-age disabled
population. Regrettably, most of it was spent to subsidize inactivity.
Business and the Disabled, LOUISVILLE COURIER-J., Sept. 5, 1989, at 10A.; see also Dan
Casady, Editorial, Disabilities Bill is Civil Rights Move for the 1980s, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
June 25, 1989, at 2, available at 1989 WL 6609630 ("The economic benefits to society in terms
of reductions in the deficit from getting people off welfare, out of institutions, and on the tax
rolls cannot be ignored. This bill must be part of our strategy to get our nation's economic
house in order."); Editorial, Civil Rights for the Disabled, ARK. GAZETTE, Sept. 26, 1989, at B6,
available at 1989 WL 6909512.
Whatever the costs, society will benefit by inviting millions into fuller
participation in the economic life of the nation. Now, government spends $60
billion a year caring for the disabled. The unemployment rate among the
handicapped is 70 percent. By removing their second handicap-barriers and
discrimination in the workplace-millions will become productive, not
dependent.
Id.; Douglas Familaro, Letter to the Editor, IgnorantAttitude, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 21, 1990,
at 44, available at 1990 WL 4380940.
Millions of disabled people are presently unemployed and depend on the federal
government's disability checks which cost the U.S. taxpayers $60 billion to $100
billion a year. Half of employed disabled people earn $15,000 or less per year
because of their disabilities. The Americans with Disabilities Act will greatly
help to improve our economy by placing disabled people into decent jobs with
reasonable pay.
Id.; John R. Garrison, Letter to the Editor, DisabilitiesAct, CHI. TRiB., Jan. 15,1990, available
at 1990 WL 2935400 ("The long-term economic benefits of getting people with disabilities off
welfare rolls and into mainstream society outweigh those minimal costs."); James A.
McMahon, Editorial, Disabled Need Opportunity, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, May 4, 1990,
available at 1990 WL 5247771 ("These minimal costs are more than justified when you
consider the fact that $300 billion is spent annually to care for our disabled citizenry who are
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pursued a local angle on the story. These papers wrote pieces about
individual local residents with disabilities who urged passage of the
ADA so that they could escape dependency,2"' local events at which
disability rights activists spoke of the imperative to eliminate
dependency,' local studies delineating the fiscal benefits of
providing employment to people with disabilities, 5 and the
positions of local legislators who supported the ADA with welfare
reform arguments.25
In short, anyone who even casually followed the debate over the
proposed ADA legislation, whether in a national newspaper or in
the local papers, was likely to have been exposed to the welfare
reform argument. Although that argument was far from the only
substantive justification the statute's backers offered, and it may
not even have been the predominant one, it played a major role in
the public campaign to enact the ADA.
currently excluded from employment-that represents an average of $1,200 for every man,
woman and child.").
253. See, e.g., Pete Slover, Bill Favoring Disabled Workers Hailed, HoUs. CHRON., Aug. 29,
1989, available at 1989 WL 2754256 (discussing congressional testimony of Eric Reed, a local
resident with quadriplegia).
254. See, e.g., Wendy Diller, James Brady Calling on Corporate America Urges Hiring of
the Disabled, RECORD OF NOMRHERN N.J., May 17, 1989, at El, available at 1989 WL 5210410
(quoting James Brady's speech to workers at a local company) ("There are 8.2 million people
with disabilities who are working age and want to work. It is much more cost-effective to have
them employed as productive tax contributors and not tax consumers."); Olive Talley,
Disabled People Rally for Civil Rights, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, April 30, 1988, at 34A,
available at 1988 WL 5317870 (describing rally at Dallas' City Hall) ('We are not asking that
society support us, but we are demanding our right ... to participate in and support society,'
spokesman Justin Dart told the crowd as an interpreter signed for the deaf.").
255. See Myron S. Waldman, Rights Bill for 43 Million: After 4 Years of Talks, Act Nears
Last Hurdles, NEWSDAY, Mar. 5, 1990, at 5, available at 1990 WL 3320331 (discussing recent
survey "of 100 disabled workers hired by New York-area companies," which found that, in a
recent year, these workers paid about $400,000 in taxes while not collecting about $500,000
in government benefits they previously received).
256. Lori Baker, PHOENIX GAZETTE, Dec. 19, 1989, at Al (discussing local activists' and
legislators' positions on the proposed ADA and quoting then-Senator DeConcini as saying.
"[bly giving Americans with disabilities as much access to independence as we can-instead
of doling out checks and pushing them aside-we will bring far-reaching benefits to all
Americans"); David C. Beeder, Called 'Greatest Achievement' Harkin: Disabilities Bill Backed,
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 8, 1989, available at 1989 WL 3038067 (discussing Senator
Harkin's role as principal sponsor of the ADA and reporting that "[Harkin] said enactment
of the bill could reduce the $57 billion spent annually by the federal government on disability
benefits and dependency programs').
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B. The Welfare Reform Argument and the Courts
When the cases discussed in Part I are reconsidered in the light
of the welfare reform argument that provided such a significant
portion of the public justification for the ADA, they seem a great
deal more understandable. In this section, I hope to show how those
cases actually fit quite comfortably with the welfare reform
argument. If that is true, then it is much more difficult simply to
blame courts for imposing their own views on the statute and
disregarding the "true" purposes of the ADA. To the extent that the
current body of case law is problematic, the fault may lie as much
in the welfare reform argument that was so prominent in the efforts
to obtain passage of the statute. 7
1. Definition-of-Disability Cases
If the ADA is understood as a means of saving society money
by moving people off of disability benefits rolls and into the
workforce, on whom should the statute bestow its protections? One
obvious answer is that the statute should focus on protecting
those people who would be unable to work-and thus dependent on
public assistance-without antidiscrimination and accommodation
protection. On this view, the statute should not protect people who
otherwise have a good chance of finding employment, even if
discrimination and denial of accommodation deprives them of some
257. Although I did not discuss them in Part I because they have not been as significant
a focus of the academic critique of the Supreme Court's ADA jurisprudence, the welfare
reform argument also fits another pair of controversial ADA rulings: the holding in
Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 577-78 (1999), that employers of commercial
truck drivers may require all of those drivers to comply with the federal government's general
visual acuity standards even when the government has granted a particular driver a waiver
from those standards; and the holding in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S. Ct. 2045,
2051-53 (2002), that an employer may exclude an individual with a disability based on a
threat he poses to his own health, even if he poses no risk whatsoever to customers and
coworkers. (Full disclosure: I represented Echazabal in the Supreme Court.) Both of these
decisions can be criticized-the former because it creates a broad and unjustified exemption
from the reasonable accommodation principle, see Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 1504-05 n.101,
and the latter because it disregards a clear statutory purpose to override paternalistic
exclusions of people with disabilities. But both cases involved an apparent mismatch between
a particular employee and a particular type of job, rather than a disability that rendered the
plaintiff more broadly unemployable. Thus, under the welfare reform view, the ADA was not
necessary in those cases, and the Supreme Court not surprisingly ruled for the employers.
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opportunities they find very desirable. Sutton, Murphy, Toyota, and
the lower court cases that limit ADA coverage to "the truly disabled"
can be read as drawing a very similar line between those who could
find work without the ADA and those who need ADA protection to
avoid dependency on disability benefits programs. Indeed, some of
the most objectionable aspects of these cases seem to rely on this
very distinction.
Sutton stated that "[if jobs utilizing an individual's skills (but
perhaps not his or her unique talents) are available, one is not
precluded from a substantial class of jobs""' and hence has no
"disability" embraced by the ADA. 9 The Court further stated that
an individual cannot satisfy the "regarded as" portion of the
disability definition simply by "say[ing] that if the physical criteria
of a single employer were imputed to all similar employers one
would be regarded as substantially limited in the major life activity
of working only as a result of this imputation."260 These statements
make no sense if the goal of the ADA is to provide a socially
stigmatized group equal access to the workplace by affording
protection against prejudice and stereotypes. 261 If taken seriously,
these statements would shield the employer who harbors the most
extreme prejudices or acts on the most idiosyncratic stereotypes. An
employer who believes that all people with harelips are too mentally
impaired to operate computers,26 2 or who simply finds such people
unsightly, could put up a "No Harelips Need Apply" sign and defend
any lawsuit on the basis of the very extremism of his views. "Sure
I don't like harelips," the owner could say, "but I'm not telling
anybody else they can't hire them. Just let those people apply for
jobs where their kind will be accepted." Such a defense would never
be permitted under race or gender civil rights statutes, which aim
258. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999).
259. See id. at 491 (stating that the ADA definition of disability's "substantially limits"
prong is fulfilled if"at a minimum ... plaintiffs allege they are unable to work in a broad class
of jobs").
260. Id. at 493.
261. I have so argued, though I believe that these statements are properly characterized
as dicta. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 507-08, 515-17.
262. This "spread effect"-in which people readily assume that an impairment that affects
one body function is broadly disabling-is one of the most common forms of disability
prejudice. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 423-24.
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to provide equal access to the full range of opportunities in society,
but the Court's statements in Sutton would appear to allow it. 2"
If, however, the ADA is not seen as an equivalent to the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, but as an effort to reduce social costs by moving
people from disability benefits rolls into the workforce, then these
statements in Sutton seem less incongruous. "If jobs utilizing an
individual's skills (but perhaps not his or her unique talents) are
available,"264 then the ADA is not necessary for the plaintiff to avoid
dependency. She can stay off the disability benefits rolls by taking
one of the available jobs. ADA protection of such a plaintiff,
therefore, does nothing to reduce the $60 billion annual cost of
disability benefits programs to public budgets. Similarly, there is no
reason to impute one employer's exclusion to other employers,
because an individual will not be forced to the dependency rolls on
the basis of a single employer's misperceptions.
21
Krieger and Diller have criticized decisions like Sutton for
assuming that the ADA is simply another disability benefits
program and for applying to that statute the same criteria of
necessity' and moral worth that our political culture generally
requires for inclusion in such benefits programs.' When the ADA
is viewed as a disability benefits program, Diller has written, "the
case law has a certain coherence, although not the coherence
intended by the framers of the law."267 The foregoing discussion
suggests that Krieger and Diller's argument is misplaced. If courts
took seriously the welfare reform argument articulated by the
statute's framers and supporters in the campaign to enact the ADA,
263. Bonnie Tucker, as well as Arlene Mayerson and Matthew Diller, make this point. See
supra note 48 and accompanying text.
264. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492.
265. This point highlights a crucial problem with the welfare reform approach from the
standpoint of proper interpretation of the statute: The approach completely fails to account
for the "regarded as" prong of the statutory definition of "disability." My primary interest
here, however, is not in whether the welfare reform argument represents a correct
interpretation of the statute, but instead in whether it can provide a coherent principle that
describes the shape of the case law.
266. See Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 48-49; Krieger, supra note 8, at 516-17.
For excellent discussions of the necessity and moral worth criteria applied to disability
benefits programs, see DEBORAH A. STONE, THE DISABLED STATE (1984); Matthew Diller,
Entitlement and Exclusion: The Role of Disability in the Social Welfare System, 44 UCLA L.
REv. 361 (1996).
267. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 48.
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decisions like Sutton would not be justified simply on the ground
that the ADA is "just another benefits program" that had to be
limited to morally worthy recipients. Instead, such decisions
would be justified on the ground that the ADA is a regime
enacted specifically as a cost-saving alternative to existing benefits
programs. A welfare reform approach would treat the ADA as a way
of getting people out of benefits programs and into the workforce,
not as a way of getting job accommodations for people who would be
in the workplace regardless. Such an approach would adopt a
narrow interpretation of "disability," but not simply because of a
general societal view that disability benefits programs should be
kept within tightly cabined bounds. It would adopt a narrow
interpretation of disability to focus the statute on its target
population. Much of the case law challenged by ADA defenders fits
this model very well.
To be sure, the Supreme Court's definition-of-disability cases are
not explicit on this point.2 s Indeed, at least two aspects of the
Court's definition-of-disability jurisprudence suggest that the Court
has not had the welfare reform argument in mind in reaching the
outcomes it has. First, the Court has been quite reticent to hold that
working is a "major life activity" under the statute.269 Second, in the
268. Some of the welfare reform attitude, however, seems to lurk just below the surface in
some lower court cases, that both Diller and I have criticized, that pejoratively characterize
accommodation requests by people with relatively minor impairments as requests for a
"handout" or an unfair "competitive advantage." See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 470 & n.277
(quoting Roth v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 57 F.3d 1446, 1460 (7th Cir. 1995) (affirming denial
of relief to medical resident who sought to be excused from working long shifts as an
accommodation for his strabismus (crossed eyes) and explaining that the court would not
"allow[] an individual with marginal impairment to use disability laws as bargaining chips
to gain a competitive advantage")); Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 48 & n.170
(quoting Hileman v. City of Dallas, 115 F.3d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1997) ("We refuse to construe
the ... Act as a handout to those who are in fact capable of working in substantially similar
jobs.") (alteration in original) (footnote omitted)).
269. See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200 (2002) ("Because of the
conceptual difficulties inherent in the argument that working could be a major life activity,
we have been hesitant to hold as much, and we need not decide this difficult question today.");
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492. The Sutton Court reserved the question of whether "working" is a
major life activity but noted:
[T]here may be some conceptual difficulty in defining "major life activities" to
include work, for it seems "to argue in a circle to say that if one is excluded, for
instance, by reason of [an impairment, from working with others] ... then that
exclusion constitutes an impairment, when the question you're asking is,
whether the exclusion itself is by reason of handicap."
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Toyota case the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's attempt to tie the
major life activity of performing manual tasks'to tasks performed at
the workplace.270 The Toyota Court explained that the ADA's
definition of disability applies not only in employment dis-
crimination cases, but also in cases involving public transportation
and places of public accommodation. 271 This broad application, the
Court believed, "demonstrates that the definition is intended to
cover individuals with disabling impairments regardless of whether
the individuals have any connection to a workplace."272 In its words,
at least, the Court thus appears to reject the notion that statutory
coverage should be tied to the inability to work without accom-
modation.
But my point is not about the intentions of the Justices who joined
these opinions. It is about the pattern of the Court's holdings. If that
pattern fits the welfare reform argument for the ADA-as I have
argued that it does-then critics of the Court's decisions must do
more than simply assert that the Court has betrayed the statute's
promises. They must marshal a normative argument against the
welfare reform principle as a benchmark for understanding the
statute.
2. Judicial Estoppel Cases
If one sees the ADA as an alternative to disability benefits
programs, the judicial estoppel cases make sense as well-at least
in a general way. The welfare reform argument posits a choice
between benefits and ADA protection, and the plaintiffs in these
cases have made their choice. They have chosen dependency, and,
the argument would go, they should not get the benefits of
workplace accommodation as well. Although I have not discovered
any case that has explicitly made this point, the extreme animosity
some courts have shown to ADA plaintiffs who previously received
benefits seems clearly to reflect such a perspective.
One might find that perspective shortsighted and ultimately
counterproductive because it fails to address the reality of ADA
Id. (alterations in original).
270. See Toyota, 184 U.S. at 200-01.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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plaintiffs' situations. People apply for disability benefits because
they are in a desperate position. They want to find work, but they
need to eat in the interim. If application for and receipt of such
benefits operates as a waiver of the right to accommodations that
are necessary for reentry into the workforce, then the judicial
estoppel rule effectively turns short-term desperation into long-term
dependency. Moreover, the fear that judicial estoppel is necessary
to prevent people from "double-dipping" on regular employment and
the disability benefits system is overblown. To the extent that an
individual earns income by working, her disability benefits
payments decrease. Eventually, she will lose eligibility for those
benefits entirely. 3 It is, therefore, not fair to characterize people
who receive both workplace accommodations and disability benefits
as imposing a double burden on society.
These are powerful points, but if the goal is to reduce the social
costs of dependency on disability benefits programs they are not
ironclad. First, it is important to understand that the SSDI program
does not decrease benefits by a dollar for every dollar the recipient
earns at work. Rather, the recipient can work for a nine-month
"trial work period" and receive full SSDI benefits regardless of
earnings.27 For the next thirty-six months, the recipient will receive
disability benefits in any month in which her earnings fall below the
"substantial gainful activity" level.27 Additionally, for ninety-three
months (nearly eight years) after the trial work period the recipient
will continue to receive Medicare pursuant to the Ticket to Work
and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999.6 These benefits
were designed as work incentives, which may save the government
money by moving long-time disability insurance recipients into the
workforce. But when benefits are extended to people who have been
273. For elaboration of these points, see Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note
64, at 1044-45.
274. See 42 U.S.C. § 422(cX4) (2000); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1592(a) (2002).
275. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(bX2) (2002). This level is currently set by regulation at $700
per month. Id.
276. See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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only briefly unemployed,2 7 courts might reasonably think that they
simply provide a subsidy for work that would take place anyway.278
Moreover, students of disability benefits programs have arrived
at a consistent empirical finding: "[Dlisability benefit[s] recipients
only rarely return to work. 279 If that is right, then an effort to avoid
the social costs of dependency should focus on keeping people off of
the disability rolls in the first place. 2' To this end, the judicial
estoppel doctrine makes it costly for people-particularly those who
intend their stay on the disability rolls to be a short-term prelude to
a return to work-to receive disability benefits. If they accept such
benefits, then the judicial estoppel doctrine effectively makes
them give up the chance to go back to work with reasonable
277. In Barnhart v. Walton, 122 S. Ct. 1265 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the Social
Security Administration reasonably interpreted the Social Security Act to deny SSDI and SSI
benefits to an individual whose inability to perform substantial gainful activity lasted for less
than twelve months. Id. at 1270. Crucial, however, to the Court's decision, and the application
of the Social Security Administration regulation to which the Court deferred, was the fact that
the SSDI applicant had returned to work before the adjudication of his benefits application.
Id. at 1269-70. An individual can apply for SSDI benefits before twelve months have passed
since he has become unable to work. If the applicant has remained unemployed through the
time of the agency's determination of his application, and the agency determines, prior to the
end of the twelve-month period, that the inability to work "can be expected to last" for twelve
months, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1XA) (2000), then the applicant will be entitled to
benefits-including a "trial work" period after five months of unemployment. See id. § 422(c).
278. Cf Hilary Williamson Hoynes & Robert Moffitt, The Effectiveness of Financial Work
Incentives in Social Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income: Lessons
from Other Transfer Programs, in DISABILITY, WORK, AND CASH BENEFITS 189, 206 (Jerry L.
Mashaw et al. eds., 1996) (arguing that the effects of financial work incentives on the number
of participants in disability benefits programs are ambiguous). Hoynes and Moffitt specifically
argue that while such incentives encourage some people to leave the benefits rolls in order to
work, they encourage others to stay on the rolls in order to take advantage of the incentives,
and still others to enter the benefits rolls for similar reasons. Id.
279. Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1065; see also GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, SOCIAL SECURITY: DISABILITY PROGRAMS LAG IN PROMOTING RETURN TO WORK 1 (Mar.
1997) ("[Not more than 1 in 500 DI beneficiaries, and few SSI beneficiaries, have left the rolls
to return to work.').
280. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 279, at 19; Richard V. Burkhauser & Mary
C. Daly, Employment and Economic Well-Being Following the Onset of a Disability, in
DISABILITY, WORK, AND CASH BENErI'm, supra note 278, at 59, 77-86. For a tepid (at best)
defense of the ADA in precisely these terms, see Richard V. Burkhauser, Lessons From the
West German Approach to Disability Policy, in DISABILITY AND WORK: INCENTIVES, RIGHTS,
AND OPPORTUNITIES 85, 85 (Carolyn L. Weaver ed., 1991) ("Although I have a number of
reservations with the ADA, the law does have a positive attribute, which is that it seeks to
keep people who become work-impaired on the job; through its job accommodation mandate
it intervenes before these workers have left their jobs and become trapped in the disability
system.').
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accommodation. By making receipt of disability benefits more costly,
the doctrine thus provides an incentive for people to stay off the
benefits rolls. When viewed in the expost perspective of one who has
already elected to apply for disability benefits, such a rule may look
like it locks people into dependency. When viewed, however, from
the ex ante perspective of one who wants to work but is deciding
whether to go on the disability rolls for a short time, the judicial
estoppel rule may actually decrease dependency.
I do not mean to endorse these policy judgments. To my mind,
expansion of public subsidies for work by people with disabilities
would be a good thing, and it is not clear to me that people who need
disability benefits to survive will, or should, refuse to apply for them
out of a desire to preserve the right to get an ADA lawsuit past
summary judgment. It should nonetheless be clear from this
analysis that the judicial estoppel cases can be defended without
indulging the retrograde assumption that disability is "a medically
determined category that is inconsistent with work."' 1 Nor need
these cases be seen as treating the ADA as just another disability
benefits program, one that is unnecessary for people who "are
already being 'taken care of' by the social welfare system."2"2 Rather,
these cases can be seen as reflecting a view that accords with the
attitudes of many welfare reformers: Disability is entirely consistent
with work, work is to be preferred to receipt of disability benefits
programs, and people with disabilities should therefore be prodded
to make the choice to work.2" Although Diller does not appear to
appreciate the full significance of the welfare reform argument
in the effort to enact the ADA,2"' he does acknowledge that the
ADA's "philosophy that individuals with disabilities have a greater
potential to work than had been previously realized" can readily be
seen to justify "measures that serve as 'disincentives' to benefit
recipients."2" To the extent the judicial estoppel cases seek to
impose such disincentives, they need not be read as reflecting-and
281. Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1059.
282. Diller, Judicial Backlash, supra note 13, at 48.
283. See Burkhauser, supra note 280, at 85.
284. See supra note 182 and accompanying text Zdiscussing Diller's brief acknowledgement
that the welfare reform argument was asserted during congressional consideration of the
ADA).
285. Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1068-69.
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indeed are best read as rejecting-a model of the ADA as just
another benefits program and of disability as a medical status
incompatible with work.
3. Reasonable Accommodation Cases
Reasonable accommodation cases such as Vande ZandeM are of
course the easiest to understand in welfare reform terms. Vande
Zande is explicit on the point. Judge Posner's opinion for the
Seventh Circuit in that case directly ties its cost-benefit analysis of
reasonable accommodation to the statutory finding that "markets'
the Act as a cost saver.""' If the purpose of workplace accom-
modation is understood as moving people off disability benefits rolls
and into the workforce, the more objectionable aspects of the Vande
Zande opinion make sense. An accommodation that does more than
"enable the disabled worker to work in reasonable comfort"2 saves
society nothing in terms of dependency costs. Although it may
eliminate a stigmatic injury, such injuries have no effect on the
public budget and are therefore irrelevant from an welfare reform
perspective. Accordingly, from that perspective, any amount of
money spent on such an accommodation, no matter how small,
represents a deadweight societal loss.
I have previously argued that the ADA is best understood as an
effort to give a stigmatized, socially disadvantaged group the tools
to challenge that stigma and social disadvantage. The anti-stigma
project is thus central to the ADA as I would read it.289 But Davis
and Krieger overreach when they argue that Vande Zande
represents an instance of a judge ignoring the true principles
that underlie the ADA and instead imposing on the statute his
own understanding of disability, one totally foreign to the Act's
drafters.2' Judge Posner is, of course, a longtime advocate of cost-
benefit analysis in the law, and the welfare reform understanding
that underlies Vande Zande undoubtedly appealed to him for that
286. Vande Zande v. Wis. Dept of Admin., 44 F.3d 538 (7th Cir. 1995).
287. Id. at 543.
288. Id. at 546. 0
289. See Bagenstos, supra note 22, at 418-66.
290. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text (presenting Davis and Krieger's
arguments).
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reason. The discussion above, however, should make clear that this
understanding of the ADA was not foreign to the statute's
drafters.29' Rather, it was a crucial part of the argument made by
the statute's strongest supporters. Any criticism of cases like Vande
Zande-like any criticism of the definition-of-disability and judicial
estoppel cases discussed above-must take on the welfare reform
argument repeatedly propounded by disability rights supporters.
III. THE WELFARE REFORM ARGUMENT AND THE INDEPENDENT
LIVING MOVEMENT
If the restrictive decisions interpreting the ADA can be
understood as implementing the welfare reform argument that
formed such a significant part of the legislative case for the ADA,
the question remains: Where did that argument come from? One
obvious possibility might be that the welfare reform argument was
a purely opportunistic way of hoodwinking conservatives into
supporting a fundamentally radical law. As I will discuss below,
there is something to that suggestion: Disability rights advocates
increasingly relied on welfare reform arguments as the political
climate turned toward fiscal retrenchment and against extension of
civil rights policies in the late 1970s and the 1980s.292 There can be
little doubt that those advocates believed that their increasing
reliance on such arguments represented the most effective strategy
for appealing to the conservatives, neoconservatives, and neoliberals
who now held the balance of power in Washington.
But this is not simply a tale of activists trapped by their own
rhetoric. The welfare reform argument for the ADA was not simply
an opportunistic tool to obtain the support of newly-ascendant
conservatives in Washington. Rather, it derived from and drew
heavily on a movement indigenous to the disability community-a
movement that was a key staging ground for and that provided
important leadership to the broader disability rights movement.
That movement, the independent living movement, incorporated
several strands of thinking that were notable for their ambivalence
291. See discussion supra Part II.A.
292. See infra Part III.B.1.
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toward disability benefits programs.29 The welfare reform
arguments for the ADA picked up on and extended the criticisms of
benefits programs that were immanent in the ideology of many
(though not all) independent living advocates. To the extent that the
welfare reform argument has led to undesirably narrow inter-
pretations of the ADA, the problem may not lie solely with the
courts-or even with disability rights advocates' tactical choice to
use that argument to sell the ADA. The problem may instead lie
within a set of foundational ideas of the disability rights movement
itself. As I hope to show, the independent living movement reflects
a curious combination of libertarian and social democratic thought.
Where, as in the selling of the ADA, the libertarian aspects of
independent living thinking receive the lion's share of emphasis, the
result likely undermines the ability to achieve the goals virtually all
disability rights activists share.
In this Part, I elaborate that argument. Part III.A provides an
overview of the independent living movement, with a particular
focus on its origins and the ambivalence it expresses toward
disability benefits programs. In Part III.B, I argue that disability
rights activists increasingly adopted the idea of"independent living"
as what social movement theorists call a "collective action frame."
The welfare reform argument represented a particular, hardly
inevitable, instantiation of that frame, one that strongly resonated
with both conservative legislators and people with disabilities
themselves. Useful as it was for the emergent disability rights
movement, however, the move to the welfare-reform/independent-
living frame had a cost, which I discuss in Part III.C. Because
much of the agenda of the disability rights and independent living
movements can be readily characterized as a call for costly
redistribution and constant government intervention on behalf of
people with disabilities, a focus on avoiding dependency costs can be
used to delegitimize and undermine that agenda. That, I fear, is a
significant part of what has happened in the interpretation of the
ADA.
293. See Judith E. Heumann, Independent Living Movement: Organizing for an Active,
Disabled OldAge (1994), at http:/www~independentliving.org/toolsforpower/tools28.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2003).
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A. The Independent Living Movement
1. The Origins of the Independent Living Movement
Most knowledgeable observers trace the origins of the
independent living movement to the early 1970s.294 Around that
time, people with disabilities in a number of communities around
the country came together in local organizations known as
"independent living centers." The first independent living center,
the Center for Independent Living in Berkeley, California, began as
an organization of students with disabilities at the University of
California.29 The first of those students, Ed Roberts, was admitted
to the university in 1962. As a result of polio, contracted when he
was fourteen, Roberts used a wheelchair and spent substantial
amounts of time in an iron lung. Although the university initially
sought to revoke its acceptance of Roberts when it learned of his
disability, the institution relented after a doctor at the Cowell
Hospital, located on campus, proposed to house him on a floor of
that facility. Several other college-aged people with disabilities who
used wheelchairs learned of Roberts' arrangement and, in the next
few years, obtained admission to the university as well. Like
Roberts, these students were housed in the Cowell Hospital.
Perhaps owing to the political consciousness of the times,
particularly on the Berkeley campus, the students who resided at
Cowell Hospital began to see their situation in largely political
294. See, e.g., BERKOWITZ, supra note 216, at 197-207; JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHINGABouT
Us WITHOUT Us: DISABILITY OPPRESSION AND EMPOWERMENT 130-31 (1998); CHAVA WHLG
LEvY, A PEoPLE's HISTORY OF TEE INDEPENDENT LIVING MOVEMENT (Ctr. on Indep. Living, U.
of Kan., 1988), available at http:/www.independentliving.org/docs5/ILhistory.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2003); Gerben DeJong, Defining and Implementing the Independent Living
Concept, in INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE 4, 8 (Nancy M. Crewe &
Irving Kenneth Zola eds., 1983); SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 49-54; Steven E. Brown, Freedom
of Movement: Independent Living History and Philosophy (Inst. on Disability Culture, 2000),
at http:J/www.ilru.orglilnet/files/bookshelf/freedom/freedomindex.html (last visited Jan. 28,
2003).
295. The story of the Center for Independent Living has been frequently told. The
information in the remainder of this paragraph and the next two is taken from BERKOWITZ,
supra note 216, at 200-01; Levy, supra note 294; Edward V. Roberts, A History of the
Independent Living Movement: A Founder's Perspective, in PSYCHOSOCIAL INTERVENTIONS
WITH PHYSICALLY DISABLED PERSONS 231, 234-39 (Bruce W. Heller et al. eds., 1989); SHAPIRO,
supra note 9, at 44-58; Brown, supra note 294.
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terms.2 They organized a political group called the "Rolling Quads"
and urged the university to eliminate the architectural barriers that
prevented wheelchair users from moving freely about the campus.
They also organized a student-run class entitled "Strategies of
Independent Living." With a grant from the Federal Office of
Education, the Cowell residents launched the "Physically Disabled
Students' Program" (PDSP) in 1970. That organization, run by and
for students with disabilities, aimed to provide such students
with the services they would need to lead independent lives that
were integrated into the broader community. Services included
attendants to assist in dressing, personal hygiene, and other
activities of daily living, as well as prompt and reliable wheelchair
repair services-a necessity for wheelchair users who sought to live
in the community.
From the beginning, people with disabilities from both the
Berkeley student body and the broader community sought to
participate in the PDSP's services. The organizers of the program
soon decided to create a new organization that was designed to
serve the community at large. That organization, the Center for
Independent Living (CIL), was incorporated in 1972. The founders
of Berkeley's CIL sought to create an organization controlled by and
serving people with diverse disabilities, which would provide
"services that [people with disabilities could] control on their own
terms, and [would be] dedicated to independence and the tran-
scendence of other institutions."297 Moreover, instead of providing
care and maintenance of people with disabilities those services
would promote independence from medical and rehabilitation
institutions. Above all, the Center dedicated itself to the principle
of consumer control-the principle that people with disabilities
should control the services they receive.
At roughly the same time, independent living centers began to
spring up throughout the country. In 1972, the same year that
Berkeley's CIL was incorporated, disability activists in Houston
started a cooperative living project that was dedicated to the same
296. Berkowitz attributes some of the Cowell residents' political consciousness to the fact
that many of the people who worked at the hospital in positions as orderlies and the like were
conscientious objectors to the Vietnam War who were performing alternative service in lieu
of being drafted. See BERKOwrrz, supra note 216, at 200.
297. Id. at 201.
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basic principles.29 Other disability activists founded the Boston
Center for Independent Living in 1974.' Today, there are
approximately 400 independent living centers throughout the
United States. Although each center is different, as befits "a
profoundly local movement, bred of the specific needs of individual
communities as divergent as Berkeley and Columbus," °° most
independent living organizations subscribe to several fundamental
premises. "These premises include the notion that each individual
is different and unique; that people with disabilities are the most
knowledgeable experts about our own needs and issues; and that
programs serving disabled people should be designed to serve all
disability groups."s0 z As analyzed by Gerben DeJong, one of the
movement's most important chroniclers, the independent living
movement drew heavily on the civil rights, consumerism, self-help,
demedicalization, and deinstitutionalization movements of the
1970s for several basic ideas: that discrimination is what prevents
people with disabilities from achieving full integration into the
community, that people with disabilities rather than medical and
rehabilitation professionals should decide what services they receive
and how they receive them, and that people with disabilities should
have the opportunity to make their own decisions about their lives,
bearing whatever risks those decisions entail. 2
298. See Rita A. Varela, Changing Social Attitudes and Legislation Regarding Disability,
in INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 294, at 28, 43.
299. See id.
300. BERKOWrrZ, supra note 216, at 202; see also DeJong, supra note 294, at 8-9 (stating
that "[elach center offers its own unique blend of advocacy and consumer services"); Varela,
supra note 298, at 34 (stating that the "motif of local autonomy became a characteristic of the
independent living programs that emerged in Berkeley, Houston, and Boston" and arguing
that "[ilndependent living in America ... was never an orchestrated campaign" but was instead
.a movement").
301. Brown, supra note 294; see also Roberts, supra note 295, at 238-39 (describing basic
characteristics of independent living centers as: (1) demanding self-determination and control
by people with disabilities; (2) providing education to people with disabilities to improve their
self-image and to the public at large to demonstrate 'the potential of people with even the
most severe disabilities to live independent, productive lives with dignity and respect;" (3)
coordinating advocacy to fight discrimination- and promote participation of people with
disabilities in the community; and (4) providing services to all regardless of age or category
of disability).
302. DeJong, supra note 294, at 11-20; see also Peg Nosek et al., A Philosophical
Foundation for the Independent Living and Disability Rights Movements, ILRU 30-31
(Occasional Paper No. 1, 1982) (stating that the "element of administrative and policy control
by philosophically sophisticated disabled individuals" was "the most significant difference
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For a variety of reasons, the independent living movement
became a major driving force behind the broader disability rights
movement of the 1970s and 1980s. For one thing, "most of the early
disability rights leaders were identified with CILs."03 The Berkeley
Center for Independent Living, in particular, self-consciously
positioned itself to groom disability rights leaders."0' The Berkeley
CIL also organized the most significant protest of the early
disability rights movement-a twenty-eight-day sit-in in the San
Francisco office of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare to protest Secretary Joe Califano's refusal to sign the
regulations implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.30 5
Even after these early days, the independent living movement
continued to play a major role in the disability rights movement by
providing staging areas for disability activists in communities
throughout the country, a network through which those activists
could share information, and, perhaps most important, orga-
nizations with paid staff who could support disability rights
activities. 3° Given the significant institutional role of the inde-
pendent living movement in broader disability rights struggles, it
should hardly be surprising that "the philosophy of independent
between the true independent living program and the traditional rehabilitation institutions").
303. CHARLTON, supra note 294, at 132.
304. For example, leaders of the Berkeley CIL encouraged Judy Heumann, then a young
disability rights activist in New York, to move to Berkeley to attend graduate school and
become involved in the disability community there. See SHARON BARNARTr & RICHARD
SCOTCH, DISABILITY PROTESTS: CONTENTIOUS POLITIcs 1970-1999, at 61 (2001); SHAPIRO,
supra note 9, at 58. Heumann became a major national leader of the disability rights
movement and served in the Clinton Administration as Assistant Secretary of Education for
Special Education and Rehabilitative Services.
305. For a discussion that focuses on the role of the Berkeley CIL in the successful "sign
504" protest, see Roberta Ann Johnson, Mobilizing the Disabled, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS OF
THE SIXTIES AND SEVENTIES 82 (Jo Freeman ed., 1983). See Roberts, supra note 295, at 235
("It was no coincidence that the most effective sit-in occurred in the birthplace of the
independent living movement. Here, the coalition of people with varied disabilities was a
working reality, not a theory.").
306. See, e.g., BARNARTT & SCOTCH, supra note 304, at 60-61; BERKOWrTZ, supra note 216,
at 207; CHARLTON, supra note 294, at 132; Sharon Groch, Free Spaces: Creating Oppositional
Consciousness in the Disability Rights Movement, in OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS: THE
SUBJECTIVE ROOTS OF SOCIAL PROTEST 65, 87-93 (Jane Mansbridge & Aldon Morris eds,
2001); SCOTCH, supra note 189, at 178; Richard K. Scotch, Politics and Policy in the History
of the Disability Rights Movement, 67 MILBANK Q. 380, 394 (1989).
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living formed much of the basic philosophical underpinnings of the
larger [Disability Rights Movement] .. 307
2. The Independent Living Movement and the Nature of
"Independence"
At the heart of the independent living movement was the
sometimes ill-defined concept of "independence." Although partic-
ipants in the movement had a variety of understandings of what
would constitute "independence," many of the versions of that
concept elaborated by those participants reflected a good deal of
ambivalence toward public welfare benefits for people with
disabilities. The welfare reform case for the ADA drew directly-
though, I should make clear, not inevitably--on these "independent
living" critiques of the disability benefits system.
A major goal of the independent living movement was to redefine
the notion of "independence." Although the term might in our
society generally connote physical independence-the ability to
move about and perform tasks of daily life without assistance-
movement activists sought to define "independence" in terms of
agency, freedom from paternalistic institutions, and the ability to
live a full life in the community." s Independent living centers thus
307. CHARLTON, supra note 294, at 132; see also Johnson, supra note 305, at 90 ("The
development of an independent living philosophy was essential for birthing a social movement
of the disabled-not only because of its emphasis on pride and autonomy for the disabled but
because it took disabled people out of their isolation and brought them together in large
numbers."). In their extensive empirical analysis of disability protests, Barnartt and Scotch
start from the premise that civil rights and independent living represent distinct demands
and even distinct social movements. See BARNART r & SCOTCH, supra note 304, at 32-44. For
reasons discussed above, I think it clear that civil rights and independent living demands
represent intertwined strands of the same disability rights movement. Indeed, Barnartt and
Scotch themselves suggest that the messages of civil rights and independent living are
intertwined. They note:
People with impairments have to be seen as people who wish for, and can live
independent, fulfilling, and self-supporting lives. They have to become viewed
as people who constitute a minority group that has suffered from a lack of civil
rights in order for an extension of the frame of civil rights to be possible.
Id. at 35. In the end, Barnartt and Scotch appear to conclude that their empirical analysis
does not support their premise of two separate movements. Id. at 136 ("One hypothesis has
been that there are at least two social movements occurring concurrently in the disability
community, a disability rights movement and an independent living movement. But the
evidence for this claim is not strong.").
308. Ed Roberts, one of the founders of the independent living movement recalled:
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define "independence" in terms of the ability of people with
disabilities to make their own choices concerning how to live their
lives, what services to receive, and how and where to receive
them."°9 Even if people with disabilities need assistance in personal
hygiene, transportation, or other activities in order to live in the
community and make these choices, that need not compromise their
independence. Rather, independent living advocates believe that
such assistance actually promotes independence, so long as those
who provide the assistance are subject to the control and direction
of the individuals with disabilities who receive it. As one analyst put
it, the independent living movement treats independence as
consisting in "decisional" rather than "executional" autonomy.1 0
Independent living activists often tell personal stories about the
moment they came to understand that this "decisional" conception
of independence was the most important one. Elias Cohen relates a
particularly arresting story in this vein from one of the individuals
who pressed the welfare reform argument during the hearings to
consider the ADA, longtime activist Lex Frieden:1 1
When he left his parents' home after having had an accident
in which he suffered a spinal cord injury, his parents drove him
to an independent living center so that he could learn to live on
his own. When evening came, he sought an attendant to help
him get into bed. He wheeled along the hall and came to another
disabled chap and asked if somebody could help him get into bed.
The other fellow pointed to a man with long hair, wearing blue
jeans and a chambray shirt. Lex wheeled over to him and said,
"Will you help me go to bed?" The fellow said, "Sure! Where's
your room?" and Lex said, "Over there." The man just stood
The students in the DSP conceived the idea of "independent living," which to
them meant active participation in society-working, having a home, raising a
family, and generally sharing in the joys and responsibilities of community life.
Independent living meant freedom from isolation and institutionalization; it
meant the ability to choose where to live, how to live, and how to carry out the
activities of daily living that most able-bodied people take for granted. It meant
taking the responsibility for political action and charting a new way of life.
Roberts, supra note 295, at 237.
309. See, e.g., Nosek et a., supra note 302, at 3 ("Judy Heumann states, 'To us,
independence does not mean doing things physically alone. It means being able to make
independent decisions. It is a mind process not contingent upon a "normal" body.').
310. Elias A. Cohen, What is Independence?, GENERATIONS, Winter 1992, at 49.
311. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
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there and didn't do anything. Lex asked, "Would you come with
me and help me?" And the fellow accompanied him to the
room-and just stood there. "Would you lift me onto the bed?"
Lex asked, and the fellow said, "Sure," and he lifted him onto the
bed, but he didn't do anything. Lex said, "Would you please put
my feet up onto the bed?" and the fellow said, "Sure." Lex
thought the fellow was stupid and couldn't understand what was
going on. As he later told the story, Lex commented, "I had to
ask him to take off my shoes, take off my shirt. I thought, maybe
he isn't stupid, maybe he's stoned. But when I was in bed, in my
pajamas, I realized that was the first time I had undressed
myself since my accident."
312
For Frieden, then, the embrace of decisional independence was
psychologically empowering; it enabled him to "undress himself'
again, as he had before his accident.
Other independent living activists focus on a separate aspect
of their embrace of decisional independence-the realization that
they could open up additional time for productive activities in the
community once they stopped trying physically to perform all of the
tasks of daily living. Ed Roberts reports:
One of my therapists insisted that I learn to feed myself. Meals
took hours, and I was always exhausted when they were over. I
realized then that I could either use my time to feed myself or
have an attendant feed me, allowing me to spend the time saved
to go to school. I went to school.1s
As DeJong summarizes the lesson, "A person who can get dressed
in fifteen minutes with human assistance and then be off for a day
of work is more independent than the person who takes two hours
to dress and then remains homebound." 14
312. Cohen, supra note 310, at 49.
313. Roberts, supra note 295, at 234. Similarly, Irving Kenneth Zola recounts that he had
learned in rehabilitation "to push [him]self to the maximum of [his] physical capability,"
including to walk wherever he wanted to go, "[n]o matter that it took [him] five times as long
to get there, or that [hie slipped along the way, or that [he] arrived at (his] destination
cramped and exhausted." But those exhausting walks did not leave him "really independent."
Irving Kenneth Zola, Toward Independent Living: Goals and Dilemmas, in INDEPENDENT
LrVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 294, at 344, 345.
314. DeJong, supra note 294, at 24; see also Adrienne Asch, Disability, Bioethics, and
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Personal assistance compromises independence, in this view,
only when it requires that the individual with a disability subject
him or herself to the control and direction of the personal assistant,
a parent, or a welfare or rehabilitative bureaucracy. A substantial
portion of the business of independent living centers thus consists
of providing a clearinghouse to match individuals who wish to work
as personal assistants with individuals who need such assistance.
Importantly, it is the individual with a disability who retains control
over hiring, firing, terms and conditions of employment, as well as
the direction of the workday.3  In addition, much of the advocacy
agenda of the independent living movement revolves around efforts
to secure funding for consumer-controlled personal assistance.318
Such a position is not inherently antagonistic to the provision
of cash and in-kind benefits to people with disabilities. To the
contrary, so long as benefits are distributed in a way that leaves the
individual recipients with maximum control over their own lives
and gives them the greatest chance to live and work in the
community, such benefits can be seen as promoting, rather than
hindering, independence as the independent living movement
defines it. Independent living advocates have often viewed disability
benefits in precisely those terms.317
Human Rights, in HANDBOOK OF DISABIUTY STuDIEs 297, 313 (Gary L. Albrecht et al. eds.,
200 1) ("Disability rights adherents contend that independence need not be viewed in physical
terms; rather, self-direction, self-determination, and participation in decision making about
one's life are more genuine and authentic measures of desirable independence or, better,
interdependence."); Irving Kenneth Zola, Deueloping New Self-Images and Interdependence,
in INDEPENDENT LIvING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 294, at 49, 58 ("The
Independent Living Movement argues that it is more important for us to have full control over
our lives than over our bodies. We will give up doing some things for ourselves if we can
determine when and how they are to be done.").
315. See BERKowrrz, supra note 216, at 201 (describingthe operations of the BerkeleyCIL);
Varela, supra note 298, at 43 (listing attendant care as one service closely identified with
independent living centers).
316. For example, the National Council on Independent Living played a major role in
advocating for the Medicaid Community-based Attendant Services and Supports Act of 2001
(MiCASSA), S. 1298, 107th Cong. (2001), and predecessor bills that would expand federal
funding for personal assistance services. Cf Micassa Summary, at http/www.ncil.org/
micassa1298.htm (last visited Sept. 4, 2002) (providing bill summary and text, as well as
gathering bill supporter information).
317. See DeJong, supra note 294, at 12 ("[Dlisabled persons have become aware that benefit
rights are prerequisites to living in a community setting. Without income assistance benefits
or attendant care benefits, many disabled persons would be involuntarily confined to long-
term care facilities.").
994 [Vol. 44:921
THE ADA AS WELFARE REFORM
Acceptance of disability benefits has even been institutionalized
in the movement. Much of the work at independent living centers
involves efforts to give people with disabilities information and
other tools to advocate for the benefits to which they are entitled.318
Moreover, some independent living centers have been careful to
hold down the wages they pay to employees with disabilities, to
ensure that those individuals do not exceed the Social Security
Administration's "substantial gainful activity" threshold and accord-
ingly become ineligible for continued receipt of benefits.319
In that sense, the independent living movement had a strongly
social-democratic dimension-one that would lead to significant
support for existing disability benefits programs. But that element
coexisted with other sets of ideas that could easily lead to a strong
skepticism of disability benefits programs."' For one thing, many
independent living movement activists frequently identified welfare
and charity as prime impediments to independence. Such programs,
in the view of the more radical of these activists, "buy off" people
with disabilities by keeping them out of the community and out of
the workforce in exchange for guaranteed maintenance by the
state.321 In language that generally recalled the New Left critique
of welfare bureaucracies,322 these independent living activists
argued that disability benefits programs subordinate people with
disabilities, leaving them subject to the control of welfare agencies
and "helping professionals," and in an inferior status in society at
large.323 In a more libertarian vein, others emphasized that welfare
318. See Varela, supra note 298, at 43-44 (listing the provision of information on income
and benefits rights as a service closely identified with independent living centers).
319. See Roberts, supra note 295, at 237 ("Employees of the center earned only as much as
was allowed within the limitations of various disability benefits. They could not afford to take
full-time pay for full-time work because it would not make up for the loss of medical
benefits.").
320. See Cheryl Rogers, The Employment Dilemma for Disabled Persons, in IMAGES OF THE
DISABLED, DISABLING IMAGES 117, 120-21 (Alan Gartner & Tom Joe eds., 1987).
321. Id. at 120.
322. For an account of this critique, as absorbed by "welfare rights" advocates of the 1960s
and 1970s, see William H. Simon, The Invention and Reinvention of Welfare Rights, 44 MD.
L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1985).
323. See CHARLTON, supra note 294, at 93; Nosek et al., supra note 302, at 9-10. Consider
the bitterness of this description by four leaders of the independent living movement:
Aggressive programs of coercions and disincentives are used to force a majority
of disabled individuals into certain traditional, subservient roles: clowns; self-
centered, disability obsessed misfits; faithful subjects for weak, insecure mini-
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and disability benefits programs make people with disabilities
dependent on the state rather than on their own industry.324 Even
if some kinds of disability benefits programs might theoretically
avoid compromising the independence of benefits recipients, a vocal
group of independent living adherents harshly attacked the existing
institutions of the disability welfare state. Because those same
institutions remained in place when the ADA was under consid-
eration, there should be little wonder that independent living
activists' efforts to enact the new statute would dovetail with that
critique of the disability welfare system.
In addition, as the rhetoric of "independence" suggests, many
adherents to the independent living movement continually and
insistently urged an ethic of self-help and individual respon-
sibility.3 2 Individuals with disabilities, these adherents argued,
must take responsibility for their own lives and actions. 26 As Peg
monarchs; grateful recipients of the good deeds of ineffectual part-time saints;
smiling, modest, uncomplaining, thankful Uncle Toms with white canes; sweet
Aunt Patsys in wheelchairs--everyman's reliable inferiors, society's eternal
children.
Id. at9.
324. See Nosek et al., supra note 302, at 7 (describing benefits programs as "devoted to the
support of non-productive, often counter-productive dependence"); id. at 11 ("Continuation of
our present policy-involving massive, inefficient subsidies which support large segments of
the population in relatively idle dependency-threatens to destroy that dynamic, democratic
socioeconomic mechanism which has made possible a culture of unprecedented optimism,
opportunity and productivity.").
325. See CHARLTON, supra note 294, at 127 (arguing, as a veteran leader of the independent
living movement, that self-help and self-determination form the core principles of disability
rights); Zola, supra note 314, at 49 (describing the independent living movement as "but the
latest incarnation of an old theme in American life-the idea of self-help"). Foreign students
of the American disability movement have seen this point clearly. See Jerome E. Bickenbach,
Disability Human Rights, Law, and Policy, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note
314, at 565, 576 ("From the beginning of the movement, disability advocates in the United
States adopted and made their own the culture of individualism .... To reject stereotypes of
infirmity and childlike dependency, they believed it essential that people with disabilities
strive for independence and self-sufficiency."); Tom Shakespeare & Nick Watson, Making the
Difference: Disability, Politics, and Recognition, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra
note 314, at 546, 550 ("A large element of the movement in North America has stemmed from
consumerism and self-help; for example, in the independent living centers, this emphasis
plays a large part. This is a particularly American tradition of self-reliance and individual
rights.").
326. For example, Peg Nosek and her coauthors argue:
[T~he individual will benefit by adopting a working hypothesis that he is the
locus of the problem and the solution in the sense that he is, within the reality
of his conscious universe, the only one who can initiate change and perceive its
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Nosek, Yayoi Narita, and Justin and Yoshiko Dart put it, "[t]he
essence of independence-of human fulfillment-and the foundation
of equality is not the granting of rights and benefits by others, but
the establishment of self-discipline and self-reliance....""'
For individuals with disabilities to assume personal responsibility
for their lives, on this view, they must make choices and bear the
consequences of those choices. To DeJong, this "dignity of risk" is of
central importance: "The dignity of risk is the heart of the IL
movement. Without the possibility of failure, the disabled person
lacks true independence and the ultimate mark of humanity, the
right to choose for good or evil."' s Independent living activists urged
that the empowerment and flourishing of people with disabilities
would be best advanced by a regime in which people with dis-
abilities had the opportunity to develop their skills, test them in the
world, and succeed or fail according to their talents.
Emphasis on personal responsibility and the "dignity of risk"
could, of course, accord with the continued receipt of some forms of
public and personal assistance. Those kinds of assistance that
enable people with disabilities to leave segregated institutions and
their homes and enter the workforce are quite consistent with such
an emphasis. There is, however, an enormous tension between the
major disability benefits programs-which excuse people with
disabilities from the obligation to work and pay them a steady cash
benefit simply because they have a disability-and the notion that
individuals with disabilities should test their skills in the world and
results. Therefore, the individual can be said to bear a complete responsibility
for solving his own and society's problems.
Nosek et al., supra note 302, at 14 (emphasis omitted).
327. Id. at 22.
328. DeJong, supra note 294, at 20; see also CHARLTON, supra note 294, at 128 (stating that
the principles of self-help and self-determination "are not without risk:" "[t]hey tend to
promote a go-it-alone approach that would require people to actually take control of their
lives, an endeavor for which many people with disabilities are not prepared"); Varela, supra
note 298, at 44 (noting that when independent living movement leaders write about
independence "they stress choice, risk, and self-determination"); Zola, supra note 313, at 351-
53 (stressing the importance of risk-taking to fulfillment and independent living). A
"definition of independent living," circulated by the Independent Living Resource Utilization
Center (ILRU), states: "Independent living has to do with self-determination. It is having the
right and the opportunity to pursue a course of action. And, it is having the freedom to
fail-and to learn from one's failures, just as nondisabled people do." An American Definition
of Independent Living, at httpJ/www.independentliving.org/toolsforpower/tools8.html (last
visited Jan. 28, 2003).
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experience the "dignity of risk." DeJong, for example, has described
activists' views in a way that leaves very little room for traditional
benefits programs:
The IL movement rejects the behavioral expectations created
by both the sick role and its derivative, the impaired role,
asserting that the disabled do not want to be relieved of their
familial, occupational, and civic responsibilities in exchange for
childlike dependency. In fact, the movement considers any such
"relief" tantamount to denying the disabled both their right to
participate in the life of the community and their right to full
personhood.5 '
In this context, it is hardly surprising to hear leaders of the
independent living movement speak approvingly of such things as
moving "from a welfare mentality to one that has seen [people with
disabilities] become contributing, productive members of society." 30
It could not be accidental that independent living activists, who
challenged the existing disability welfare state as creating de-
pendency, adopted the same rhetoric of personal responsibility as
have the advocates of trimming back the welfare state more
generally.3" '
329. DeJong, supra note 294, at 18. British activists with disabilities beginning in the early
1970s took a similar view of disability benefits programs. See, e.g., MICHAEL OLIVER & COLIN
BARNES, DISABLED PEOPLE AND SOCIAL POLICY: FROM EXCLUSION TO INCLUSION 80 (1998)
(arguing that disability activists in the early 1970s began to understand "that a national
disability income might itself be exclusionary; if disabled people were to be provided with an
adequate income without working, there would be no need to include disabled people in the
labour market and in the workforce').
330. Roberts, supra note 295, at 239-40. Bickenbach similarly notes:
In this environment of individual rights and the rejection of paternalistic state
agencies, human rights advocates have tended to be highly suspicious of
entitlement programming, especially income support and welfare policies, and
have argued instead for economic self-sufficiency, usually in the form of
remunerative employment. The aim was to make people with disabilities
competitive in the open labor market and to give them a fair and equal
opportunity to get and keep a job.
Bickenbach, supra note 325, at 576.
331. "Personal responsibility" has long been a buzzword for welfare reformers, one given
pride of place in the title of the 1996 welfare reform bill, the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). On the focus on "responsibility" among welfare
reformers, see NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFORMATION OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT
SURRENDER OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 63-65 (2002).
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As the disability rights movement began its push for the ADA
in the late 1980s, an influential strand of "independent living"
thinking thus stood in an extremely tenuous relation with existing
disability benefits programs. With its attack on the dependency-
creating aspects of disability benefits programs, and its insistence
that prejudice and environmental barriers constituted the principal
obstacles to the full community participation of people with
disabilities, 32 that strand of independent living thinking contained
the seeds of the welfare reform argument for the ADA.
Indeed, for years several independent living activists had been
calling attention to the high public costs of disability benefits
programs and the need for people with disabilities to move off of
the disability benefits rolls and into the workforce. These activists,
speaking and writing largely for an audience of people with
disabilities rather than the broader political community, often made
precisely the same welfare reform arguments that would achieve
such prominence in the public campaign to enact the ADA. As early
as 1982, a group of movement leaders prepared a paper entitled A
Philosophical Foundation for the Independent Living and Disability
Rights Movements."3 That paper, which the Independent Living
Resource Utilization Project circulated to independent living centers
throughout the country, repeatedly invoked the welfare reform
argument in almost the same form it would take in the campaign to
enact the ADA. The paper drew attention to the high public cost of
dependence on disability benefits programs33' and argued that
society "cannot afford not to" end its policy of "massive, inefficient
subsidies which support large segments of the population in
relatively idle dependency .... 3' In so doing, the paper explicitly
opposed the independent living agenda to the 'give me' socialist"
view "that 'society' should and can provide certain benefits to
each human with no corresponding obligation on the part of the
332. See, e.g., DeJong, supra note 294, at 22 ("According to the IL paradigm ... the problem
resides in an environment that includes the rehabilitation process, the physical environment,
and the social control mechanisms of society-at-large.").
333. Nosek et al., supra note 302.
334. See id. at 7 (stating that disability benefits payments had "grown from $59.1 billion
in 1970 to an estimated $210 billion in 1980" and that "this situation, already a major factor
in public deficits and inflation, could become an uncontrollable socioeconomic disease").
335. Id. at 11.
2003] 999
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
individuals."338 In bringing together independent living activists'
critique of dependency-creating benefits programs and those activ-
ists' agenda for equal opportunity, the Philosophical Foundations
paper represents one of the first statements of the welfare reform
argument that would emerge so forcefully later in the decade.337
B. The Utility of Avoiding Dependency
The welfare reform argument for the ADA, then, did not come
from nowhere. It arose from a set of ideas, internal to the disability
rights movement, that represented one possible answer to the
question: What is independent living? But why did the leaders of the
campaign to enact the ADA choose to frame their arguments so
significantly in independent-living/welfare reform terms? Why focus
on "independence'--particularly the more libertarian conception of
"independence-and not just "equality" or "integration"?
During the last two decades, social movement scholars have
increasingly turned their attention to the process by which social
movements frame issues to mobilize constituents and achieve
collective goals. This literature draws on the idea of a "frame"
popularized among sociologists by Erving Goffman's 1974 book
Frame Analysis."S To Goffman, "frames" are the schemata of
interpretation that people use to make sense of their experiences,
and to answer the question "What is it that's going on here?" 9 As
Goffman argues, such frames inherently highlight some aspects of
a situation while making others effectively invisible or irrelevant,
at least temporarily.3" Much of his book is devoted to an analysis of
336. Id. at 44.
337. Notably, one of the authors of the Philosophical Foundations paper was Justin Dart,
who would later deploy the welfare reform argument to great effect in the congressional
hearings to consider the proposed ADA. See supra notes 218-20 and accompanying text.
338. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE
(1974). Goffman was quick to clarify that he did not invent the concept of the "frame." Id. at
7 (crediting the concept to many others, and specifically crediting the use of the term "frame"
to Gregory Bateson).
339. Id. at 8, 10-11; see also Rubin, supra note 23, at 17 ("A frame is a problem-solving
scheme that individuals employ to make sense of their environment. For social movement
scholars, frame analysis serves to explain how individuals develop shared perceptions that
serve as a basis for action, thus melding individual motivation with organizational
structures.").
340. See GOFFMAN, supra note 338, at 241-46 (discussing "out-of-frame activity").
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intentional efforts by individuals to manipulate and change the
frames that others will bring to bear on a particular slice (or, in
Goffman's word, "strip") of activity.341
Recent social movement theorists have applied the idea of a
"frame" to the activities of social movement actors. These theorists
tend not to engage directly with Goffman's analysis. Frequently
citing Goffman, however, they have argued that one significant
aspect of social movement activity is the creation and dissemination
of "collective action frames"-ways of interpreting the world that
encourage support for a movement's program among potential
adherents and other relevant audiences.3 4 Although these theorists
have been regrettably imprecise in defining what kind of collection
of ideas would constitute such a "frame,"' their analysis provides
341. See id. at 83-200, 378-438.
342. Sources I have found useful include: William A. Gamson, Constructing Social Protest,
in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CULTURE 85, 89-104 (Hank Johnston & Bert KIlandermans eds.,
1995) [hereinafter Gamson, Constructing Social Protest]; William A. Gamson, The Social
Psychology of Collective Action, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 53, 65-74 (Aldon
D. Morris & Carol McClurg Mueller eds., 1992) [hereinafter Gamson, The Social Psychology
of Collective Action]; Scott A. Hunt et al., Identity Fields: Framing Processes and the Social
Construction of Movement Identities, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: FROM IDEOLOGY TO
IDENTITY 185, 185-204 (Enrique Larafla et al. eds., 1994); Hank Johnston & Bert
Iandermans, The Cultural Analysis of Social Movements, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CULTURE, supra, at 3, 8-9; Bert Kiandermans, The Social Construction of Protest and
Multiorganizational Fields, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, supra, at 77, 80, 85-
94; Doug McAdam, Culture and Social Movements, in NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra at 36,
37-45; David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant
Mobilization, 1 IN'L SOC. MOVEMENT RES. 197 (1988) [hereinafter Snow & Benford, Ideology];
David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS IN
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, supra, at 133, 135-41; Sydney Tarrow, Mentalities, Political
Cultures, and Collective Action Frames: Constructing Meanings Through Action, in FRONTIERS
IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, supra, at 174,186-92; SIDNEY TARRow, POWER IN MOVEMENT:
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, COLLECTIVE ACTION AND POLITICS 118-34 (1994); Mayer N. Zald, Culture,
Ideology, and Strategic Framing, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:
PoLFIcAL OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS 261, 261-74
(Doug McAdam et al. eds., 1996); William A. Gamson, Political Discourse and Collective
Action, 1 INTL SOc. MOVEMENT RES. 219, 220-28 (1988) (hereinafter Gamson, Political
Discourse]. David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and
Movement Participation, 51 AM. SOC. REV. 464 (1986).
343. See Zald, supra note 342, at 261 ("ITihe notion of strategic framing is quite vague in
terms of its constitutent elements and general processes."). William Gamson refers to "issue
packages" as consisting of a core "frame" for interpreting events and "a number of different
condensing symbols that suggest the core frame and positions in shorthand, making it
possible to display the package as a whole with a deft metaphor, catch-phrase, or other
symbolic device." Gamson, Political Discourse, supra note 342, at 222. Many other scholars
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:921
important insight into the mobilizing role of ideas-shaped by the
movements themselves-in social movement activity.3 44 As these
scholars emphasize, collective action frames are consciously created
by social movement actors, but they do not arise spontaneously from
the minds of those actors. Rather, framing is an "act[] of cultural
appropriation."3 4 Successful collective action frames draw on the
existing political culture at the same time they seek to transform
it.3 4' And importantly, a social movement will rarely have any
single, uncontroverted collective action frame. Rather, the framing
process is itself a locus of intramovement contest. 47
In this section, I draw on the frame analysis literature of recent
social movement theory to explore why the welfare reform argu-
ments assumed such prominence in the campaign to enact the ADA.
I suggest that the adoption of an independent-living/welfare reform
frame served a number of purposes for disability rights leaders.
Most obviously, such a frame promised to resonate with mainstream
seem to use the term "frame" to encompass these "condensing symbols" as well. See, e.g.,
TARROW, supra note 342, at 122; Zald, supra note 342, at 262. Pamela Oliver and Hank
Johnston have recently criticized social movement scholars who take a framing perspective
for failing to take account of both the cognitive roots of framing processes and the role of
ideology in transmitting political ideas. See Pamela E. Oliver & Hank Johnston, What a Good
Idea! Ideologies and Frames in Social Movement Research, 5 MOBILIZATION 37 (2000).
344. In this, the "frame analysis" perspective represents a response to the widely endorsed
"resource mobilization theory" of social movement activity, which argues that the resources
available to potential social movements-and not the ideas they articulate-are the crucial
determinants of movement emergence and success. See, e.g., John D. McCarthy & Mayer N.
Zald, Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, 82 AM. J. Soc. 1212
(1977).
345. McAdam, supra note 342, at 37-38; see also Zald, supra note 342, at 266 ("Social
movements exist in a larger societal context. They draw on the cultural stock for images of
what is an injustice, for what is a violation of what ought to be.").
346. See Tarrow, supra note 342, at 189-92; see also TARROW, supra note 342, at 122 ("Out
of a cultural toolkit of possible symbols, movement entrepreneurs choose those that they hope
will mediate among the cultural underpinnings of the groups they appeal to, the sources of
official culture and the militants of their movements-and still reflect their own beliefs and
aspirations.").
347. See Gamson, Constructing Social Protest, supra note 342, at 89-90 ("Movements may
have internal battles over which particular frame will prevail or may offer several frames for
different constituencies."); William A. Gamson & David S. Meyer, Framing Political
Opportunity, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 342, at 275,
283 (" lit is comparatively rare that we can speak sensibly of the movement framing. It is
more useful to think of framing as an internal process of contention within movements with
different actors taking different positions."); Zald, supra note 342, at 270 (discussing intra-
movement contests over framing).
1002
THE ADA AS WELFARE REFORM
political leaders and the general public at a time of fiscal crisis and
increasing public impatience with the demands of minority groups.
Less obviously, but more interestingly, the adoption of such a frame
helped to mobilize people with disabilities to associate themselves
with and support a broad-based disability rights movement.
This argument is not of merely historical interest. If it is correct,
my argument suggests that the contention that courts have imposed
their own views on the ADA is even more problematic than I have
suggested above. To the extent that the courts have implemented
the welfare reform idea itself framed by influential participants in
the disability rights movement, they have implemented an idea
that played an important role in cementing together a disability
rights movement in the first place. If the welfare-reform/
independent-living frame also limits the prospects of the disability
rights movement, as I argue below in Part III.C., its importance to
the movement will nonetheless make it particularly difficult to get
beyond.
1. Resonance with Mainstream Politicians and the General
Public
Although social movement scholars have devoted their greatest
efforts to examining the power of collective action frames to
mobilize potential movement constituents, they have also noted the
importance of those frames in obtaining support from mainstream
political leaders and the broader public.3 The disability rights
movement's increasing reliance on an independent-living/welfare
reform frame throughout the 1980s clearly served this latter
function.
As I noted above, the concept of "independence," and the
particular focus on eliminating the costly dependence of people with
disabilities on public benefits programs, rose to prominence in
disability rights advocates' arguments in the early 1980s. Frank
Bowe's 1980 book, Rehabilitating America, presented the most
sustained version of the argument, and disability rights advocates
348. See, e.g., McAdam, supra note 342, at 37-38; Snow et al., supra note 342, at 465 n.2.
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relied heavily on that argument to fight then-Vice President Bush's
proposed rollback of the Section 504 regulations.3 49
In one of the leading articles on social movement framing
processes, David Snow and his colleagues argue that social
movements often follow a strategy of "frame extension'--an effort
to bring new constituents and grievances within an established and
successful collective action frame."0 One might therefore have
expected disability rights leaders to rely on a simple extension of the
civil rights frame that had been so successful in supporting the
expansion of the rights of racial minorities in the 1960s and of
women in the 1970s-and they certainly did to some extent. Sharon
Groch, for example, argues that the disability consciousness of early
disability rights/independent living leaders drew directly on the
"oppositional consciousness created by African Americans and
brought to the public's attention during the Black civil rights
movement of the 1950s and 1960s.""5' Sharon Barnartt and Richard
Scotch make a similar argument."5 2 These scholars are clearly
correct that disability rights/independent living leaders were
influenced by and drew from the civil rights frame, if in some
respects 3 3 their story is too pat.
As I have attempted to argue, however, the picture is more
complicated than Groch and Barnartt and Scotch suggest. I do not
deny that the civil rights frame has played an important role in the
disability rights movement. Social movements rarely can be said to
have a single frame; the act of framing is often very much contested
within the movement.354 But the deliberate decision by many
disability rights leaders to move beyond the civil rights frame and
toward a focus on welfare reform and independent living seems to
be particularly important to understanding the trajectory of that
movement.
349. See supra notes 212-17 and accompanying text.
350. See Snow et al., supra note 342, at 472.
351. Groch, supra note 306, at 88.
352. See BARNARrr & SCOTCH, supra note 304, at 18-20.
353. See Groch, supra note 306, at 90 (stating that Ed Roberts did not begin to see
disability as a civil rights issue until he spent time in 1974 teaching African-American
students and that, similarly, Judy Heumann 'crystallize[d] her oppositional consciousness"
when she tutored a group of African-American students while in college).
354. See supra note 347 and accompanying text.
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As the 1970s gave way to the 1980s, the civil rights frame
presented difficulties for the disability rights movement. A series of
developments during the 1970s-the implementation of school
busing in the North, the rise of disparate-impact theories of
discrimination, and the widening implementation of affirmative
action, to name the most obvious ones-all combined with a tight
economy to make civil rights policies increasingly controversial in
the public at large.35 Increasing opposition to the extension of civil
rights policies was a major factor in the election of Ronald Reagan
in 1980.
The agenda of disability rights leaders would extend the civil
rights frame even further in the same controversial direction.
Instead of simply seeking the elimination of invidious, intentional
discrimination, disability rights leaders demanded that individuals
with disabilities receive reasonable accommodations on the job
-accommodations to which nondisabled employees would not
necessarily be entitled.35 7 Disability rights leaders also demanded
elimination of architectural and transportation barriers to the full
integration of people with disabilities in the community. As the
extensive, harshly-fought battle for accessible public transportation
that began in the 1970s made clear, removal of such barriers could
be costly and would arouse the opposition of well-organized, well-
funded interests.358
At a time when deregulatory ideas were ascendant, and much of
the public was impatient with minority groups' claims for ever-
expanded entitlements in the name of civil rights, a simple
extension of the civil rights frame did not hold out substantial
355. For an excellent discussion that connects this point to broader difficulties faced by
liberals and the Democratic Party, see THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN
REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN PoLrrlcs 101-04, 122-29
(1991).
356. See id.
357. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 216, at 221 (noting backlash against accommodation
requirement); PERCY, supra note 214, at 73-75 (discussing controversy over accommodation
requirement).
358. On the controversy over the removal of architectural and transportation barriers
generally, see BERKOWITZ, supra note 216, at 217-22; PERCY, supra note 214, at 106-28;
SCOTCH, supra note 189, at 98-100. On the enormous controversy over accessible public
transportation, see BERKOWITZ, supra note 216, at 219-21; ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
INSTITTIrONAL DIsABILITY: THE SAGA OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY FOR THE DISABLED passim
(1986); PERCY, supra note 214, at 129-59.
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prospects of success.359 Indeed, the Reagan Administration made
clear from the very beginning the risks the new political currents
posed for disability rights advocates. As discussed above, the regu-
lations implementing Section 504 were among the first targets of
Vice President Bush's new Task Force on Regulatory Relief.3co To
combat these developments, disability rights advocates had to move
beyond the civil rights frame.
Disability rights leaders self-consciously aimed to solve these
problems by couching their demands in terms of the elimination of
dependency and the promotion of independence.36' Such a frame
359. See, e.g., JOHN D. SKRENTNY, THE Mfm'oRy RIGHTS REVOLUTION 265-75 (2002)
(arguing that the ease of the analogy between black civil rights and disability civil rights
accounted for the quiet passage of the nondiscrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973, but that the high costs of disability rights became obvious during the statute's
implementation in the 1970s and 1980s). Writing in 1987, Edward Berkowitz described the
differences between the disability rights movement and "earlier civil rights movements" as
"significant," and noted "The black civil rights movement a decade earlier had reduced the
cost of public accommodations in the South by reducing the need to have one facility for blacks
and another for whites." BERKOWITZ supra note 216, at 221. He continued:
To admit James Meredith's handicapped counterpart to a university would cost
money rather than save it. It would mean that the physical plant would need to
be expanded or modified, and it would require the university to pay the
administrative costs of complying with the federal regulations. Legal advisors
to the American Council of Education warned that Section 504 would produce
"sheaves of unread, unnecessary paper." Few people argued that way in
Meredith's case. In the intervening decade, however, inflation had driven the
cost of education to the point where major social initiatives, such as
accommodating the handicapped, were subjected to substantial criticism because
they were perceived to be costly.
Id. at 221-22 (footnote omitted). Barnartt and Scotch, who assert that the disability rights
movement merely extended the civil rights frame, acknowledge that the fact that "civil rights
for persons with disabilities might cost something" represented a major difference from the
goals of the African-American civil rights movement. BARNARTr & SCOTCH, supra note 304,
at 35. They argue, however, that the distinction required only a simple "modification" of the
civil rights frame. Id. at 35-36. To the contrary, I contend that this fact pushed toward
adoption of a substantially new frame.
360. See BERKOWrrZ, supra note 216, at 222-23; PERCY, supra note 180, at 88-96; SCOTCH,
supra note 189, at 170-71; SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 120-24.
361. See BERKOWITZ, supra note 216, at 222 (noting that the disability rights movement
"was increasing its political sophistication by learning how to temper and tailor its rhetoric");
id. ("In the past, leaders had spoken of entitlements and inherent rights. Now, with the
arrival of Reagan and George Bush, who led an important Task Force for Regulatory Relief,
the leaders stressed independence."); see also Gareth H. Williams, The Movement for
Independent Living: An Evaluation and Critique, 17 SOC. ScI. MED. 1003, 1005 (1983)
(arguing that the popularity of the independent living idea "is given strength by the way in
which it happens to fit in with the prevalent ideology of robust conservative individualism").
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enabled the movement to harness a related aspect of the
conservative politics of the early 1980s. When President Reagan
took office, he rode (and later fed) a wave of resentment of public
spending-particularly spending on welfare programs. 6  As
Reagan's large tax cut and defense buildup left the federal budget
in a seemingly perpetual state of deficit, the pressure on domestic
spending rose even more. In part due to the President's continuing
attacks on the subsidization of idleness and dependency, the
pressure on welfare spending was particularly intense. The Social
Security disability system did not escape these pressures. In
keeping with its welfare reform agenda, the Reagan Administration
sought very early to tighten eligibility for the Social Security
disability programs, though its efforts were ultimately thwarted by
Congress and the courts. 63
In this context, the value of the welfare-reform/independent-living
frame to disability rights leaders should be obvious. To achieve their
goals, disability rights leaders could almost endorse the wave of
fiscal conservatism and opposition to welfare programs. They could
say that people with disabilities do not want to be dependent on
disability benefits; "they simply want to work." Unlike a presen-
tation of disability rights laws as the logical next step in the
increasingly fragile expansion of civil rights protections, the
presentation of disability rights laws as a means of achieving
independence resonated strongly with the ascendant conservative
ethic of individualism, self-reliance, and fiscal restraint. As I noted
above, that presentation seemed to resonate with then-Vice
President Bush and his counsel C. Boyden Gray when Evan Kemp
used it to oppose the rollback of the Section 504 regulations.364 And
the ability of disability rights leaders successfully to frame the issue
as one of independence versus dependence likely accounts for the
Thus, I think that Jerome Bickenbach is wrong when he writes, "Without intending to,
American disability advocates sent messages that clearly resonated with the growth of
neoconservatism that went on to dominate the political landscape during the 1980s and
1990s." Bickenbach, supra note 325, at 576 (emphasis added). It seems to me the appeal to
neoconservatives was quite intentional.
362. See, e.g., EDSALL & EDSALL, supra note 355, at 129-31, 136, 148, 152-53.
363. For a discussion of this episode, see BERKOWIZ, supra note 216, at 124-51; SUSAN
GLUCK MEZEY, No LONGER DISABLED: THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL
SECURITY DISABILITY 76-87, 121-39, 147-68 (1988).
364. See SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 121.
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unusually large degree of support that the ADA drew from
legislators of the Republican party.3"
2. Resonance with People with Disabilities
But the welfare-reform/independent-living frame was not useful
as a way of obtaining external political support in a conservative
era. It was useful as well as a way of mobilizing support for the
disability rights movement among people with disabilities them-
selves. This is an extremely important point, for it demonstrates
that the adoption of the independent living frame was not simply a
strategic decision of a monolithic community, which could be judged
on its net utility in achieving the community's external goals.
Rather, adoption of that frame by disability rights leaders repre-
sented a very important step in creating the disability community
itself.
Students of the disability movement in America have consistently
noted a major obstacle to widespread mobilization of people with
disabilities: Historically, social institutions have divided people with
disabilities into separate categories and groups based on the
particular impairments they have. People with blindness, deafness,
mobility impairments, mental illness, and mental retardation
(and,. in more recent times, HIV) have each dealt with separate,
impairment-specific government programs, charitable institutions,
and lobbying organizations. This division into separate institutions
had an effect on the consciousness of individuals with disabilities,
who often did not perceive or acknowledge that they had anything
in common with people who had different impairments. The
365. There are of course other reasons for the surprisingly bipartisan support for the ADA.
The most notable of these are: (1) the "hidden army" phenomenon (i.e., the fact that many
legislators of both parties have disabilities themselves or have close family relationships with
people with disabilities), see SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 117-20; and (2) the opportunistic
alliance, beginning in the mid-1980s, between the disability rights movement and the anti-
abortion movement to oppose the practice of withholding medical treatment from newborns
with disabilities, see BERKOWrIZ, supra note 216, at 223. Still, the focus of disability rights
leaders on getting individuals off of the welfare rolls and into the workforce clearly resonated
with a number of participants in the process. Cf NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, EQUALITY OF
OPPORTUNITY, supra note 199, at 55 ("This fiscal conservatism was crucially important for
securing the later success of the ADA. It demonstrated that efforts to improve the lives of
persons with disabilities could coincide with fiscal restraint, and thus win the support of
skeptical members of Congress.").
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resulting fragmentation of the disability community diluted its
political strength and led to counterproductive struggles for
resources among different impairment-specific groups.3
When the modem American disability rights movement began in
the early 1970s, movement leaders believed that a significant part
of their task was to forge a collective identity of ."people with
disabilities" from this disparate collection of impairment-specific
identities. 67 In this, the disability rights movement was hardly
366. On the political and cultural fragmentation of people with disabilities into
impairment-specific groups, see GARY L. ALBRECHT, THE DISABILITY BUSINESS:
REHABILITATION IN AMERICA 281 (1992) ([P]ersons with disabilities, their parents, and friends
have constituted self-help groups around such conditions as colostomies, multiple sclerosis,
AIDS, and diabetes. These diverse groups, while sharing common interests, do not constitute
a united lobby. Rather they seek their own objectives, often competing with one another for
resources."); BARNARTr & SCOTCH, supra note 304, at 66 ("Because the self-interests of people
with impairments are potentially as different as the impairments themselves, mobilization
is difficult, perhaps more so than it was in the women's movement or the civil rights
movement."); JOHN B. CHRISTIANSEN & SHARON N. BARNARTT, DEAF PRESIDENT Now! THE
1988 REVOLUTION AT GALLAUDET UNIvERSITY 217 (1995) (stating that "[iln general, the
disability rights movement has been somewhat fragmented into groups representing different
disabilities" and that '[olne of the most glaring instances of this fragmentation is the fact that
the movement for deaf rights has not followed the same course as have other parts of the
disability rights movement"); SCOTCH, supra note 189, at 31-34 (describing proliferation of
impairment-specific disability organizations through the 1960s); SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 126
("The disability rights movement spanned a splintered universe. There are hundreds of
different disabilities, and each group tended to see its issues in relation to its specific
disability."); Groch, supra note 306, at 67 (arguing that this fragmentation has "hampered the
development of a broad-based oppositional consciousness among" different "subgroups of the
disability community"); Johnson, supra note 305, at 91 (arguing that the separation of people
with disabilities into impairment-specific "subcultures" "tended to prevent their wholesale
participation in and identification with a general disability movement"); Roberts, supra note
295, at 233 ("This [charity-based] approach has also specialized disabilities thereby leading
to a fragmentation of the disabled community and its supporters. (The charities devoted to
cerebral palsy have little common cause with charities devoted to the hearing impaired, for
example.)"); Scotch, supra note 306, at 382-85 (describing the fragmentation and dispersion
of people with disabilities); Zola, 8upra note 314, at 57 ("While organizing around specific
diseases may occasion great success in raising research monies, it has divided our strength
and caused one disease group to vie against another. This has led not only to
overspecialization of services but also to underdevelopment of our consciousness.").
367. See, e.g., ALBRECHT, supra note 366, at 282 (arguing that the disability "movement
will become more powerful if individuals transcend such specific identities as blindness or
spinal cord injury and generalize to the shared social position of all people with disabilities);
see also SIMI LINTON, CLAIMING DISABILITY: KNOWLEDGE AND IDENTITY 12 (1998) (claiming
that the disability movement has sought "to build a coalition of people with significant
impairments, people with behavioral or anatomical characteristics marked as deviant, and
people who have or are suspected of having conditions, such as AIDS or emotional illness, that
make them targets of discrimination").
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unique. Many scholars in recent years have emphasized the role of
the formation of collective identity in the activity of social
movements. Theorists who write about the so-called "new" social
movements have particularly emphasized this point. They argue
that the formation of collective identity Js an important goal-an
endpoint in itself-for such movements."'e Other scholars have
persuasively argued that the formation of collective identity is an
important task for all social movements-not necessarily as an end
in itself, but as a "strategic step" in achieving the movement's
broader social goals. 69 Writing specifically of "movements for the
liberation or integration of negatively privileged status groups,"
David Snow and his colleagues have argued that "the success of
their mobilization efforts ... rests in part on effecting changes in the
way their potential constituents view not only their life situation,
but also themselves."37 °
The frame of "independent living" offered a means of aiding the
effort to forge a collective identity of people with disabilities, for the
frame promised to resonate with a broad group of people with a wide
range of conditions. For one thing, the independent living frame
possessed what David Snow and Robert Benford have termed
"experiential commensurability:"3 7 ' It seemed to accord with the
experiences of a large number of people with diverse impairments.
The wheelchair users who left Cowell Hospital were not the only
ones who sought independence from medical and other professionals
368. See, e.g., ALBERTO MELUCCI, NOMADS OF THE PRESENT SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
INDIVIDUAL NEEDS IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 30-36 (1989); cf Eskridge, supra note 23,
(discussing interplay between law and identity-based social movements). Rubin contends that
this "emphasis on individual identity formation" is "the principal theme that distinguishes
the Continental approach [to social movement theory] from the resource mobilization
perspective of American scholarship." Rubin, supra note 23, at 41.
369. Gamson, Social Psychology of Collective Action, supra note 342, at 58-61; see also
Debra Friedman & Doug McAdam, Collective Identity and Activism: Networks, Choices, and
the Life of a Social Movement, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, saupra note 342,
at 156 (arguing that collective identity can serve as a form of selective incentive that
overcomes barriers to mobilization); Gamson, Constructing Social Protest, supra note 342, at
100-01; Hunt et al., supra note 342, at 185 ("[Ildentity constructions, whether intended or not,
are inherent in all social movement framing activities."); Klandermans, supra note 342, at 88-
89 (arguing that changes in understandings of collective identity alter potential movement
adherents' perceptions regarding the justice of existing arrangements and hence promote
mobilization).
370. Snow et al., supra note 342, at 475.
371. Snow & Benford, Ideology, supra note 342, at 208-09.
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who attempted to run their lives. Blind activists in organizations
like the National Federation of the Blind and the American Council
of the Blind also sought to escape dependence on rehabilitation
professionals and charities that controlled and limited their
opportunities. 72 People with mental retardation, confined to
congregate institutions throughout the country, organized the self-
advocacy group "People First" to seek freedom from insti-
tutionalization and the constant control of institution staff.37 3 People
with psychiatric disabilities, too, sought deinstitutionalization, and
many sought the establishment of consumer-controlled alternatives
to the physician-dominated mental health system.374 Even the
culturally Deaf, who used the capital "D" to indicate that they
considered themselves a linguistic minority rather than a group
of people with physical impairments, and whose embrace of
separatism sat uneasily with the movement's general aim of
integration, could get behind a program of "independence."75 For
they too sought to escape the control of professionals who thought
they knew what was best (in this case, professionals who forced
individuals with hearing impairments to struggle to speak orally
and read lips, rather than permitting them to speak sign
language). 376 Although there were many differences among these
groups, all sought to make their own decisions concerning their
lives, with all the risks that would entail. All sought freedom from
professionals and welfare bureaucracies that paternalistically made
372. See Groch, supra note 306, at 76-77; see also ROBERTA. SCoTr, THE MAKING OF BLIND
MEN 108-10 (1969) (describing"the independent blind"); FRED PELKA, THE DISABILrrY RIGHTS
MOVEMENT 216-17 (1997). Although the independent living frame surely had appeal for blind
activists, it has not been wholly successful in integrating adherents of the National
Federation of the Blind into the broader disability movement. See, e.g., Groch, supra note 306,
at 77 (describing Federationists' opposition to becoming a part of a "pan-disability
movement").
373. See SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 184-210.
374. See JUDY CHAMBERLIN, ON OUR OWN: PATIENT-CONTROLLED ALTERNATIVES TO THE
MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM (1978); see also DeJong, supra note 294, at 19 (noting that "Itlhe
trend to deinstitutionalization is one that cuts across many disabling conditions").
375. On divisions between the culturally Deaf and people with disabilities generally, see
BARNARTr& SCOTCH, supra note 304, at 49-51; Harlan Lane, Construction of Deafness, in THE
DISABILITY STUDIES READER 153, 154-68 (Lennard Davis ed., 1997).
376. See Lane, supra note 375, at 164 (arguing that beth "culturally Deaf people" and
"people with disabilities" seek "to promote their construction of their identity in competition
with the interested (and generally better funded) efforts of professionals to promote their
construction").
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decisions for them. All sought self-reliance rather than dependence
on the state or charity.3 "
Moreover, people with disabilities remain members of the broader
society. Ideas like independence and self-reliance have deep cultural
resonance in America. The founding of our nation took the form
of a declaration of independence, after all, and ideas of rugged
individualism are firmly embedded in our culture.' 8 People with a
wide range of impairments were likely to be moved by appeals to
such resonant cultural concepts. 79 In addition, the self-help and
demedicalization movements extended throughout the culture, to
people with no impairments at all as well as those with both minor
and major impairments.' Any constituent of these movements thus
became a potential constituent of the welfare-reform/independent-
living frame, regardless of whether she had an impairment that was
theretofore considered a "disability."
Finally, it is worth noting that not all people with disabilities
-even politically active people with disabilities-are liberal
Democrats or supporters of civil rights generally."s l The focus on
377. See, e.g., Jean Flatley McGuire, Organizing From Diversity in the Name of
Community: Lessons From the Disability Civil Rights Movement, 22 PoLY' STUD. J. 112, 119
(1994) ("The development of similar ideologies, and especially the evolution of self-
empowerment, further linked the various constituencies. People First and other consumer-
empowerment efforts organized within virtually every disability. The groups reflected ajointly
held commitment to autonomy and self-determination, although the expression of these ideals
varied considerably.*).
378. See, e.g., Nancy M. Crewe, Freedom for Disabled People: The Right to Choose, in
INDEPENDENT LIVING FOR PHYSICALLY DISABLED PEOPLE, supra note 294, at 357 (arguing that
the "very name of the Independent Living Movement" resonates with a concept of freedom
that is "dear to [the) heart and mythology" of our nation); see also Vicki Schultz, Life's Work,
100 COLuM. L. REV. 1881, 1886-87 (2000) ("Historically and theoretically, what we have called
for in citizens is the perceived capacity for Independence."').
379. See, e.g., Gamson, Political Discourse, supra note 342, at 227 (arguing that social
movement "packages" or frames are more potent when they resonate with broader cultural
themes); Snow & Benford, Ideology, supra note 342, at 210-11 (arguing that the power of a
frame to mobilize adherents depends to some extent on "narrative fidelity," i.e., "the degree
to which proffered framings resonate with cultural narrations, that is, with the stories, myths,
and folk tales that are part and parcel of one's cultural heritage").
380. On the wide penetration of these movements, see ALBRECHT, supra note 366, at 287;
DeJong, supra note 294, at 13-15.
381. See Andrew I. Batavia, Ideology and Independent Living: Will Conservatism Harm
People with Disabilities?, 549 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POLIT. & Soc. SC. 10, 11 (1997) (arguing that
"tt]he disability community is not the monolith that is often portrayed in policy debates" and
supporting that argument with Harris survey data showing "that, while 48 percent of people
with disabilities consider themselves Democrats, about as many--44 percent-say that they
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independence and self-reliance provided a way of appealing to the
more conservative people with disabilities without alienating those
who held more liberal orientations.
In short, the welfare-reform/independent-living frame served a
very useful internal purpose for the disability rights movement: It
helped to create the collective identity of "people with disabilities."
Not all people with disabilities experienced people cringing or
recoiling from them in public. (Think of people with hidden dis-
abilities like mental illness or HIV). Nor did all people with
disabilities experience discrimination in employment or trans-
portation. (Think of people with mental retardation confined in
institutions or many people with blindness). Nor did they all seek
full integration into the broader community. (Think of the culturally
Deaf). But people in all of these groups sought "independence" from
the control of professionals, welfare bureaucracies, and charity. And
people in all of these groups sought the opportunity to succeed or
fail according to their own choices.
C. The Limits of Welfare Reform
The welfare-reform/independent-living frame, then, has been
enormously useful for the disability rights movement. It has played
a crucial role both in generating external political support for the
movement's goals and even in creating a disability rights movement
in the first place. But that success has come with a cost. In Parts I
and II above, I argued that the welfare reform argument provides
ammunition for the substantial body of cases in which courts have
substantially limited the effect of the ADA. In this section, I want
to suggest that the restrictive case law under the ADA reflects a
more general problem with the welfare-reform/independent-living
frame: The frame works best in justifying interventions for those
people with disabilities who are already, in the words of the
National Council on the Handicapped report proposing the ADA,
"On The Threshold of Independence." 2 As many have remarked,
these are precisely the sort of people who created the independent
are not Democrats; 25 percent are Republicans; and 19 are Independents"). See generally
CHARLTiON, supra note 294, at 121-22 (describing diverse political orientations of disability
rights activists).
382. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON THE HANDICAPPED, supra note 196.
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living movement in the first place. 3 But the frame has trouble
justifying the kinds of interventions required by those people with
114disabilities who experience the most severe disadvantage.
1. The Broad Demands of the Independent Living Movement
There is an inherent tension in the use of welfare reform
arguments to serve the goals of the independent living and dis-
ability rights movements. Adherents claim to seek "independence,"
"self-reliance," and "self-help." But to obtain the "independence"
they seek they rely significantly on assistance from third parties.
This is true even if the demands of the disability rights movement
are characterized in the narrowest possible terms -as a demand for
protection from intentional discrimination against people with dis-
abilities in employment, public accommodations, and government
services. Even in that context, people with disabilities must depend
on others to achieve "independence," for they rely on courts (and
perhaps government enforcement agencies) to guarantee their right
to participate in community activities.
Of course, independent living and disability rights advocates
have not sought merely a traditional guarantee of "nondiscrimi-
nation." Rather, they have sought, and obtained, a guarantee that
383. Berkowitz has been most explicit on this point:
[Slome members of the handicapped community do not identify with the
independent living centers, which are geared toward people in wheelchairs or
those with spinal cord injuries, post-polio, cerebral palsy, muscular dystrophy,
and multiple sclerosis. "Almost every ... analyst agrees that there is a powerful
physical disability orientation," says Donald Galvin, a former director of a state
rehabilitation program. Roberts and Heumann have been accused of "living in
a white, middle-class dream world" that excludes the poor and the aged.
BERKOWrrz, supra note 216, at 206 (alteration in original); see also Williams, supra note 361,
at 1005 ("The core constituency of the independent living movement is young, male and fit'
as opposed to 'frail', whereas a major feature of the social reality of disablement is the elderly
female, lacking in robustness and living far from the supportive confines of university
campuses.").
384. I am hardly the first person sympathetic to the disability rights movement to note
difficulties with the ideas of independent living activists, though most critics have not come
from this country. See, e.g., Ravi Malhotra, The Politics of the Disability Rights Movements,
8 NEW POL. 65, 69 (2001) ("By limiting itself to accept the restrictions imposed by market
forces, [the independent living movement) therefore 1jndermined its own radical potential to
empower disabled people."); Shakespeare & Watson, supra note 325, at 550-51 (arguing that
the idea of independent living promises the least for poor and marginal individuals with
disabilities); Williams, supra note 361, at 1005.
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employers, public accommodations, and government services
afford people with disabilities reasonable accommodations.
Implementation of a reasonable accommodation regime adds an
additional layer of "dependence." People with disabilities depend on
employers and others to make (perhaps costly) changes in workplace
routines to facilitate their employment, and they depend on the
courts to ensure that employers make such changes.
And the demands of the disability rights movement do not stop
there. Disability activists-especially those prominently associated
with the independent living movement-demand publicly funded
personal assistance services, to enable individuals with disabilities
to live full lives in the community." They also demand publicly
financed health care for people with disabilities, to eliminate the
fear that going to work means losing health care benefits.3 As
Barnartt and Scotch's extensive empirical research demonstrates,
the plurality of disability protests in the last three decades have
asserted demands for state-provided services like these, rather than
demands for civil rights-and the proportion of service-related
demands increased in the 1990s."' Many of these protests involved
specific demands for state money.s 8
Programs such as personal assistance services and health care.
are, in fact, essential if people with disabilities are to enter the
workforce in substantially larger numbers and live full lives in the
community. But they are also expensive, potentially lifetime
entitlements. The program of the independent living movement thus
requires dependence not only on courts and employers, but also on
an expanded welfare state.
385. See, e.g., BARNARTr & SCOTCH, supra note 304, at 43 ("The independent living
movement is also making monetary demands. One demand is for federal or state support for
personal care attendants, in addition to, or instead of, such support for institutional care.");
SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 251-55 ("Personal assistance services are the new, top-of-the-agenda
issue for the disability rights movement.").
386. For discussion of disability rights advocates' increasing engagement with health care
issues, see Gerben DeJong & Ian Basnett, Disability and Health Policy: The Role of Markets
in the Delivery of Health Services, in HANDBOOK OF DISABILITY STUDIES, supra note 314, at
610, 614-17. On the importance of guaranteed health care to remove obstacles to employment
of people with disabilities, see Robert B. Friedland & Alison Evans, People with Disabilities:
Access to Health Care and Related Benefits, in DISABILITY, WoRK, AND CASH BENEFrrS, supra
note 278, passim.
387. See BARNARrr & SCOTCH, supra note 304, at 174-78.
388. Id. at 74, 150.
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2. The Limits of Cost-Benefit Arguments
None of this is to disparage these broader goals of the
independent living movement. I do, however, intend to suggest
that the effort to use welfare reform arguments to reframe
"independence" as being essentially coextensive with agency and
antipaternalism becomes increasingly strained as people with
disabilities must rely on more and more outside assistance to
achieve that "independence." At some point, the incongruity
between typical societal notions of independence and the type of
independence urged by the disability rights movement is likely to
render the welfare reform argument useless as a means of achieving
the movement's goals in the political community at large.8 9
We may have reached that point. To now, disability rights
activists have been able to manage the tension between the
independent-living/welfare-reform frame and the substance of their
demands by deploying cost-benefit arguments. That move is only
natural. When operating against a baseline of tens of billions of
dollars in annual welfare spending for people with disabilities, the
most obvious way of quantifying the amount of "dependency" is by
looking at bottom-line expenditure figures. Any move that decreases
those expenditures on net--even if it involves some up-front
cost-can easily be said to decrease dependency and therefore
increase independence. The up-front cost is easily understood as an
investment in independence, one that society will recoup down the
line. For example, virtually nobody argues that publicly funded
primary and secondary education, or publicly subsidized grants and
loans for higher education, foster "dependency" on the government.
As controversial as public education policy has been, the obviously
investment-like nature of education funding has made it un-
thinkable to raise a challenge on that ground.
389. Social movement theorists have recognized that such "semantic tension" can limit the
utility of a collective action frame. See, e.g., Snow & Benford, Ideology, supra note 342, at 210
(pointing to Clifford Geertz's analysis of the failure of labor unions to succeed in framing the
Taft-Hartley Act as a "slave labor law") (quoting CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF
CuLTURES 212 (1973) (O(Slemantic tension between the image of a conservative Congress
outlawing the closed shop and of the prison camps of Siberia was-apparently-too great.")).
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In the welfare reform case for the ADA, disability rights
activists relied heavily on the government-intervention-as-invest-
ment strategy.sg If people with disabilities can receive inexpensive
and simple accommodations from their employers, and thereby stop
drawing tens of billions of dollars in federal transfer payments for
idleness, who wouldn't say that people with disabilities have become
more "independent?" As recent empirical efforts to assess the impact
of the ADA suggest, however, the number of people who can be
drawn into the workforce by inexpensive and simple employer-
provided accommodations is likely to represent only a small fraction
of people with disabilities.
Two prominent empirical analyses of disability employment
trends following enactment of the ADA report negative findings.
Daron Acemoglu and Joshua Angrist report that implementation of
the ADA was associated with a decrease in the number of weeks
worked for both men and women with disabilities between ages
twenty-one and thirty-nine.391 Their analysis controls for a variety
of possible alternative explanations-including, importantly, the
expansion of public disability benefits programs that also occurred
in the 1990s, a trend that muted but did not erase their basic
negative findings.392 Focusing on employment rates rather than
weeks worked, Thomas DeLeire similarly found that a significant
decline in the employment rate for working-age men with dis-
abilities was associated with the enactment of the ADA.3 '3 The
authors of both papers take these results as evidence that the
accommodation and firing costs imposed by the ADA have, on
balance, led employers to hire fewer workers with disabilities.394 In
a recent article, Christine Jolls argues that findings like those
reported by Acemoglu/Angrist and DeLeire likely result from the
implementation of the ADA's accommodation mandate in a context
in which prohibitions on wage discrimination are effectively binding
but prohibitions on employment discrimination are not. 95
390. See discussion supra Part II.A.3.
391. See Daron Acemoglu & Joshua D. Angrist, Consequences of Employment Protection?
The Case of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 109 J. POL. ECON. 915, 931 (2001).
392. See id. at 938.
393. See Thomas DeLeire, The Wage and Employment Effects of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 35 J. HUM. RES. 691, 700-05 (2000).
394. See Acemogu & Angrist, supra note 391, at 924,950; DeLeire, supra note 393, at 711.
395. See Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 273-82 (2000).
20031 1017
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:921
The AcemoglulAngrist and DeLeire results are controversial, and
the studies have come under methodological attack."s And it is
surely too soon to conclude that the ADA has had or will inevitably
have a negative effect on the employment of people with disabilities.
The Acemoglu/Angrist and DeLeire studies examine trends through
1996 only, and Acemoglu and Angrist "note that the negative effects
of the ADA seem to peak in 1994 or 1995."s9' To the extent that
accommodations represent one-time costs (such as the installation
of a ramp), Acemoglu and Angrist acknowledge that the aggregate
disincentive to hire people with disabilities should decrease over
time.3 98 Accommodation costs should decrease over time in any
event, as employers develop a body of information and experience
regarding effective means of accommodating a range of disabilities
in a range of settings. And even if accommodations costs provide
and will continue to provide some disincentive to hire people with
disabilities, Jolls notes that more vigorous and sure enforcement of
the ADA at the hiring stage could effectively counterbalance that
disincentive. 99 Moreover, analyses like those of AcemoglulAngrist
396. See, e.g., Susan Schwochau & Peter David Blanck, The Economics of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, Part III: Does the ADA Disable the Disabled?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. &
LAB. L. 271,298-304 (2000); Michael Ashley Stein, Empirical Implications of Title 1, 85 IOWA
L. REV. 1671, 1679-80 (2000). One of the most significant aspects of this attack points to the
fact that Acemoglu/Angrist and DeLeire rely on data that uses a definition of disability that
does not track the definition used in the ADA. Schwochau & Blanck, supra, at 298-300. In
particular, those studies treat "disability" as being identical to self-reported "work disability,"
a term defined as a "health problem or disability which ... limits the kind [or] amount of
work." Id. at 299. In the most careful attempt so far to examine the degree to which the use
of different definitions of disability affects the findings regarding the employment effects of
the ADA, Douglas Kruse and Lisa Schur report that the ADA has had positive effects on
individuals with disabilities who do not report a "work disability." Douglas Kruse & Lisa
Schur, Employment of People with Disabilities Following the ADA, 41 INDUS. REL.(forthcoming
2003). The degree to which this finding undercuts the arguments of Acemoglu/Angrist,
DeLeire, and Jolls is unclear. To the extent that people identify themselves as having
disabilities, but not disabilities affecting the kind or amount of work they can do, they are
likely not to need or request accommodations; accommodation costs are thus unlikely to be
a major deterrent to hiring such individuals. Whether accommodation costs are deterring
employers from hiring people with disabilities who do need accommodations thus probably
cannot be answered on the basis of the Kruse/Schur analysis.
397. Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 391, at 940. This point is particularly important given
that Title I of the ADA was not fully implemented until July, 1994. See Stein, supra note 396,
at 1679.
398. See Acemoglu & Angrist, supra note 391, at 940.
399. See Jolls, supra note 395, at 281-82. Noting that the ratio of discharge cases to hiring
cases under the ADA has been about ten to one, Steven Willborn argues that the skew of ADA
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and DeLeire do not take account of possible increases in efforts
to enter the workforce that may result in future years from
full implementation of the provisions of ADA Titles II and III,
which increase educational opportunities, improve transportation,
and open up a range of community activities for people with
disabilities.'
But the fact that Acemoglu/Angrist and DeLeire have not finally
established that the ADA will have a net negative effect on the
employment of people with disabilities should not obscure a larger
point: The ADA has not (yet) had any significant positive effect on
the rate of employment of people with disabilities. Even as of the
year 2000, it is undeniable that the nonemployment rate for people
with disabilities remained extremely high: Only thirty-two percent
of working-age Americans with disabilities were employed, com-
pared with eighty-one percent of the comparable population without
disabilities."° This rate of nonemployment is roughly the same as
the rate that prevailed at the time that the ADA was enacted, and
it persisted during a period of remarkable economic prosperity. °2 If
the goal of the ADA is understood as moving people off of disability
benefits rolls and into the workforce, the statute is not working out
as an effective means of achieving that goal. '
3. The Limits of Antidiscrimination Law
It might be tempting to assume that the trend of restrictive
decisions by courts interpreting the ADA explains the continuing
low rate of employment among people with disabilities. Those
enforcement toward the discharge stage may have exacerbated the employment problem faced
by individuals with disabilities. See Steven L. Willborn, The Nonevoloution of Enforcement
under the ADA- Discharge Cases and the Hiring Problem, in EMPLOYMENT, DISABILITY, AND
THE AMERICANS wITH DISABiLITIS AcT 103, 111 (Peter David Blanck ed., 2000).
400. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, §§ 201-310, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 104 Stat.
327 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12189 (2000)).
401. NATIONAL ORG. ON DIsABILITY, 2000 N.O.DJHARRs SURVEY OF AMERICANS WITI
DISABIITIES 27 (2000).
402. See, e.g., Schwochau & Blanck, supra note 396, at 298-308 (2000); Stein, supra note
396, at 1680.
403. This outcome was predicted by Matthew Diller, who argued that the possibility of
using the ADA to move significant numbers of people with disabilities off of the disability
benefits rolls had been oversold. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at
1066-75.
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decisions have surely had some effect, but it is unlikely that
they represent the fundamental problem. The most pronounced
restrictive trend, after all, has been in the definition-of-disability
decisions, and those decisions fairly clearly target the statute's
protections precisely to those who need the ADA to get into or stay
in the workforce. 4 4 Rather, it seems likely that the ADA has not
significantly increased employment for people with disabilities,
because antidiscrimination law-as important as it is-is an
inherently limited tool in attempting to address deep structural
inequalities.
The limits of antidiscrimination law seem particularly salient in
the disability area. People with disabilities who are not working can
be thought of as generally falling into one of two categories: those
who once had gainful employment, but who became unable to work
in part because they developed disabilities or their pre-existing
disabilities grew worse; and those who, in part because of their
disabilities, never had any significant work experience. ' 5 For both
of these groups, lack of access to employer-provided medical care
may be a significant barrier to employment.' °
Although people whose disabilities caused them to leave work will
be able to obtain publicly financed medical care if they receive
disability benefits, the five-month waiting period for SSDI benefits
and the two-year waiting period for Medicare can create an
extended period of idleness.0 7 Most analysts agree that the longer
404. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
405. This division obviously leaves out those individuals with disabilities who experience
unemployment for reasons wholly unconnected to their disabilities. I do not mean to deny that
significant numbers of people exist in this category, but theirs is not a problem for a
specifically disability-oriented employment policy.
406. See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw & Virginia Reno, Overview, in DISABILITY, WORK, AND CASH
BENEFITS, supra note 278, at 1, 18 (arguing that the "substantial barriers" faced by people
with disabilities in "obtaining health care coverage in private markets" makes them "difficult
to hire and retain and increases their incentive to participate in public programs with
relatively comprehensive attachments for health care coverage"); SUSAN STEFAN, UNEQUAL
RIGHTs: DISCRIMINATION AGAiNsr PEOPLE wrrH MENTAL DiSABIUrIs AND THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT 78 (2001) (arguing that "much of the behavior of disabled people and
their potential employers is driven by concerns about the availability and cost of health care"
and that "[ml any more disabled people could work and many more employers would be willing
to hire them if this threshold issue were satisfactorily addressed"); see also DeJong & Basnett,
supra note 386, at 612-14 (describing healthcare needs of people with disabilities); Friedland
& Evans, supra note 386, at 357-72 (elaborating on that point).
407. See, e.g., Hoynes & Moffitt, supra note 278, at 203 ("[Eligibility requires that
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the period of idleness, the lower the chance that an individual with
a disability will return to the workforce.4 "e Accordingly, any effort to
increase employment among this group of people with disabilities
must focus on the provision of services to people who are already in
the workforce but at risk of falling out.' Some analysts even
propose eliminating the waiting periods for receiving benefits.1 °
And, of course, the government could significantly promote work
among this group through a broad expansion of publicly provided
health care.' 1'
For people with disabilities who never had any significant work
experience, the provisions of the Ticket to Work and Work
Incentives Improvement Act should help to alleviate the concern
with medical care. But individuals in this group often face
other significant barriers to employment, including the lack of
personal assistance services, assistive technology, and accessible
transportation." 2 Although civil rights laws remain exceptionally
important, they do very little for the person who needs assistance
with daily hygiene to leave the house but cannot earn enough to hire
recipients earn less than SGA during the application and waiting periods. This will act to
lower employment effort.").
408. See, e.g., Mashaw & Reno, supra note 406, at 11 ("[T]hose who are never forced to
sever their ties to the workforce completely have considerably better success in maintaining
their position in it."); see also Walter Y. Oi, Employment and Benefits for People with Diverse
Disabilities, in DISABILITY, WORK, AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 278, at 103, 121 ("Given
the high application costs and the SGA limits on earnings, a person who applies for DI
benefits seems to be making a commitment to a more or less permanent withdrawal from the
legal labor market.").
409. See GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 279, at 19; Burkhauser & Daly, supra note
280, at 77-86. The Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act includes a provision
that authorizes a demonstration project in which the Social Security Administration would
provide such early intervention, but it is too soon to tell how that project will play out. See
Bonnie O')ay & Monroe Berkowitz, Disability Benefit Programs: Can We Improve the Return-
to-Work Record?, in-HANDBOOK OF DISABUATY STUDIES, supra note 314, at 633, 637.
410. See, e.g., Oi, supra note 408, at 122.
411. See, e.g., Friedland & Evans, supra note 386, at 357 ("Health care reform proposals,
such as those debated by President Clinton and Congress in 1994, would have eliminated
many, but not all, impediments in the labor market related to health coverage. For most
people with disabilities, these changes would have meant considerable improvement."); id. at
373.84 (arguing that only relatively comprehensive health care reform can remove the
barriers that access to health care imposes on work for people with disabilities).
412. See NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ACHIEVING INDEPENDENCE 62, 68-69 (1996);
Andrew I. Batavia, Health Care, Personal Assistance and Assistiue Technology: Are In-Kind
Benefits Key to Independence or Dependence for People with Disabilities?, in DISABILITY, WORK,
AND CASH BENEFITS, supra note 278, at 398-407.
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a personal attendant.413 Fixing that problem-and others like
it-requires large and continuing public investment.
4. Avoiding Dependency and the Broader Independent Living
Agenda
If moving more people with disabilities into the workforce
requires expansion of social services spending for people with
disabilities, the loosening of restrictions on disability benefits, and
large public investments in personal assistance services, assistive
technology, and accessible transportation, then the welfare-
reform/independent-living frame will not be the means to that goal.
The three sets of cases discussed in Part I of this Article provide a
good example of the limitations imposed by the cost-benefit
arguments that are necessary to manage the semantic tensions
inherent in using a welfare reform frame to justify increased
government intervention. In the judicial estoppel cases, plaintiffs
seek to draw on disability benefits programs as they simultaneously
seek workplace accommodations. If the accommodation mandate is
supposed to be an investment in independence from disability
benefits programs, it may seem like a bad bargain when an
accommodation's recipient continues to draw on those programs.414
In reasonable accommodation cases like Vande Zande, plaintiffs
may readily be seen as seeking to increase their dependence by
demanding that courts require employers to provide them
accommodations that are unnecessary for workforce participation
and hence gratuitously costly.1 5 And the definition-of-disability
cases can be seen as a generalization of the Vande Zande situation:
Any accommodation in these cases is gratuitously expensive and
increases dependence, because the plaintiffs in these cases would be
413. Although not writing about disability specifically, Vicki Schultz has recently
recognized the inherent limitations of employment discrimination law as a tool for assuring
meaningful employment to all. See Schultz, supra note 378, at 1938 ('he employment
discrimination laws are not capable of generating the structural transformations necessary
to create the conditions in which work can provide equal citizenship for all."). Schultz argues:
"We must remake our laws-indeed, all our social institutions--to create a world in which
everyone has the right to participate in paid work, with all the social support that is necessary
to make that possible." Id.
414. See supra Part III.B.2.
415. See supra Part III.B.3.
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able to work-and hence remain off the disability benefits rolls-
without any assistance. l6
The cases discussed in Part I of this Article were interpretively
controversial. That is, there was and remains substantial dis-
agreement about whether they were even correct as a matter of
statutory interpretation. But the limitations imposed by the
welfare-reform/independent-living frame are perhaps even more
apparent in various readings of the statute that are almost
universally acknowledged to be interpretively correct. An example
is the ADA's "undue hardship" provision. By limiting the scope of
mandated accommodations to those that do not require "significant
difficulty or expense, 17 the statute plainly does not go as far as it
might in requiring accommodations that would enable people with
disabilities to enter and remain in the workforce. Similarly, both the
statute's legislative history and the EEOC's guidance to its
implementing regulations make clear that the "reasonable
accommodation" duty extends only to on-the-job accommodations
and not to "personal" items--even if those personal items are, like
personal assistance services, essential for an individual with a
disability to get to work in the first place. 18 To the extent that
scholars who defend the ADA have discussed these matters, they
have treated them as (at best unfortunate) compromises with the
ADA's basic principle of full participation." 9 If the foregoing
analysis is correct, however, those compromises may have been
essential to preserve the narrative coherence of the welfare-
reform/independent-living frame deployed by disability rights
leaders.
And most important, the constraining effects of the welfare-
reform/independent-living frame can be seen in areas of disability
policy that go beyond the ADA. In particular, such a frame makes
it difficult to justify disability policy initiatives that require
continuing, and not just transitional, public expenditures on
416. See supra Part III.B.1.
417. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10XA) (2000).
418. See 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630, App. § 1630.9 (2002) (citing House and Senate committee
reports).
419. See, e.g., Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and
Implications of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413,518-
22 (1991); Drimmer, supra note 182, at 1400-02.
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individuals with disabilities. Perhaps ironically, efforts to obtain
passage of federal legislation to pay for personal assistance
services-probably the most important legislative priority of the
independent living movement 2°-provide the best example here.
Although such legislation has been introduced in three successive
Congresses, it remains stalled, largely because of concerns
regarding the cost of a continuing federal entitlement to attendant
services.""1 Interestingly, Senator Harkin, a major sponsor of this
legislation, makes on its behalf the same cost-saving arguments he
made on behalf of the ADA.
422
Efforts to expand health care for workers with disabilities may
provide another example of this phenomenon. In 1999, Congress
enacted a sweeping bill to give people with disabilities an incentive
to work by extending Medicare coverage to workers with
disabilities-but even that historic legislation cuts off Medicare
after eight and a half years.' Obviously, the need for and difficulty
of obtaining insurance coverage for the health consequences of one's
disability can hardly be expected to be reduced over the course of
eight and a half years. 42' The failure to make health care coverage
420. See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S14641-42 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1999) (reprinting letters from
independent living and disability organizations stating that those organizations placed a high
priority on passage of pending personal assistance legislation).
421. I do not mean to suggest that costs provide the only reason for the difficulty in
enacting personal assistance legislation. The fact that attendant care, and resultant
deinstitutionalization, would come at the expense of nursing homes and public employee
unions-both powerful political actors-undoubtedly plays a role as well. But the ability of
these actors to use disability rights activists' own frame of independence is obviously of help
to them. Cf. Gwyneth I. Williams & Rhys H. Williams, "All We Want is Equality": Rhetorical
Framing in the Fathers' Rights Movement, in IMAGES OF IsSUES: TYPIFYING CONTEMPORARY
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 191passim (Joel Best ed., 2d ed. 1995) (describing the utility to the fathers'
rights movement of appropriating the frame of liberal feminism).
422. Compare the following discussion of attendant care legislation to Senator Harkin's
efforts to sell the ADA:
A lot of people say this will cost money. Actually, it will save money. Medicaid
spendingon long-term care in 1997 totaled $56 billion, butonly $13.5 billion was
spent on home and community-based services. That $13.5 billion paid for the
care of almost 2 million people. In contrast, the $42.5 billion we spent on
institutional care paid for just a little over 1 million people.
146 CONG. REC. S7640 (daily ed. July 26, 2000) (statement of Sen. Harkin).
423. See Ticket to Work and Work Incentives Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-
170, 113 Stat. 1860 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
424. See, e.g., Burkhauser & Daly, supra note 280, at 76 ("Once one has a disability, it is
relatively rare to experience a health recovery.").
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for workers with disabilities permanent reflects a desire to
characterize such coverage as merely transitional.
Similarly, the passage of the ADA has led many policy analysts
to urge a substantial scaling-back of the Social Security disability
program. These analysts say we should subsidize independence,
not dependence.4 25 Legal scholars such as Matthew Diller have
argued that such proposals represent an opportunistic appro-
priation of the rhetoric used to pass the ADA by conservatives who
favor retrenchment of welfare programs generally.' 26 In Diller's
words, such proposals may represent nothing more than the use of
"a new vocabulary for pre-existing hostility to the disability benefit
programs."' 27 But I think it is implicit in Diller's broader account
that such proposals are not merely opportunistic. To a significant
degree, the welfare-reform/independent-living frame necessarily
undermines the legitimacy of continuing disability benefits in-
definitely.
These limitations imposed by the welfare-reform/independent-
living frame are significant, and they have the greatest impact on
the most vulnerable individuals with disabilities. They also make
the independent living frame a particularly unlikely candidate for
obtaining enactment of programs that would meaningfully reduce
the shockingly high nonemployment rate among people with
disabilities. Such programs would require massive, ongoing public
investments. Worthwhile as such programs are, they press the
tensions inherent in the welfare-reform/independent-living frame
425. For a very recent example, see O'Day & Berkowitz, supra note 409, at 639-40 (arguing
that the 1996 welfare reform law provides a proper model for reforming the Social Security
disability system). See also Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1069-70
(collecting other similar proposals by prominent disability policy analysts).
426. See Diller, Dissonant Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1068-70; see also
Christopher G. Bell, The Americans with Disabilities Act, Mental Disability, and Work, in
MENTAL DISORDER, WORK DISABILITY, AND THE LAw 203, 217-18 (Richard J. Bonnie & John
Monahan eds., 1997) (arguing that the ADA will lead the public to think that people with
disabilities are now all able to work, and that this will create pressure to tighten eligibility
for disability benefits programs); cf Michael Ashley Stein, Employing People with Disabilities:
Some Cautionary Thoughts for a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, in EMPLOYMENT,
DIsABILTY, AND THE AMmRIncANs wIH DISABHMT S ACT, supra note 399, at 51, 56 (arguing
that "as more tangible (and thus superficial) barriers to integration are ameliorated, the
disabled will be open to the same criticisms currently leveled at blacks, which ascribe
enduring inequities to self-inflicted culpabilities").
427. Diller, Dissonant, Disability Policies, supra note 64, at 1069.
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to the breaking point. If disability rights activists are to obtain
these reforms, I submit, they cannot use the same playbook that
successfully brought them the ADA.
CONCLUSION
Many critics argue that the courts, in issuing rulings that take a
restrictive view of the ADA's protections, are substituting their own
views of the statute's purposes for the statute's true purposes.42 8 In
this Article, I hope to have shown that matters are more
complicated than that. Many of the rulings that disability rights
advocates find most indefensible can be readily explained as
implementing a statutory purpose of avoiding dependency on public
benefits programs. As I have attempted to show, a wide range of
proponents of the ADA strongly pressed the goal of avoiding such
dependency during the period in which Congress considered the
statute, and that goal formed a major part of the statute's public
justification. Although I, too, disagree with many of the restrictive
rulings that courts have issued when interpreting the ADA, I
cannot agree that those rulings disregard the true purposes of the
statute. They simply emphasize one purpose offered by the ADA's
proponents at the expense of other such purposes.
This point connects, I have argued, to a deeper tension within the
ideas of disability rights and independent living advocates. The
independent living movement has argued for "independence" from
government welfare programs at the same time as it has sought
additional government programs to support that "independence."
Although the movement's emphasis on avoiding dependency pointed
in the same direction as its agenda of programmatic expansion
during the efforts to sell the ADA, those two aspects of independent
living thinking are likely to operate at cross-purposes when the
movement turns (as it has) to seeking meaningful solutions to the
problem of persistent unemployment among people with disabilities.
To the extent that the independent living movement continues to
seek to resolve this tension in favor of welfare reform arguments, as
it did in the campaign to enact the ADA, that movement may
428. See supra notes 5-13 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 44:9211026
20031 THE ADA AS WELFARE REFORM 1027
effectively disable itself from achieving its broader programmatic
goals.
